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2016 Supreme(SC) 471

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Dipak Misra, Shiva Kirti Singh, JJ.
State of Gujarat & Anr. – Appellants
Versus
Lal Singh @ Manjit Singh & Ors. – Respondents
Criminal Appeal No. 171 of 2016 (@ S.L.P. (Criminal) No. 7701 of 2012)
Decided On : 29-06-2016

IMPORTANT POINTS
Life imprisonment means sentence for entire life unless part or whole of the sentence remitted.
Statutory power created by section 433 under the Code cannot be equated to Constitutional powers under Articles 72 and 161 but section 433-a cannot be invalidated as indirectly violative of Articles 72 and 161.
Orders passed under Articles 72 and 161 are amenable to judicial review.
Order of commutation of death penalty into life imprisonment would be independent of the power of remission under the Constitution as well as the Code.
Whether Central government or State Government is the appropriate Government depends upon the order of sentence passed by the Criminal Court. It also depends upon whether the sentence ordered by the Criminal Court is found under any law relating to which the Executive Power of the Union extends.
Court cannot grant any remission and provide for premature release. It can at best only give a direction to consider any claim for remission.
High Court should not adjudicate on issues not raised.
High Court can grant parole but the conditions thereof should be left to be decided by administrative or jail authorities.

Headnote:(a) Sentence – Life imprisonment – Means sentence for entire life unless part or whole of the sentence remitted – Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Section 55 IPC and Section 433(b), CrPC – Prisoner has no indefeasible right to be unconditionally released on the expiry of 20 years including remissions – Guidelines given in Laxman Naskar. (Para 16, 17, 18)

       (1976) 3 SCC 470; (1961) 3 SCR 440 : AIR 1961 SC 600; (1983) 2 SCC 454; AIR 2000 SC 2762 : (2000) 7 SCC 626; (2005) 7 SCC 417; 1962 Supp (1) SCR 567 : AIR 1962 SC 605; AIR 1945 PC 64 – Relied upon

       (b) Code of criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 433-A and Articles 72 and 161, Constitution of India – Statutory power created by section 433 under the Code – Cannot be equated to Constitutional powers under Articles 72 and 161 – However section 433-a cannot be invalidated as indirectly violative of Articles 72 and 161 – Orders passed under Articles 72 and 161 are amenable to judicial review – However the scope of judicial review is very limited. (Para 22, 25)

       (1981) 1 SCC 107; (1989) 1 SCC 204; (1998) 4 SCC 75; (2004) 7 SCC 634; (2000) 5 SCC 170; (2006) 8 SCC 161 – Relied upon

       (c) Sentence – Life imprisonment for 25 or 30 years without remission – Permissible – Order of commutation of death penalty into life imprisonment would be independent of the power of remission under the Constitution as well as the statute. (Para 28)

       2015 (13) SCALE 165; (2008) 13 SCC 767; (2014) 4 SCC 242– Relied upon

       (d) Power of remission – Vets with the State – Remission can be granted u/s 432 and 433, Cr PC even after exercise of power under Articles 72 and 161 – Court at best can only give a direction to consider any claim for remission and cannot grant any remission and provide for premature release. (Para 28, 29)

       2015 (13) SCALE 165 – Relied upon

       (e) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 432(7) – Appropriate Government – Whether Central government or State Government – Depends upon the order of sentence passed by the Criminal Court – Depends upon whether the sentence ordered by the Criminal Court is found under any law relating to which the Executive Power of the Union extends. (Para 30, 31)

       (1976) 3 SCC 470; (1976) 3 SCC 616; (2004) 1 SCC 616; AIR 1974 SC 31 : (1974) 3 SCC 531 – Relied upon

       (f) Constitution of India – Article 226 – Issue of appropriate Government not raised before High Court – Still High Court held that Government of Gujarat is the appropriate government – High Court not finding any perversity in impugned order – Not referring to G.V. Ramanaiah’a case – High Court discussing only abstractions – State Government order a speaking order – Impugned judgment not correct. (Para 32)

       AIR 1974 SC 31 : (1974) 3 SCC 531 – Referred

       (g) Prison Rules – Parole – High Court can grant where it has been refused unjustifiably – Even then the conditions thereof should be left to be decided by administrative or jail authorities – Instantly parole granted by abrupt direction – Not sustainable. (Para 33, 34)

       (2000) 3 SCC 409 – Relied upon

       Facts of the case:

       The first respondent along with 20 other accused was tried in TADA Cases Nos. 2, 7 of 1993 and 2 of 1994. The Designated Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) convicted the first respondent and some others for the offences punishable under Section 3(3) of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 and sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/- each and in default to suffer RI for 6 months; under Section 120-B(1) IPC sentenced to suffer RI for 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/- each, in default to suffer RI for 3 months; under Section 5 of the TADA Act sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/- and in default to suffer RI for 6 months; under Section 5 of the Explosive Substances Act to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/- and in default to undergo RI for 3 months; under Section 25(1-A) of the Arms Act sentenced to suffer RI for 7 years and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/- and, in default, to suffer RI for 3 months. Be it stated, he was also convicted for the offence punishable under Section 3(3) of the TADA Act read with Section 120-B IPC but no separate sentence was awarded.

