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2017 Supreme(SC) 885

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
A.K. Sikri, N.V. Ramana, JJ.
Excel Crop Care Limited - Appellants
Versus
Competition Commission of India And Another - Respondents
Civil Appeal Nos. 2480, 53-55, 2874 & 2922 of 2014
Decided On : 08-05-2017

Advocate Appeared:
N.K. Kaul, ASG, Vaibhav Gaggar, Arjun Krishnan, Saksham Dhingra, Sanyat Lodha, Ms. Neha Mishra, Ankur Singh, hiv Johar, A.K. Jha, Rohit K. Singh, Rajan Narain, Mohit Paul, Krishnan, Venugopal, Sr. Adv., Rahul Goel, Ms. Anu Monga, Neeraj Lalwani, Rishabh Arora, Nitish Sharma, Gaurav Ray, Rohit K. Singh, Ajit Pudussery, K. Vijayan, S.S. Haranka, Advocates.

Penalty under Section 27(b) of the Competition Act, 2002, must be calculated based on "relevant turnover" (turnover of the infringing product) rather than "total turnover" to ensure proportionality, especially for multi-product companies. The "process for bidding" covers all stages until the contract award.

Headnote:(A) Competition Act, 2002 - Sections 3 and 27(b) - Anti-competitive agreements - Bid rigging - Penalty calculation - Applicability of Section 3 to tenders - If the "process for bidding" continues after the enforcement of Section 3, the provision is applicable regardless of when the tender was first issued. The "process for bidding" encompasses all stages from the notice inviting tender to the award of the contract, including negotiations. (Paras 14, 15, 24)

(B) Scope of Investigation - The investigation directed by the regulatory authority is not confined strictly to the allegations in the initial complaint. If further evidence of anti-competitive practices emerges during the probe, such findings can be included in the final report. (Paras 35, 36)

(C) Collusive Bidding - Repeated identical pricing by competitors with differing cost structures and geographical locations provides strong evidence of a cartel, overriding arguments of conscious parallelism in an oligopolistic market. (Paras 38, 40)

(D) Quantum of Penalty - Turnover for calculating penalty under Section 27(b) must be interpreted as "relevant turnover" (turnover related to the product or service in question) rather than "total turnover" of the enterprise. This ensures proportionality and prevents inequitable and absurd results for multi-product companies. (Paras 74-77)

Facts of the case:
Manufacturers of a specific chemical product were alleged to have formed a cartel by quoting identical rates in various government tenders over several years and jointly boycotting a specific tender. The regulatory authority imposed penalties based on 9% of the total average turnover of the companies. The appellate tribunal reduced this penalty to be based on the "relevant turnover" of the product in question.

Findings of Court:
The court upheld the findings of the appellate tribunal. It confirmed that Section 3 applies to tenders where the process continued after notification, the investigation scope allows for the inclusion of newly discovered facts, and the penalty must be based on relevant turnover to remain proportionate to the specific infringement.

Issues: (i) Whether Section 3 applies to tenders where bids were submitted before notification but the process continued after; (ii) Whether an investigation can include events not explicitly mentioned in the initial complaint; (iii) Whether identical pricing constitutes evidence of a cartel; and (iv) Whether "turnover" for penalty purposes refers to total or relevant turnover.

Ratio Decidendi: The "process for bidding" is a continuous activity extending from the notice to the contract award. Evidence of a cartel is inferred from identical pricing across diverse companies with varying cost structures. To avoid absurd outcomes and maintain proportionality, "turnover" for penalty purposes must be construed as the turnover of the specific product or service affected by the contravention.

Result: Appeals dismissed.

Legal Category Hierarchy

Table of Contents

1. Appeals concerning penalty for anti-competitive agreement in tenders for Aluminium Phosphide Tablets under Section 3, Competition Act, 2002. (Para 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 )

2. Retrospective application of Section 3 – Jurisdiction to investigate subsequent tender – Proof of cartel through identical pricing – Penalty on total vs relevant turnover. (Para 3 , 35 , 36 , 37 , 38 , 39 , 40 , 56 , 57 , 58 , 59 , 60 , 61 , 62 , 63 , 64 , 65 , 66 , 67 , 68 , 69 , 70 )

3. Section 3 applies retroactively to continuing tender process – Identical pricing despite different costs indicates cartel – Penalty on relevant turnover to ensure proportionality. (Para 10 , 11 , 12 , 13 , 14 , 15 , 16 , 17 , 18 , 19 , 20 , 21 , 22 , 23 , 24 , 25 , 26 , 27 , 28 , 29 , 30 , 31 , 32 , 33 , 34 , 35 , 36 , 37 , 38 , 39 , 40 , 41 , 42 , 43 , 44 , 45 , 46 , 47 , 48 , 49 , 50 , 51 , 52 , 53 , 54 , 55 , 56 , 57 , 58 , 59 , 60 , 61 , 62 , 63 , 64 , 65 , 66 , 67 , 68 , 69 , 70 , 71 , 72 , 73 , 74 , 76 , 77 , 78 , 79 , 80 , 81 , 82 , 83 , 84 , 85 , 86 , 87 , 88 , 89 )

4. Penalty under Section 27(b) of Competition Act, 2002 shall be calculated on relevant turnover of the product involved in the contravention, not total turnover. (Para 24 , 25 , 26 , 27 , 28 , 32 , 33 , 34 , 49 , 50 , 72 , 73 , 74 , 86 , 87 , 88 )

5. Appeals by companies and CCI dismissed; COMPAT's order on penalty and merits upheld. (Para 75 , 90 )

6. Does Section 3 of the Competition Act, 2002 apply to agreements that began before its enforcement but continued after?

