Supreme Court of India
P. SATHASIVAM, CJI., RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI & RANJAN GOGOI, JJ.
Econ Antri Ltd.
Versus
Rom Industries Ltd. & Another
Criminal Appeal No.1079 of 2006
Decided On : 26-08-2013
Held :
Having considered the question of law involved in this case in proper perspective, in light of relevant judgments, we are of the opinion that Saketh lays down the correct proposition of law. We hold that for the purpose of calculating the period of one month, which is prescribed under Section 142(b) of the N.I. Act, the period has to be reckoned by excluding the date on which the cause of action arose. Court hold that SIL Import USA does not lay down the correct law. Needless to say that any decision of this Court which takes a view contrary to the view taken in Saketh by this Court, which is confirmed by us, do not lay down the correct law on the question involved in this reference. [Para 25]
Law Laid Down :
For the purpose of calculating the period of one months under Section 142(b) of NI Act the period of limitation has to be reckoned by excluding the date on which cause of action arose.
Key Points: - The court held that while computing the period of one month under Section 142(b), the date on which the cause of action arose must be excluded (!) . - This principle is supported by Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which provides that the first day of a prescribed period is excluded when the period is expressed as starting from a certain date (!) . - A long line of English decisions, including The Goldsmiths’ Company v. The West Metropolitan Railway Company, Cartwright v. MacCormack, and Marren v. Dawson Bentley & Co. Ltd., confirm that the day from which a period runs is to be excluded (!) (!) (!) . - The Limitation Act, 1963, though not directly applicable to the Negotiable Instruments Act, its underlying principle is incorporated through Section 9 of the General Clauses Act (!) (!) . - The court rejected the argument that differing words ‘from’ and ‘of’ in the Negotiable Instruments Act indicate a different legislative intention (!) (!) . - The interpretation followed in Saketh must be upheld, and any contrary view, such as in SIL Import USA, does not lay down correct law on this question (!) (!) .
Judgment :-
Smt Ranjana Prakash Desai, J.
1. On 13/10/2006, while granting leave in Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.211 of 2005, this Court passed the following order:
“In our view, the judgment relied upon by the counsel for the appellant in the case of Saketh India Ltd. & Ors. v. India Securities Ltd. (1999) 3 SCC 1 requires reconsideration. Orders of the Hon’ble the Chief Justice may be obtained for placing this matter before a larger Bench.”
Pursuant to the above order, this appeal is placed before us.
2. Since the referral order states that the judgment of this Court in Saketh India Ltd. & Ors. v. India Securities Ltd. (1999) 3 SCC 1) (“Saketh”) requires reconsideration, we must first refer to the said judgment. In that case, this Court identified the question of law involved in the appeal before it as under:
“Whether the complaint filed under Section 138 of the NI Act is within or beyond time as it was contended that it was not filed within one month from the date on which the cause of action arose under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 of the NI Act?”
The same question was reframed in simpler language as under:
“Whether for calculating the period of one month which is prescribed under Section 142(b), the period has to be reckoned by excluding the date on which the cause of action arose?”
3. It is pointed out to us that there is a variance between the view expressed by this Court on the above question in Saketh and in SIL Import, USA v. Exim Aides Silk Exporters, Bangalore (1999) 4 SCC 567). We will have to therefore re-examine it for the purpose of answering the reference. The basic provisions of law involved in this reference are proviso (c) to Section 138 and Section 142(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (“the NI Act”).
4. Facts of Saketh need to be stated to understand how the above question of law arose. But, before we turn to the facts, we must quote Section 138 and Section 142 of the N.I. Act. We must also quote Section 12(1) and (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 and Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, on which reliance is placed in Saketh.
Section 138 of the N.I. Act reads as under:
“138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account. Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid. either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provision of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may be extended to two years, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both:
Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless-
(a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier;
(b) the payee or the holder in due course of the Cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within thirty days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and
(c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice.”
Section 142 of the N.I. Act reads as under:
“142. Cognizance of offences: Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974 ),-
(a) no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section 138 exc
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