JUDGMENT

CHANDRACHUD, CJI.:— The question as regards the scope of the power of the President under Art. 72 of the Constitution to commute a sentence of death into a lesser sentence may have to await examination on an appropriate occasion. This clearly to not that occasion because in so far as this case is concerned, whatever be the guidelines observed for the exercise of the power conferred by Art. 72, the only sentence which can possibly be imposed upon the petitioner is that of death and no circumstances exist for interference with that sentence. Therefore we see no justification for saying that in refusing to commute the sentence of death imposed upon the petitioner into a lesser sentence, the President has in any manner transgressed his discretionary power under Art. 72. Undoubtedly, the President has the power in an appropriate case to commute any sentence imposed by a court into a lesser sentence and as said by Chief Justice Taft in James Shewan & Sons v. United States, (1924) 69 Lawed 527 at p. 535, the "executive clemency exists to afford relief from undue harshness or evident mistake in the operation or enforcement of the criminal law" and that the administration of justic