JUDGMENT-ORDER :

L.M. Sharma, CJI.

1. By the present application under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, the Petitioner has challenged the constitutional validity of the Representation of the People (Amendment) Ordinance, 1992 (Ordinance No. 1 of 1992) and the Representation of the People (Second Amendment) Ordinance, 1992 (Ordinance No. 2 of 1992), on the grounds of violation of Articles 14, 19 and 21. By the first Ordinance, Section 52 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (the Act) providing for countermanding elections in certain circumstances has been amended. By the second Ordinance the period of 20 days in Section 30 of the Act has been reduced to 14 days. Later, when the Parliament met, the amendments were incorporated by an amending Act.

2. The provisions of Section 52, as they stood before the amendment, provided for countermanding the election in either of 2 contingencies-(i) if a candidate whose nomination was found valid on scrutiny under Section 36 or who has not withdrawn his candidature under Section 37 died and a report of his death was received before the publication of the list of contesting candidates under Section 38, (ii) if a contesting candidate died and a report of his death was received before the commencement of the poll. On countermanding the Returning Officer will have to report the fact to the Election Commission ; and all proceedings with reference to the election will have to be commenced de novo in all respects as if for a new election.. By the first Ordinance, the area attracting the provisions of countermanding has been narrowed down by confining the provisions only to such cases where a candidate of a recognised political party dies.

3. Section 30 deals with appointment of dates for nomination, scrutiny and the holding of poll, and in Clause (d) it is provided that the date of poll shall not be earlier than the twentieth day after the last date for the withdrawal of candidatures. With a view to expedite the whole process the words "twentieth day" have been substituted by the words "fourteenth day" in the said clause by the impugned Ordinance.

4. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner has strenuously contended that the distinction made by the impugned amendment between a candidate set up by a recognised political party and any other candidate is artificial, inconsistent with the spirit of the election law and discriminatory. The Constitution does not confer on a candidate set up by a registered political party any special right, and treats all candidates similarly. It does not recognise any categorisation. It is, therefore, argued that the difference which is being introduced by the impugned amendment is contrary to the scheme of the Constitution and violative of the equality clause in Article 14. According to the learned Counsel, this will also infringe the guarantee under Article 19(1)(a) in respect of freedom of speech and expression.

5. Elaborating his argument, the learned Counsel contended that the right to choose its representative belongs to the voters of a particular constituency and this should not be whittled down by amendments which have a tendency to undermine this element. Lack of wisdom in giving importance to recognised political parties was emphasised by saying that such 1 parties almost always impose their choice of candidates in their own interest and at the cost of the welfare of the constituencies. By introducing this imbalance in the Act, it is stated, the republican character of the Constitution is jeopardised. The sum and substance of the argument on behalf of the Petitioner is that no distinction can be made between one candidate and another purely depending on recognition as a political party.

6. So far the second Ordinance is concerned, the objection is that the period of 14 days, substituted by the amendment, is too short and the reduction from the period of 20 days is arbitrary and prejudicial to the ' larger interest for which elections are held.

7. In reply,