Yes, where the anti-competitive conduct continued after enforcement, the Act applies retroactively to the entire process. (Para 12 , 13 , 14 , 15 , 16 , 17 , 18 , 19 , 20 , 21 , 22 , 23 , 24 , 25 , 26 , 27 , 28 )

7. Can the Director General investigate tenders not mentioned in the original complaint if revealed during investigation?

Yes, the DG has power to investigate all facts necessary to uncover anti-competitive practices, including subsequent conduct. (Para 35 , 36 )

8. Does identical pricing by competitors, despite different cost structures, constitute evidence of cartel?

Yes, repeated identical pricing over many tenders with different cost structures is strong evidence of concerted practice. (Para 37 , 38 , 39 , 40 , 41 , 42 , 43 , 44 , 45 , 46 , 47 , 48 , 49 , 50 )

9. For imposing penalty under Section 27(b), should 'turnover' be interpreted as total turnover or relevant turnover?

'Turnover' means relevant turnover of the product/service involved in the contravention, not total turnover of the enterprise. (Para 56 , 57 , 58 , 59 , 60 , 61 , 62 , 63 , 64 , 65 , 66 , 67 , 68 , 69 , 70 , 71 , 72 , 73 , 74 , 80 , 81 , 82 , 83 , 84 , 85 , 86 , 87 , 88 , 89 )

JUDGMENT :

A.K. Sikri, J.

All these Civil Appeals arise out of the common judgment and order dated October 29, 2013 passed by the Competition Appellate Tribunal (for short, 'COMPAT'). These proceedings have their origin in the letter dated February 04, 2011 written by the Food Corporation of India (for short, 'FCI') to the Competition Commission of India (for short, 'CCI') complaining of an anti-competitive agreement purportedly arrived at between M/s. Excel Crop Care Limited, M/s. United Phosphorous Limited (for short, 'UPL'), M/s. Sandhya Organics Chemicals (P) Ltd. respectively (the appellants in CA Nos. 2480, 2874 and 2922 of 2014 and hereinafter referred to as the 'appellants') and Agrosynth Chemicals Limited, in relation to tenders issued by the FCI for Aluminium Phosphide Tablets (for short, 'APT') of 3 gms. between the years 2007 and 2009. The CCI entrusted the matter to the Director General (DG) for investigation, who submitted his report on October 14, 2011 giving his prima facie findings affirming the allegations of the FCI that the appellants had entered into an anti-competitive agreement, which was violative of Section 3(3) of the Competition Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). On receipt of this complaint, the CCI issued notices to the appellants who filed their objections. After hearing the parties, the CCI passed the order dated April 23, 2012 whereby it concluded that the appellants had entered into the anti-competitive agreement in a concerted manner thereby offending the provisions of Section 3 of the Act. As a consequence, it imposed penalty @ 9% on the average total turnover of these establishments for last three years. Appeals were filed by the appellants before the COMPAT under Section 53-B of the Act. In these appeals, the issue on merits has been decided against the appellants by COMPAT in its judgment dated October 29, 2013. These appeals question the validity of the order of the COMPAT on the aforesaid aspect.

Now the facts in detail :

2. An Inquiry in this case was initiated by the CCI on the basis of letter/ complaint dated February 04, 2011 written by the Chairman and Managing Director of the FCI to the CCI. It was alleged in this complaint that four manufactures of APT had formed a cartel by entering into an anti-competitive agreement amongst themselves and on that basis they had been submitting their bids for last eight years by quoting identical rates in the tenders invited by the FCI for the purchase of APT. It was alleged that the requirement for APT was almost got doubled during the period 2007-2009 and was likely to rise further in view of the requirement of large quantity of these tablets by the FCI, Central Warehousing Corporation and other State agencies for preservation of food grains, which these agencies were storing in their godowns. The CCI assigned the complaint to the DG for investigation. The DG collected required information from the FCI and other Government agencies dealing in warehousing and storage of food grains and also from Central Insecticides Board and Registration Committee, Faridabad. Representatives of FCI were also examined. After collecting the aforesaid information, the DG submitted his report with the following findings:

(a) The main market of APT in India was that of the institutional sales and a majority of buyers were Government agencies. The number of private buyers was insignificant. APT is sold in the box of 3 gms. tablets, 12 gms. tablets, and a sachet of 10 gms. in powder. Out of this, 3 gms. tablets constitute 56% of the total sale. Sale of these 3 gms. tablets was restricted to the Government agencies and approved pest control operators, which could not be sold in the open market. These Government agencies were procuring APT tablets of Rs. 40 crores annually.

(b) There were only four manufacturers of APT, namely, M/s. Excel Crop Care Limited, M/s. UPL, M/s. Sandhya Organics Chemicals (P) Ltd. (which are the three appellants herein) and Agrosynth


























































































































































































































































































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