2019 Supreme(SC) 1147

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, SURYA KANT, JJ.
John D’Souza - Appellants
Versus
Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation – Respondent
Civil Appeal No.8042 of 2019 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition(C)No. 6371 of 2019]
Decided on : 16-10-2019

IMPORTANT POINTS
Section 33(2)(b) contemplates a summary enquiry into validity of the domestic enquiry to prove misconduct on the touchstone of natural justice and whether it is mala fide. Adjudicating on the industrial dispute and quantum of punishment is beyond jurisdiction u/s 33(2)(b).
Jurisdiction u/s 33(2)(b) is in two parts: First to ascertain, on the basis of material on record, whether enquiry was conducted properly complying with natural justice and if so, whether a prima facie case for dismissal is made out. Second, in case of any defect in the enquiry, to permit the parties to adduce their respective evidence and on appraisal thereof to conclude whether the discharge or dismissal or any other punishment awarded was justified.

Headnote:

(a) Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - Section 10 r/w Sections 11(3), 11A and 33(2)(b) - Section 10 r/w Sections 11(3), 11A is a complete code for adjudication of `industrial dispute’ stemming out of an order of discharge or dismissal of a workman - No Legislative intent or any legal necessity to set-up a parallel remedy under the same Statute for adjudication of the same `industrial dispute’ by the same Forum of Labour Court or Tribunal via Section 33(2)(b) - Section 33(2)(b) not an overlapping procedure to adjudicate legality, propriety, justifiability or otherwise sustainability of a punitive action taken against a workman. (Para 22)

(b) Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - Section 33 - Aimed at preventing adverse alteration in the conditions of service of a workman during pendency of conciliation proceedings - Includes discharge and dismissal or any other punitive action against the workman except when the proved misconduct is not connected with the pending dispute. (Para 23)

(c) Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - Section 33(2)(b) - Contemplates a summary enquiry into validity of the domestic enquiry to prove misconduct on the touchstone of natural justice and whether it is mala fide - Adjudicating on the industrial dispute and quantum of punishment is beyond jurisdiction u/s 33(2)(b) - Section 10(1)(c) and (d) and 11A. (Para 24, 25)

(d) Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - Section 33(2)(b) - Jurisdiction in two parts - First to ascertain, on the basis of material on record, whether enquiry was conducted properly complying with natural justice - If so, whether a prima facie case for dismissal is made out - Second, in case of any defect in the enquiry, to permit the parties to adduce their respective evidence and on appraisal thereof to conclude whether the discharge or dismissal or any other punishment awarded was justified. (Para 31, 34, 38)

(e) Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - Section 33(2)(b) - Instantly labour tribunal and the Single Judge erroneously presumed that no enquiry can be held under Section 33(2)(b) without asking the parties to lead their evidence - Similarly Division Benches have erroneously proceeded on the premise that in a prima facie fact finding enquiry u/s 33(2)(b) no evidence can be adduced or considered by the Labour Court except what is on the record of domestic enquiry. (Para 35)

(f) Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - Section 33(2)(b) - Even if the dismissal is approved, it is subject to scrutiny of the Labour court/tribunal if an industrial dispute is raised against the dismissal. (Para 36)

Facts of the case:

The question arising in this appeal revolves around the scope and ambit of the enquiry to be held by a Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal while granting or refusing approval for the discharge or dismissal of a workman under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act.

The appellant-workman joined the Corporation as a bus conductor on 28th November, 1984. He had been a Union activist and also the General Secretary of the KSRTC and BMTC United Employees Union.

The appellant reportedly remained absent from duty since 18th August, 2005 onwards without prior permission of his superiors or getting his leave sanctioned. The appellant steadily absented himself from duty w.e.f. 18th August, 2005 to 29th October, 2005 for which he was served an article of charges on 23rd June, 2006. The appellant participated in the enquiry during the time the Management’s witnesses were examined and after closure of the evidence of Management he was given an opportunity to produce his witnesses and also the documents for which the enquiry proceedings were adjourned to 28th January, 2010. The enquiry was eventually closed and report was submitted holding that the charges had been proved. Thereafter a show cause notice dated 21st August, 2010 along with the enquiry findings was served upon the appellant to which he submitted his reply. The disciplinary authority was not satisfied with the explanation furnished by the appellant, hence it passed the order of dismissal from service on 11.10.2010.

The Corporation moved an application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act seeking permission of the Labour Court to effectuate the order of dismissal. It further appears that the appellant meanwhile attained the age of superannuation.

The Labour Court held that the domestic enquiry was conducted in a fair and proper manner. However, deciding the Issue Nos. 2, 3 and 4 in favour of the appellant, application of the Management under Section 33(2)(b) was rejected. The Corporation challenged the final order of the Labour Court by filing a writ petition which was dismissed. The Corporation filed Writ Appeal which was allowed by a Division Bench of the High Court laying down that the Labour Court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 33(2)(b) could not have permitted the parties to adduce evidence as the scope of enquiry thereunder is very limited. The matter was remitted back to the Labour Court for reconsideration.

In the second round also the Labour court and the Writ court decided against the Corporation but the Division Bench allowed the writ-appeal.

Finding of the Court:

Matter required to be remanded to the Labour court. If the Labour Court finds that the domestic inquiry held against the appellant is suffering from one of the incurable defects, then it may look into the evidence adduced by the parties for the purpose of formation of its prima facie opinion.

Result: Appeal allowed.