JUDGMENT (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.)

1. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court allowing the application filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the `Cr.P.C.). Respondents had filed an application praying for quashing the First Information Report (in short the `FIR) registered against them for alleged commission of theft on 13.7.1999. Statement in the FIR was that while executing the order in their favour possession of land of the complainant was illegally taken in execution of warrant of possession. The High Court accepted the prayer holding that the aforesaid aspect of the matter can be examined if any objections are filed before the concerned Court that warrant officer/bailiff acted beyond the warrant of possession, and this could not give rise to registration of the crime and, therefore, the matter is before us.

2. Learned counsel for the appellant had referred to document appearing at Annexure R/6 and submitted that without even analyzing the factual and legal aspects, by an abrupt conclusion the learned Single Judge should not have quashed the proceedings. With reference to the objections filed before the High Court it was pointed out that the challan had already been filed in the Court, and learned Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class had committed the case to the court of Sessions Judge, Amritsar. Certain other factual aspects have also been referred to. It was further pointed out that while considering the application filed in terms of Section 438 Cr.P.C., learned Additional Sessions Judge, Amritsar had passed a detailed order highlighting the role played by respondents 1 to 5.

3. Learned counsel for respondents 1 to 5 supported the judgment of the trial Court.

4. Exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in a case of this nature is the exception and not the rule. The section does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the Section which merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle quando lex aliquid alique concedit, conceditur et id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the Section, the Court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the Section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the Section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. I