JUDGMENT

SABYASACHI MUKHARJ1, C.J.I. :- This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment and order of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, dated 30th September, 1976 in Miscellaneous Petition No. 63 of 1976.

2. The respondent was the owner of a truck which was seized by the Police Sorwa on 10th December, 1974 for alleged contravention of the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (hereinafter called the Act) in connections with Crime No. 42 of 1972. The respondent made applications under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, to the High Court to quash the orders of the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Alirajpur and the Sessions Judge, Jhabua respectively rejecting his request for the return of the vehicle on furnishing security and to quash the order of the District Collector and restrain him from proceeding further in pursuance of the notice issued by him under Section 6A of the Act for confiscation of the vehicle and ask for return of the vehicle, or in the alternative to direct the District Judicial Magistrate to dispose of the, application in accordance with law.

3. The High Court after setting out the facts addressed itself to three questions, namely, (1) whether Section 6A of the Essential Commodities Act as amended by the Amendment Act No. 30 of 1974 was prospective or retrospective? (2) whether in the facts and circumstances, the criminal Court had jurisdiction to entertain an application under Section 523 read with Section 516A of the Criminal Procedure Code for the return of the vehicle seized by the Police pending final decision of the criminal case? and (3) whether the respondent was entitled on the merits for the return of the vehicle as prayed for?

4. On the first question, the High Court was of the view that it was a fundamental rule of law that no Statute should be construed to have a retrospective operation unless such a construction appeared very clearly in the terms of the Act, or arose by necessary implication, direct or indirect. The High Court referred to several decisions which it is not necessary, for us to refer to. It is well settled that the normal rule of construction is that a provision in a statute is prospective but not retrospective, but however, in the case of statutes which are merely declaratory or which relate to only matters of procedure or of evidence, it may have retrospective effect if there are indications to that effect or the manifest purpose compels one to construe the Act as such.

5. On an examination of the statute and the provisions referred to herein, the High Court found that there was no retroactivity. We are of the opinion that for the reasons given by the High Court, it is difficult to accept the position that there was no retroactivity. Indeed, Mr. Deshpande appearing for the appellant did not seriously challenge this finding of the High Court. There is no dispute in this case that the contravention of the provisions of the Act is alleged to have taken place in the instant case on the night of 15th March, 1972. The vehicle was seized on 10ih December, 1974. The High Court examined Section 4 of the Amendment Act, along with Section 6A of the Principal Act and came to the conclusion that there was no retrospective effect. We are of the opinion that the High Court was right in holding that Section 4 of the Amendment Act, 1974 was only prospective and not retrospective. Not only that there were no specific words to indicate the provisions of retrospective effect, but the positive provisions of sub-sec. (2) of S. I were to the effect that the amendment must be deemed to have come in effect on a particular date is a pointer and that puts the matter beyond doubt. The provisions of Section 6A as it stood on 15th March, 1972 only were applicable to the present case and Section 4 of the Amendment Act, 1974 could not, therefore, be applied as the Act was not in force on the date of offence. The challenge to the High Court order on this aspect cannot, I therefore, b