1. Arrest for offences under IPC, Arms Act, and UAPA — Extension of investigation time granted by Magistrate — Application for default bail under Section 167(2) CrPC. (Para 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 )
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2021 Supreme(SC) 944
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From the High Court of M.P Principal Seat at Jabalpur)
UDAY UMESH LALIT, S. RAVINDRA BHAT, BELA M. TRIVEDI, JJ.
Sadique and Others – Appellants
Versus
State of Madhya Pradesh – Respondent
Criminal Appeal No. 963 of 2021, Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 7767 of 2018
Decided On : 07-09-2021
Important Points
IMPORTANT POINT
Extension of period of investigation – Magistrate would not be competent to consider request and only competent authority to consider such request would be Court as specified in proviso in Section 43-D (2)(b) of UAPA.
Extension of period of investigation – Magistrate would not be competent to consider request and only competent authority to consider such request would be Court as specified in proviso in Section 43-D (2)(b) of UAPA.
Subject
Criminal Law - Bail
Act Referred
Headnote
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – Section 167(2) – Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – Section 43-D – Default bail – Extension of period of investigation – In so far as extension of time to complete investigation is concerned, Magistrate would not be competent to consider request and only competent authority to consider such request would be Court as specified in proviso in Section 43-D (2)(b) of UAPA – Appellants held them entitled to relief of default bail as prayed for. (Paras 13 and 14)
Facts of the case:
Present appeal challenges the final judgment and order dated 11-09-2017 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Principal Seat at Jabalpur in MCRC No. 1395/2016. The appellant No.1 was arrested on 24.12.2013 in connection with crime registered pursuant to FIR No.22/2013 lodged with STF/ATS Police Station, District Bhopal in respect of offences punishable under Sections 307, 34, 467, 468, 481 and 120-B of IPC, Sections 25 and 27 of the Indian Arms Act, Sections 3,10,13,15,18,19,20,23,38 and 39 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.
Findings of Court:
Appellants be produced before the concerned Trial Court within three days from today and the Trial Court, shall release them on bail subject to such conditions as the Trial Court may deem appropriate to impose to ensure their presence and participation in the pending trial.
Result : Criminal Appeal allowed.
Legal Category Hierarchy
- crime and sentencing
- practice and procedure
Advocates:
Advocate Appeared:
For the Appellants : Mr. Siddhartha Dave, Mr. Farrukh Rasheed, Mr. Abu Bakr Sabbag.
For the Respondents: Mr. Pashupathi Nath Razdan, Mr. Pulkit Agarwal, Ms. Maitreyee Jagat Joshi.
Advocate Appeared:
For the Appellants : Mr. Siddhartha Dave, Mr. Farrukh Rasheed, Mr. Abu Bakr Sabbag.
For the Respondents: Mr. Pashupathi Nath Razdan, Mr. Pulkit Agarwal, Ms. Maitreyee Jagat Joshi.
Table of Contents
2. Whether a Magistrate possesses the jurisdiction to extend the investigation period under Section 43-D(2)(b) of the UAPA, thereby affecting the right to default bail. (Para 11 )
3. Under the NIA Act, UAPA offences are triable exclusively by Special Courts or Sessions Courts, meaning Magistrates lack jurisdiction to extend investigation time under Section 43-D(2)(b) UAPA. (Para 12 , 13 , 14 )
4. A Magistrate has no jurisdiction to extend the time for completing an investigation under the first proviso to Section 43-D(2)(b) of the UAPA. (Para 13 , 14 )
5. Appeal allowed — Appellants granted default bail — Trial Court directed to release appellants and conclude proceedings expeditiously. (Para 15 , 16 , 17 , 18 , 19 )
6. Does a Magistrate have the authority to extend the investigation period for offences under the UAPA?
No. Since the NIA Act mandates that all UAPA offences be tried exclusively by Special Courts or the Court of Session, a Magistrate's jurisdiction to extend time under the first proviso to Section 43-D(2)(b) of the UAPA is non-existent. (Para 12 , 13 , 14 )
7. What is the legal consequence of an investigation extension granted by a court lacking jurisdiction?
An extension granted by a court without jurisdiction is of no consequence, rendering the accused entitled to default bail under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure if the charge-sheet is not filed within the statutory period. (Para 11 , 15 )
ORDER :
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal challenges the final judgment and order dated 11-09-2017 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Principal Seat at Jabalpur in MCRC No. 1395/2016.
