2007 Supreme(SC) 853

2007(4) Supreme 646
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Bombay High Court)
Dr. Arijit Pasayat & Lokeshwar Singh Panta, JJ.
Mr. C. Gupta — Petitioner
versus
Glaxo Smithklin Pharmaceutical Limited
— Respondent
Appeal (civil) 6543-6544 of 2004
Decided on : 25-05-2007

IMPORTANT POINTS
Although it has been held that an amendment would be prospective, if it is deemed to have come with effect on a particular day, a provision in the amendment Act to the effect that amendment would become operative in the future, would have similar effect.
Entirely new category of persons who are doing “operational” work was introduced first time in the definition of workman and the words “skilled” and “unskilled” were made independent categories unlinked to the word “manual”, but with prospective effect.

Headnote:Interpretation of Statute – For determining the nature of amendment, the question is whether it affects the legal rights of individual workers in the context that if they fall within the definition then they would be entitled to claim several benefits conferred by the Act – The amendment should be also one which would touch upon their substantive rights – Unless there is a clear provision to the effect that it is retrospective or such retrospectivity can be implied by necessary implication or intendment, it must be held to be prospective – Although it has been held that an amendment would be prospective, if it is deemed to have come with effect on a particular day, a provision in the amendment Act to the effect that amendment would become operative in the future, would have similar effect. (Para 23)

       AIR 1990 SC 1849 – Relied upon.

       (1976) 3 SCC 71; (2005) 3 SCC 232 – Referred to.

       Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – Section 2(s) – Entirely new category of persons who are doing “operational” work was introduced first time in the definition of workman and the words “skilled” and “unskilled” were made independent categories unlinked to the word “manual” – Further, the definition of workman as amended must be presumed to be prospective. (Para 23 and 24)

       Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – Section 2(s) – When the workman is dismissed, it is usually contended that the relevant conditions precedent for retrenchment under Section 25-N having not been followed and that, therefore, the termination is illegal whereupon the employer shall be visited b y punishments as provided in Section 25-N – However the employer is required to follow the condition mentioned in Section 25-N only in respect of a workman who is then within the definition of Section 2(s) of the Act – If the employee so dismissed, later becomes a person who is a workman within an expanded definition brought about by a subsequent amendment held to be of retrospective nature, the employer will be rendered punishable for an offence under Section 25 N and Q – As this would amount to the employer being punishable for an offence, which he could not have envisaged on the date of dismissal, this would be violative of Article 20(1) of the Constitution – Hence the amendment must be held to be prospective in nature. (Para 25)

       (1970) 3 SCC 378 – Relied upon.

       Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – Section 2(s) – While deciding the status of the person, nature of work is really relevant – Looking to the nature of functions discharged by the appellant he cannot be categorised as ‘workman’ – Therefore, the orders of the High Court do not suffer from any infirmity to warrant interference. (Paras 27 and 28)

       (2001) 7 SCC 394; (2007) 1 SCC 491 – Relied upon.

       Facts of the case :

       On 4.8.1976 Glaxo Laboratories (India) Ltd., which has now been taken over by the present respondent no.1 (Glaxo-SmithKline Pharmaceuticals Ltd.) indicated their intention to advertise the post of “Industrial Relations Executive”. Since members of the staff who fell in the category of “Management Staff Grade-III” were also entitled to apply for the vacant post which fell in “Management Staff Grade-II”, an advance staff notice was also taken out by the Company.

       On 17.3.1977 the Company issued a letter offering an appointment to the appellant as “Industrial Relations Executive”. This letter mentioned that the appellant would be a member of the Management Staff in Grade II-A and that the appointment would take effect from the date of the appellant joining the company, which was required to be earlier than 18.6.1977. Though the terms and conditions of appointment were contained in this appointment letter, the exact nature of duties and functions to be performed were not laid down therein.

       In pursuance of the appointment letter, the appellant joined services of the Company on 13.7.1977. On 15.9.1982, vide a termination letter dated 15.9.1982, the services of the appellant came to be terminated from the close of business on that day. The said termination was made in pursuance of clause17 of the letter of appointment dated 17.8.1977 on the ground that the services of the petitioner were no longer required.

       Being aggrieved by such termination, the appellant attempted to get his grievance redressed through the Deputy Commissioner of Labour (Conciliation) but the Conciliation failed and ultimately the Deputy Commissioner of Labour (Conciliation) referred the matter for adjudication.

       Ultimately, by an award passed by the Presiding Officer, First Labour Court, Bombay on 31.10.1994, the claim of the appellant was allowed and he was directed to be reinstated in service with continuity in service w.e.f. 11.12.1982 to 30.11.1989 with all consequential benefits including pay revision if any. It was, however, held that the appellant would not be entitled for any back wages from 30.11.1989 till the date of the award and would not be entitled for any relief of future reinstatement from the date of the award though he would be entitled for compensation of Rs.50,000/- in lieu thereof. This was primarily on the ground that appellant had given false information at the time of appointment.

       The learned Single Judge held that the appellant could not be said to be a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act. Notwithstanding his conclusion that the appellant was not a workman, and that the Industrial Court would not have any jurisdiction to decide the dispute, the learned Single Judge further dealt with the merits of the matter and arrived at the conclusion that the Company had ample reason to resort clause-17 of the appointment letter and terminate the appellant. This was affirmed by a Division Bench.

       Findings of the Court :

       Looking to the nature of functions discharged by the appellant he cannot be categorised as ‘workman’.