JUDGMENT

S. M. FAZAL ALI, J. (for himself and on behalf of M. H. Beg, C.J., V. R. Krishna Iyer and Jaswant Singh JJ.) :— These appeals by certificate granted by the High Court of Kerala involve a common question of law containing a challenge to the constitutionality of the Kerala Agriculturists Debt Relief Act. 1970 (Act II of 1970) (hereinafter referred to in short as the Act). The appellants have assailed particularly Sec. 20 of the Act which entitles the debtors to recover the properties sold to purchasers in execution of the decree passed in liquidating the debt owned by the agriculturists.

2. As the five appeals involve common questions of law we propose to decide them by one common judgment.

3. Section 20 of the Act was assailed before the High Court on three grounds, namely:

1. That the Act was beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature and did not fall within Entry 30 of the State List.

2. That the provisions of S. 20 and the sub-sections thereof were violative of Art. 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution of India inasmuch as they sought to deprive the appellants of their right to hold property.

3. That sub-secs. (3) and (6) of S. 20 of the Act were violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India inasmuch as the stranger decree-holder was selected for hostile discrimination whereas a bona fide alienee who stood on the same footing as the stranger decree-holder was excepted from the operation of the Act.

4. Mr. Krishnamoory Iyer, learned counsel for the appellants has not pressed point No. 1 relating to the legislative competence of the legislature and has fairly conceded that in view of the decision of this Court in the case of Fetehchand Himatlal v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 2 SCR 828 the constitutionality of the Maharashtra Debt Relief Act, 1976 which contained similar or rather harsher provisions as the Act was upheld by this Court. In these circumstances, it will not be necessary for us to examine this question any further.

5. Before however taking up the other two points raised by counsel for the appellants which were pressed before us in this Court it may be necessary to set out the approach which a Court has to make and the principles by which it has to be guided in such matters. Courts interpret the constitutional provisions against the social setting of the country so as to show a complete consciousness and deep awareness of the growing requirements of the society, the increasing needs of the nation, the burning problems of the day and the complex issues facing the people which the legislature in its wisdom, through beneficial legislation seeks to solve. The judicial approach should be dynamic rather than static, pragmatic and not pedantic and elastic rather that rigid. It must take into consideration the changing trends of economic thought, the temper of the times and the living aspirations and feelings of the people. This Court while acting as a sentinel on the qui vive to protect fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of the country must try to strike a just balance between the fundamental rights and the larger and broader interests of society, so that when such a right clashes with the larger interest of the country it must yield to the latter. Emphasising the rule of Courts in such matters this Court in the case of Jyoti Pershad v.Administrator for the Union Territory of Delhi, (1962) 2 SCR 125 at p. 148 observed as follows :-

"Where the legislature fulfils its purpose and enacts laws, which in its wisdom, is considered necessary for the solution of what after all is a very human problem the tests of "reasonableness" have to be viewed in the context of the issues which faced the legislature. In the construction of such laws and particularly in judging of their validity the Courts have necessarily to approach it from the point of view of furthering the social interest which it is the purpose of the legislation to promote, for the Courts are not, in these matters, functioning as it were in va