IMPORTANT POINT
Section 357(3) CrPC does not provide for default sentence imprisonment. However, when read with section 431, 421 and 30 CrPC and section 64 IPC, courts can impose default sentence to ensure payment of compensation awarded.

Judgment :-

Altamas Kabir, J.

1. In this Special Leave Petition we are called upon to consider whether a default sentence can be imposed when compensation is awarded under Sub-Section (3) of Section 357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

2. In the instant case, the petitioner stood convicted by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Court-II, Pathanamthitta, of an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for one year and to pay a sum of Rs.8,25,000/- as compensation to the complainant/Respondent No.1 herein under Section 357(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, (Cr.P.C.in short) and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for a further period of six months. On appeal (Criminal Appeal no.41/2006), the Additional District and Sessions Judge by her order dated 27th March, 2007 confirmed the judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the learned Magistrate. In revision, being Criminal Revision Petition No.1836 of 2007-D, the Kerala High Court by its judgment dated 28th May, 2007, while upholding the conviction, modified the sentence from imprisonment for a year to imprisonment till the rising of the Court and to pay a compensation of Rs.8,25,000/-to the complainant under Section 357(3) Cr.P.C. and in default to undergo Simple Imprisonment for six months.

3. It is the said order of the Kerala High, which has been impugned in the instant Special Leave Petition.

4. Dr. K.P. Kailasanatha Pillay, learned Advocate for the petitioner, questioned the judgment of the High Court mainly on the ground that the High Court had erred in law in confirming the default clause made by the Trial Court while directing compensation to be paid under Section 357(3) Cr.P.C. According to Dr. Pillay, though Section 357(1) Cr.P.C., inter alia, provides for the disbursement of fine imposed by way of compensation, Sub-Section (3), merely empowers the Court when it imposes a sentence of which fine does not form a part, to order the accused person to pay, by way of compensation, such amount as may be specified in the order, to the person who has suffered any loss or injury by reason of the act for which the accused person has been so sentenced. Dr. Pillay submitted that in the absence of any specific provision with regard to default in payment of compensation which was distinctly different from imposition of fine by way of a penalty, the High court had wrongly confirmed the default sentence imposed by the learned Magistrate and upheld by the learned Sessions Judge.

5. Dr. Pillay submitted that according to the scheme of the Criminal Procedure Code, if any amount is to be recovered on account of default in payment of fine, it would have to be done in accordance with the provisions of Section 421 Cr.P.C. which provides for issue of warrant for the levy of the amount by attachment and sale of any movable property belonging to the offender and in the alternative, by issuance of warrant to the Collector of the district, authorizing him to realize the amount as arrears of land revenue from the movable or immovable property or both, of the defaulter. Dr. Pillay also urged that the provisions of Section 431, which is another mode for recovery of amounts payable as fine, does not, however, cover cases involving the recovery of compensation payable under Section 357(3) and therefore, the only mode available to the Court to recover any defaulted amount by way of compensation is to take recourse to the provisions of Section 421 Cr.P.C.

6. In support of his submissions, Dr. Pillay referred to the decision of this Court in Dilip S. Dahanukar v Kotak Mahindra Co. Ltd. & Anr. [(2007) 6 SCC 528], wherein, while considering the difference between the provisions of Section 357(1)(b) and Section 357

(3) Cr.P.C., i.e., the difference between "fine" and "compensation" this Court observed that the distinction between Sub-Sections (1) and (3) of Section 357 is apparent as Sub-Section (1) provides for application