IMPORTANT POINT
Haj Committee Act is constitutionally valid.

ORDER

Heard learned counsel for the parties.

2. This Writ Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution had been initially filed challenging the constitutional validity of the Haj Committee Act 1959, but thereafter by an amendment application the Haj Committee Act of 2002 which replaced the 1959 Act, has been challenged.

3. The ground for challenge is that the said Act is violative of Articles 14, 15, and 27 of the Constitution. The grievance of the petitioner is that he is a Hindu but he has to pay direct and indirect taxes, part of whose proceeds go for the purpose of the Haj pilgrimage, which is only done by Muslims. For the Haj, the Indian Government inter alia grants a subsidy in the air fare of the pilgrims.

4. Particular emphasis has been given by the petitioner to Article 27 of the Constitution which states:-

“27. Freedom as to payment of taxes for promotion of any particular religion.—No person shall be compelled to pay any taxes, the proceeds of which are specifically appropriated in payment of expenses for the promotion or maintenance of any particular religion or religious denomination.”

The petitioner contends that his fundamental right under Article 27 of the Constitution is being violated. We have, therefore, to correctly understand and interpret Article 27.

5. There are not many decisions which have given an indepth interpretation of Article 27. The decision in Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments vs. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar,1 1954 (5) SCR 1005 held (vide page 1045) that since the object of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 is not to foster or preserve the Hindu religion but to see that religious trusts and institutions are properly administered, Article 27 is not attracted. The same view was taken in Jagannath Ramanuj Das vs. State of Orissa and Anr.2 1954(5) SCR 1046. The decision in T.M.A. Pae Foundation vs. State of Karnataka,3 AIR 2003 SC 355 (vide paragraph 85) does not really deal with Article 27 at any depth.

6. There can be two views about Article 27. One view can be that Article 27 is attracted only when the statute by which the tax is levied specifically states that the proceeds of the tax will be utilized for a particular religion. The other view can be that Article 27 will be attracted even when the statute is a general statute, like the Income Tax Act or the Central Excise Act or the State Sales Tax Acts (which do not specify for what purpose the proceeds will be utilized) provided that a substantial part of such proceeds are in fact utilized for a particular religion.

7. In our opinion Article 27 will be attracted in both these eventualities. This is because Article 27 is a provision in the Constitution, and not an ordinary statute. Principles of interpreting the Constitution are to some extent different from those of interpreting an ordinary statute vide judgment of Hon’ble Sikri, J. in Kesavanand Bharati vs. State of Kerala,4 1973 (4) SCC 225 (vide para 15). The object of Article 27 is to maintain secularism, and hence we must construe it from that angle.

8. As Lord Wright observed in James vs. Commonwealth of Australia,5 (1936) AC 578, a Constitution is not to be interpreted in a narrow or pedantic manner (followed in re C.P. & Berar Act, AIR 1939 F.C.I.). This is because a Constitution is a constituent or organic statute, vide British Coal Corporation vs. The King,6 AIR 1935 P.C. 158 and Kesavanand Bharati vs. State of Kerala, 1973 (4) SCC 225 (vide para 506). While a statute must ordinarily be construed as on the day it was enacted, a Constitution cannot be construed in that manner, for it is intended to endure for ages to come, as Chief Justice Marshal of the U.S. Supreme Court observed in McCulloch vs. Maryland,7 17 U.S. 316(1819) and by Mr. Justice Holmes in Missourie vs. Holland,8 252 U.S. 416(1920). Hence a strict construction cannot be given to it.

9. In our opinion Article 27 would be violated if a substantial part of the entire income tax coll