SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
P.N. Bhagwati, J.
Bachan Singh - Appellant
Versus
State of Punjab - Respondent
AND
Mal Singh - Appellant
Versus
Union of India and others - Respondent
AND
Sunil Batra - Appellant
Versus
Union of India and others - Respondent
AND
Nathu Singh and others - Appellant
Versus
Union of India and others - Respondent
AND
Kartar Singh and others - Appellant
Versus
Delhi Administration - Respondent
AND
Sher Singh and others - Appellant
Versus
State of Punjab and others - Respondent
AND
Sunil Batra - Appellant
Versus
Delhi Administration - Respondent
AND
Mal Singh - Appellant
Versus
State of Haryana - Respondent
AND
Nirpal Singh - Appellant
Versus
State of Haryana - Respondent
AND
Jagmohan Singh - Appellant
Versus
State of Haryana - Respondent
AND
Ujagar Singh and another - Appellant
Versus
State of Punjab and others - Respondent
Criminal Appeal No. 273 of 1979 and Writ Petns. Nos. 564, 165, 179, 168; 434 and 89 of 1979 and Spl. Leave Petn. (Cri.) No. 1732 of 1979 and W.P. Nos. 754, 756 and 976 of 1979
Decided On : 16-8-1982
Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Section 302 - Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – Section 354 sub-and (3) - Constitution of India 1950 - Articles 14, 19, 21, 31 – Universal Declaration of Human Rights – Articles 5, 7, 3 – Constitutional validity of the death penalty – Writ petitions challenge the constitutional validity of Section 302 of the Penal Code read with Section 354, sub-section (3) of the Criminal Procedure Code in so far as it provides death sentence as an alternative punishment for the offence of murder. – Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents urged that the question of constitutional validity of the death penalty stood concluded against the petitioners by the decision of a constitution bench of five Judges of this Court in Jagmohan v. State of U. P., AIR 1973 Supreme Court 947 and it could not therefore be allowed to be reagitated before this Bench consisting of the same number of Judges. – Held, Article 19 (1) (f) read with clause (5) postulates the existence of property which can be enjoyed and therefore if the owner is deprived of his property by a valid law under Article 31, there can be no question of exercising any rights under Article 19 (1) (f) in respect of such property. – Court ruled that even if a low seeks to deprive a person of his property under Article 31, it must still, in order to be valid, satisfy the requirement of Article 19(1)(f) read with clause (5). It this be the true position in regard to the inter-relation between Article 19(1)(f) and Article 31, it is difficult to see why a law authorising deprivation of the right to life under Article 21 should not have to meet the test of other fundamental rights including those set out in the different clauses of Article 19. – But even if Section 302 in so far as it provides for imposition of death penalty as alternative punishment has to meet the challenge of Article 19, the question would still remain whether the direct and inevitable consequence of that provision is to affect any of the rights guaranteed under that Article. – That is a question on which I do not wish to express any definite opinion. – It is sufficient for me to state that the object and form test or the pith and substance rule has been completely discarded by the decisions in R. C. Coopers case and Maneka Gandhis case and it is now settled law that in order to locate the fundamental right violated by a statute, the court must consider what is the direct and inevitable consequence of the statute. – Impugned statute may in its direct and inevitable effect invade more than one fundamental right and merely because it satisfies the requirement of one fundamental right, it is not freed from the obligation to meet the challenge of another applicable fundamental right. – These are the reasons for which I made my order dated May 9, 1980 declaring the death penalty provided under Section 302 of the Penal Code read with Section 354, sub-section (3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 as unconstitutional and void as being violative of Articles 14 and 21. – Court must express my profound regret at the long delay in delivering this judgment but the reason is that there was a considerable mass of material which had to be collected from various sources and then examined and analysed and this took a large amount time. – Order Accordingly.
JUDGMENT
Bhagwati, J. - These writ petitions challenge the constitutional validity of Section 302 of the Penal Code read with Section 354, sub-section (3) of the Criminal Procedure Code in so far as it provides death sentence as an alternative punishment for the offence of murder. There are several grounds on which the constitutional validity of the death penalty provided in Section 302 of the Penal Code read with Section 354 sub-and (3) of the Criminal Procedure Code is assailed before us but it is not necessary to set them out at this stage, for I propose to deal with them when I examine the arguments advanced on behalf of the parties. Suffice it to state for the present that I find considerable force in some of these grounds and in my view, the constitutional validity of The death penalty provided as an alternative punishment in Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 354 sub-section (3) of the Code, of Criminal Procedure cannot be sustained. I am conscious that my learned brethren on the Bench who constitute the majority have taken a different view and upheld the constitutional validity of the death penalty but, with the greatest respect to them and in all humility, I cannot persuade myself to concur with the view taken by them. Mine is unfortunately a solitary dissent and it is therefore with a certain amount of hesitation that I speak but my initial diffidence is overcome by my deep and abiding faith in the dignity of man and worth of the human person and passionate conviction about the true spiritual nature and dimension of man. I agree with Bernard Shaw that "Criminals do not die by the hands of the law. They die by, the hands of other men. Assassination on the scaffold is the worst form of assassination because there it is invested with the approval of the society......... Murder and capital punishment are not opposites that cancel one another but similars that breed their kind." It was the Father ad the Nation who said years ago, reaffirming what Prince Satyavan said on capital punishment in Shanti Parva of Mahabharata that "Destruction of individuals can never be a virtuous act" and this sentiment has been echoed by many eminent men such as Leonardo Da Vinci, John Bright, Victor Hugo and Berdyaev. To quote again from Bernard Shaw from Act IV of his play "Caesar and Cleopatra" :
I share this sentiment because I regard men as an embodiment of divinity and I am therefore morally against death penalty. But my dissent is based not upon any ground of morality or ethics but is founded on constitutional issues, for as I shall presently show, death penalty does not serve any social purpose or advance any constitutional value and is totally arbitrary and unreasonable so as to be violative of Articles 14, 19, 21 of the Constitution
2. Before I proceed to consider the various constitutional issues arising our of the challenge to the validity of the death penalty, I must deal with a preliminary objection raised an behalf of the respondents against our competence to entertain this challenge. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents urged that the question of constitutional validity of the death penalty stood concluded against the petitioners by the decision of a constitution bench of five Judges of this Court in Jagmohan v. State of U. P., AIR 1973 Supreme Court 947 and it could not therefore be allowed to be reagitated before this Bench consisting of the same number of Judges. This Bench, contended the respondents, was bound by the decision in Jagmohan's case (supra) and the same issue, once decided in Jagmohan's case (supra), could not be raised again and reconsidered by this Bench. Now it is true that the question of constitutional validity of death penalty was raised in Jagmohan's case (supra) and this Court by a una
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