JUDGMENT

A.S.ANAND, CJI.

(1) ON the allegations that during the check period from 11.05.1977 to 31.03.1984, the appellant, who, at the relevant time, was serving as a superintendent of police, had acquired assets disproportionate to his known source of income, first information report was lodged on 18.06.1986 by the superintendent of police, Western Range, Vigilance and Anti Corruption, Madras alleging commission of offence under sections 5(1 )(d) and (e) read with section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The appellant, after the prosecution obtained requisite sanction, was sent up for trial. Charges were framed and evidence was led. The learned IVth additional special judge, Madras, on appreciation of evidence, both documentary and oral, vide judgment dated 09.07.1990, acquitted the appellant of all the charges by a detailed judgment. Aggrieved by the order of acquittal recorded by the learned IVth additional special judge, the state filed an appeal against the acquittal of appellant before the High Court of Madras. By an order dated 24.12.1998, the High Court accepted the appeal of the state and reversed the order of acquittal of the appellant. The appellant was convicted for offences under section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 read with section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 5, 000/- and in default to undergo further simple imprisonment for a period of three months.

(2) BY special leave, the appellant is before us.

(3) WE have heard learned counsel for the parties and carefully examined the judgment of the High Court. In paragraph 7 of the judgment, the High Court has found "flaw" in the framing of charge by the learned special judge under section 5(1) (e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (hereinafter 1947 Act). According to the High Court, the 1947 Act had been repealed by the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter 1988 Act) which came into force with effect from 09.09.1988. According to the High Court, since charge was framed after 09.09.1988, though, with re gard to offence allegedly committed by the appellant during the check period 1977- 1984, the appellant should have been charged under section 13(1)(e) read with section 13(2) of the 1988 Act and not under section 5(1 )(e) of the 1947 Act. Relying on section 13 of the 1988 Act, the High Court opined that the appellant shall be deemed to have been charged for offences under section 13(1)(e) read with section 13(2) of the 1988 Act and the framing of charge by the trial court under section 5(1 )(e) read with section 5(2) of the 1947 Act, was invalid.

(4) THE High Court, thereafter, analysed the evidence of the record de novo and observing that the lower court had not properly appreciated vital circumstances of the case went on to hold:

"Hence, on an analysis, I am satisfied that the prosecution has proved satisfactorily that the accused was in possession of assets during the check period, disproportionate to the known source of his income, and this in fact has not been received from lawful source and that the receipt has not been intimated in accordance with the provisions of law and thus, the accused has committed criminal misconduct and acquisition of such disproportionate income is attributable only to corrupt practice and therefore, the accused is guilty under section 13(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and is liable to be punished for the same under section 13(2) of the said Act."

(5) A perusal of the judgment of the High Court reveals that High Court has failed to deal with various reasons given by the trial court in support of an order of acquittal. It is apparent from the terms and tenor of the impugned judgment that High Court was influenced by the phraseology of section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act, which , except for the explanation as added to that section