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2019 Supreme(SC) 1181

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
L. NAGESWARA RAO, HEMANT GUPTA, JJ.
Bijay Kumar Singh & Others - Appellants
Versus
Amit Kumar Chamariya & Others - Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 7849 of 2019 (Arising Out Of SLP (C) No.24280 of 2019) (Diary No. 22352 of 2017) With Civil Appeal No. 7850 of 2019 (Arising Out of SLP (C) No.24284 of 2019) (Diary No. 22504 of 2017)
Decided on : 22-10-2019

Advocates Appeared:
For the Petitioner(s):Anip Sachthey, Anando Mukherjee, Anjali Chauhan, Ria Sachthey, Sarla Chandra, Advocates
For the Respondent(s):Pranab Kumar Mullick, Soma Mullick, Seba Kumar Deuria, Advocates

IMPORTANT POINT
Application for determination of rent must be preceded by deposit of arrears of rent.

Headnote:

(a) Interpretation of statute - Mandatory or directory - Act required to be preformed within a specified time - Mandatory in case of private person - Directory in case of public functionary. (Para 16)

(b) West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 - Section 7(2) - Requires deposit of arrears of rent at the rate admitted to be due by the tenant along with an application for determination of the rent payable - Court then determines the rent to be paid within specified time - Court can extend the time only once and not exceeding two months. (Para 20)

Facts of the case:

The respondent filed an eviction petition against the appellants on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent in respect of two shops alleging that initially, Sudama Singh was tenant on the monthly rent of Rs.45/-and Rs.25/-per month but now the rent payable is Rs.306/-and Rs.174/-per month. It is the case of the respondent that a Receiver was appointed in Money Execution Case No. 23/1961 and the said Receiver was discharged vide order dated 10.02.2009. The respondent demanded arrears of rent but since the amount of arrears at the rate of Rs.306/-per month was not paid, the petition for eviction was filed. The appellant did not deposit any rent but filed an application to determine the arrears of rent asserting that they have paid monthly rent up to the month of June 1993 to the Receiver. However, the Receiver has not informed the appellants as to the person authorised to collect rent, therefore, they could not pay it.

The Trial Court allowed the application, determined the arrears of rent and granted time to pay the arrears of rent so determined. The learned Single Bench set aside the order passed by the Trial Court as it chose to follow the order passed in CO 1941 of 2013, though another Coordinate Bench had taken a contrary view in CO 55 of 2014. Learned Single Judge found that in the order passed by Coordinate Bench in CO 55/2014, no lis was decided and that no principle was laid down which may give light to the learned Trial Court to decide the pending litigation. Therefore, the learned Single Judge decided the matter on merits rather than referring it to the larger Bench for decision.

Finding of the Court:

Application for determination of rent must be preceded by deposit of arrears of rent.

Result: Appeals dismissed.

Judgement Key Points

Key Points: - The judgment holds that an application for determination of rent must be preceded by deposit of arrears of rent. (!) - The time for payment or deposit can be extended by the Civil Judge once, and not exceeding two months, under the proviso to Section 7(2). (!) - Sub-sections (2A) and (2B) of Section 17 (as discussed) provide that the Court may extend time or permit payment in instalments, with conditions and retrospective considerations discussed in the context of B.P. Khemka and related cases. (!) (!) (!) - The Act repealed the 1956 Act and introduced provisions for extension of time for deposit under (2A)/(2B); this is analyzed through various precedents. (!) (!) - The court emphasizes that non-deposit of admitted arrears within the prescribed time leads to eviction proceedings continuing, unless the tenant deposits as required under sub-section (2) with an application for determination. (!) (!) - The High Court’s order was upheld; there is no error in applying Nasiruddin’s interpretation that influences the eviction proceedings. (!) - The decision discusses whether to refer to a larger bench and concludes certainties in respect of Section 7’s scope. (!)

What is the scope of Section 7(2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 and its (2A)/(2B) extensions as discussed in this judgment?

What is the requirement that must precede an application for determination of rent under Section 7(2) (depositing arrears of rent) and the time limits for extension?

What is the Court’s stance on whether the provisions for extending time to deposit arrears are mandatory or directory and the consequences of non-compliance?


JUDGMENT :

HEMANT GUPTA, J.

1. The challenge in the present appeals is to an order passed by the High Court of Calcutta on 13.05.2016 in two separate eviction petitions filed by the respondent herein against two tenants.

2. Learned Single Judge has set aside the order dated 10.08.2011 whereby an application filed by the appellant under Section 7(2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 [For short the “Act”] was allowed.

3. The brief facts leading to the present appeals are that the respondent filed an eviction petition against the appellants on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent in respect of two shops alleging that initially, Sudama Singh was tenant on the monthly rent of Rs.45/-and Rs.25/-per month but now the rent payable is Rs.306/-and Rs.174/-per month. It is the case of the respondent that a Receiver was appointed in Money Execution Case No. 23/1961 and the said Receiver was discharged vide order dated 10.02.2009. The respondent demanded arrears of rent but since the amount of arrears at the rate of Rs.306/-per month was not paid, the petition for eviction was filed. The appellant did not deposit any rent but filed an application to determine the arrears of rent asserting that they have paid monthly rent up to the month of June 1993 to the Receiver. However, the Receiver has not informed the appellants as to the person authorised to collect rent, therefore, they could not pay it.

4. The learned Trial Court allowed the application, determined the arrears of rent and granted time to pay the arrears of rent so determined. The learned Single Bench set aside the order passed by the Trial Court as it chose to follow the order passed in CO 1941 of 2013, though another Coordinate Bench had taken a contrary view in CO 55 of 2014. Learned Single Judge found that in the order passed by Coordinate Bench in CO 55/2014, no lis was decided and that no principle was laid down which may give light to the learned Trial Court to decide the pending litigation. Therefore, the learned Single Judge, decided the matter on merits rather than referring it to the larger Bench for decision.

5. In this background, the argument of the learned counsel appearing for the appellant is that the High Court has not maintained judicial decorum and should have referred the matter to the larger Bench to decide the scope and ambit of Section 7(2) of the Act. We find that since a short question of law arises for consideration, therefore, without going into the question as to whether learned Single Judge should have referred the matter to the larger Bench or not, the question to be decided by this Court is to bring certainty in respect of scope of Section 7 of the Act.

6. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that the provisions of Section 7(2) of the Act are pari-materia to Section 17(2) of West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 [for short the “1956 Act”] which was the subject matter of consideration in an earlier judgment of this Court reported as B.P. Khemka Pvt. Ltd. v. Birendra Kumar Bhowmick, (1987) 2 SCC 407. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the Limitation Act, 1963 would be applicable to seek condonation of delay in filing an application under Section 7(2) of the Act. The learned Counsel also placed reliance upon judgments reported as Shibu Chandra Dhar v.Pasupati Nath Auddya, (2002) 3 SCC 617 and Gaya Prasad Kar v. Subrata Kumar Banerjee, (2005) 8 SCC 14(3).

7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the judgments in B.P. Khemka, Shibhu Chandra Dhar and Gaya Prasad Kar deal with Section 17 of the 1956 Act, wherein, sub section (2A) empowers the court to extend the time specified in sub section (1) or sub section (2). Sub section (2A) is an overriding provision starting with a non-obstante clause. There is no such equivalent provision in the Act which was enacted while repealing the 1956 Act. It is argued that B. P. Khemka has been considered by a three Judge Bench judgment reported as Arjun Khiamal

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