       The first respondent preferred Criminal Appeal which dismissed.

       During the pendency of the criminal appeal, the first respondent sought transfer from the Central Prison, Ahmedabad to the Central Prison, Jalandhar on the ground that his family is based in Punjab; his old parents were suffering from number of ailments; and further the financial condition of the family was precarious. Considering the reasons ascribed in the representation, the State Government vide order dated 11.11.1998 consented to transfer the first respondent from Central Prison, Ahmedabad to the Central Prison, Jalandhar.

       The first respondent on 19.01.2004 sought premature release under Section 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 on the ground that he would complete 14 years of actual sentence in jail. His prayer for premature release was considered by the competent authority of the State of Gujarat which vide order dated 26.10.2006 considering the over all aspects of the matter rejected the said application.

       After a number of rounds of litigation and rejections the respondent no. 1 filed a writ petition before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana for premature release.

       Eventually, the High Court directed to reconsider the first respondent’s representation in the light of the discussion made in that order and further to release him forthwith on parole for a period of three months.

       Finding of the Court:

       Impugned judgment is not sustainable.

       Result: Appeal allowed.

JUDGMENT :

Dipak Misra, J.

The present appeal, by special leave, is directed against the judgment and order dated August 23, 2012 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Writ Petition No. 1620 of 2011 whereby the High Court entertaining the Writ Petition had opined that the order dated 26.07.2011 passed by the Government of Gujarat declining to grant the benefit of premature release to the first respondent herein is illegal and further directed the State Government to reconsider his case and take a fresh decision in the light of the discussions made in the impugned order and further to release him on parole for a period of three months on furnishing personal bond/security bond for a sum of Rs. 50,000/- to the satisfaction of the concerned Jail Superintendent.

2. The facts which are essential to be stated are that the first respondent along with 20 other accused was tried in TADA Cases Nos. 2, 7 of 1993 and 2 of 1994. The Designated Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Mirzapur, Ahmedabad convicted the first respondent and some others for the offences punishable under Section 3(3) of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (for short, “the TADA Act”) and sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/- each and in default to suffer RI for 6 months; under Section 120-B(1) IPC sentenced to suffer RI for 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/- each, in default to suffer RI for 3 months; under Section 5 of the TADA Act sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/- and in default to suffer RI for 6 months; under Section 5 of the Explosive Substances Act to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/- and in default to undergo RI for 3 months; under Section 25(1-A) of the Arms Act sentenced to suffer RI for 7 years and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/- and, in default, to suffer RI for 3 months. Be it stated, he was also convicted for the offence punishable under Section 3(3) of the TADA Act read with Section 120-B IPC but no separate sentence was awarded. All the sentences were directed to run concurrently.

3. The first respondent preferred Criminal Appeal No. 219 of 1997 and the said appeal was heard along with the appeals preferred by other convicts. This Court in Lal Singh v. State of Gujarat and another, (2001) 3 SCC 221 scrutinized the evidence in detail and ultimately dismissed the appeal preferred by the first respondent and confirmed the conviction and the sentence as imposed by the learned Judge, Designated Court.

4. During the pendency of the criminal appeal before this Court, the first respondent sought transfer from the Central Prison, Ahmedabad to the Central Prison, Jalandhar on the ground that his family is based in Punjab; his old parents were suffering from number of ailments; and further the financial condition of the family was precarious. Considering the reasons ascribed in the representation, the State Government vide order dated 11.11.1998 consented to transfer the first respondent from Central Prison, Ahmedabad to the Central Prison, Jalandhar. A condition was stipulated by the State of Gujarat that tight security and proper police escort arrangement was to be ensured.

5. The first respondent on 19.01.2004 sought premature release under Section 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) on the ground that he would complete 14 years of actual sentence in jail. His prayer for premature release was considered by the competent authority of the State of Gujarat which vide order dated 26.10.2006 considering the over all aspects of the matter rejected the said application. The said order was assailed in Criminal Writ Petition No. 505 of 2007 before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana which vide order dated 25.08.2008 disposed of the Writ Petition with the direction to the State of Gujarat to reconsider the case of the first respondent for premature release considering the applicability of Section 433 CrPC, Section 3 of the Transfer of Prison




























































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