3. The appellant No. 1 was arrested on 24.12.2013 in connection with crime registered pursuant to FIR No. 22/2013 lodged with STF/ATS Police Station, District Bhopal in respect of offences punishable under Sections 307, 34, 467, 468, 481 and 120-B of IPC, Sections 25 and 27 of the Indian Arms Act, Sections 3, 10, 13, 15, 18, 19, 20, 23, 38 and 39 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (“UAPA” for short).
4. Appellant Nos. 2 to 4 were also arrested around the same time.
5. On 20th March, 2014 while dealing with an application moved on behalf of the Investigating Machinery under Section 43-D(2)(b) of the UAPA, appropriate extension was granted by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhopal.
6. On completion of 90 days of their actual custody, applications on behalf of appellants were moved under Section 167(2) of Code of Criminal Procedure (“the Code” for short) seeking bail on the ground that no charge-sheet was filed by the Investigating Agency within 90 days.
7. Said applications under Section 167(2) of the Code having been rejected by the Court of CJM, Bhopal, Revision Applications were preferred by the appellants which were also rejected by the Sessions Court, Bhopal vide order dated 09.07.2015.
8. The matter was carried further by filing MCRC No. 1396 of 2016 under Section 482 of the Code.
9. The High Court by its judgment which is presently under challenge rejected the prayer. It was observed by the High Court that since the CJM, Bhopal had passed an appropriate order on 20th March, 2014, the period available for the Investigating Machinery to complete the investigation stood extended to 180 days and as such the applications preferred by the appellants under Section 167(2) of the Code were not maintainable and that the appellants were not entitled to the relief as prayed for.
10. Considering the importance of the matter, this Court requested Mr. S.V. Raju, learned ASG to assist this Court.
11. Appearing for the appellants, Mr. Siddhartha Dave, learned Senior Advocate has relied upon the decision of this Court in Bikramjit Singh vs. State of Punjab, (2020) 10 SCC 616. It is submitted that Para 26 of the decision completely covers the issue and that the extension granted in the instant case by CJM, Bhopal was beyond jurisdiction and would, therefore, be of no consequence.
12. Para 26 of the decision of this Court in Bikramjit Singh was to the following effect:
“26. Before the NIA Act was enacted, offences under the UAPA were of two kinds - those with a maximum imprisonment of over 7 years, and those with a maximum imprisonment of 7 years and under. Under the Code as applicable to offences against other laws, offences having a maximum sentence of 7 years and under are triable by the Magistrate’s courts, whereas offences having a maximum sentence of above 7 years are triable by Courts of Session. This scheme has been completely done away with by the NIA Act, 2008 as all Scheduled Offences i.e. all offences under the UAPA, whether investigated by the National Investigation Agency or by the investigating agencies of the State Government, are to be tried exclusively by Special Courts set up under that Act. In the absence of any designated court by notification issued by either the Central Government or the State Government, the fallback is upon the Court of Session alone. Thus, under the aforesaid scheme what becomes clear is that so far as all offences under the UAPA are concerned, the Magistrate’s jurisdiction to extend time under the first proviso in Section 43-D(2)(b) is non-existent “the Court” being either a Sessions Court, in the absence of a notification specifying a Special Court or the Special Court itself. The impugned judgment in arriving at the contrary conclusion is incorrect as it has missed Section 22(2) read with Section 13 of the
