1. Accused arrested for offences under IPC, Arms Act, and UAPA — Investigation extension granted by CJM — Application for default bail under Section 167(2) CrPC. (Para 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 )
2021 Supreme(SC) 1202
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
UDAY UMESH LALIT, S. RAVINDRA BHAT, JJ.
Sadique & Ors. – Appellant
VERSUS
State of Madhya Pradesh – Respondent
Criminal Appeal No. 963 of 2021 (@ Out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.7767 of 2018)
Decided On : 07-09-2021
Important Points
Subject
Criminal Law - Bail
Act Referred
Headnote
(B) Bail - Right to default bail - After 90 days of custody without charge-sheet, appellants entitled to default bail as the law mandates - The appeal allowed and appellants ordered to be released. (Paras 14, 16, 19)
Legal Category Hierarchy
- crime and sentencing
- practice and procedure
For the Petitioner(s): Mr. Siddhartha Dave, Sr. Adv. Mr. Farrukh Rasheed, AOR Mr. Abu Bakr Sabbag, Adv.
For the Respondent(s): Mr. Pashupathi Nath Razdan, AOR Mr. Pulkit Agarwal, Adv. Ms. Maitreyee Jagat Joshi, Adv
Table of Contents
2. Whether a Chief Judicial Magistrate possesses jurisdiction to extend the investigation period under Section 43-D(2)(b) of the UAPA. (Para 10 )
3. Under the NIA Act, UAPA offences are triable exclusively by Special Courts or Sessions Courts, stripping Magistrates of jurisdiction to extend investigation time. (Para 11 , 12 )
4. Magistrates lack jurisdiction to extend investigation time under Section 43-D(2)(b) of the UAPA; such authority rests solely with the Special Court or Sessions Court. (Para 11 , 12 , 13 )
5. Appeal allowed — Appellants granted default bail — Trial Court directed to conclude proceedings expeditiously. (Para 14 , 15 , 16 , 17 , 18 , 19 )
6. Does a Magistrate have the jurisdiction to extend the time for filing a charge-sheet under Section 43-D(2)(b) of the UAPA?
No. Under the NIA Act, all scheduled offences under the UAPA must be tried by Special Courts or, in their absence, the Court of Session. Consequently, the Magistrate's jurisdiction to extend time under the first proviso of Section 43-D(2)(b) is non-existent. (Para 11 , 12 )
7. Which court is the competent authority to grant an extension of time for investigation under Section 43-D(2)(b) of the UAPA?
The only competent authority to consider a request for extension of time to complete an investigation under Section 43-D(2)(b) of the UAPA is the Court specified in the proviso, which is either the Special Court or the Sessions Court. (Para 11 , 13 )
8. What is the effect of an investigation extension granted by a court lacking jurisdiction on the right to default bail?
If the extension of time to file a charge-sheet is granted by a court without jurisdiction, such as a Magistrate in UAPA cases, the extension is of no consequence, and the accused is entitled to default bail under Section 167(2) of the CrPC. (Para 10 , 14 )
ORDER
Leave granted.
2. This appeal challenges the final judgment and order dated 11-09-2017 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Principal Seat at Jabalpur in MCRC No. 1395/2016.
3. The appellant No.1 was arrested on 24.12.2013 in connection with crime registered pursuant to FIR No.22/2013 lodged with STF/ATS Police Station, District Bhopal in respect of offences punishable under Sections 3 07 , 34, 467, 468, 481 and 120-B of IPC, Sections 25 and 27 of the Indian ARMS ACT , Sections 3 ,10,13,15,18,19,20,23,38 and 39 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (“ UAPA ” for short).
4. Appellant Nos.2 to 4 were also arrested around the same time.
5. On 20th March, 2014 while dealing with an application moved on behalf of the Investigating Machinery under Section 43-D(2)(b) of the UAPA , appropriate extension was granted by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhopal.
6. On completion of 90 days of their actual custody, applications on behalf of appellants were moved under Section 167(2) of Code of Criminal Procedure (“the Code” for short) seeking bail on the ground that no charge-sheet was filed by the Investigating Agency within 90 days.
7. Said applications under Section 167(2) of the Code having been rejected by the Court of CJM, Bhopal, Revision Applications were preferred by the appellants which were also rejected by the Sessions Court, Bhopal vide order dated 09.07.2015.
7. The matter was carried further by filing M.Cr.C. No. 1396 of 2016 under Section 482 of the Code.
8. The High Court by its judgment which is presently under challenge rejected the prayer. It was observed by the High Court that since the CJM, Bhopal had passed an appropriate order on 20th March, 2014, the period available for the Investigating Machinery to complete the investigation stood extended to 180 days and as such the applications preferred by the appellants under Section 167(2) of the Code were not maintainable and that the appellants were not entitled to the relief as prayed for.
9. Considering the importance of the matter, this Court requested Mr. S.V. Raju, learned ASG to assist this Court.
10. Appearing for the appellants, Mr. Siddhartha Dave, learned Senior Advocate has relied upon the decision of this Court in Bikramjit Singh vs. State of Punjab , (2020) 10 SCC 616. It is submitted that para 26 of the decision completely covers the issue and that the extension granted in the instant case by CJM, Bhopal was beyond jurisdiction and would, therefore, be of no consequence.
11. Para 26 of the decision of this Court in Bikramjit Singh was to the following effect:
“26. Before the NIA Act was enacted, offences under the UAPA were of two kinds — those with a maximum imprisonment of over 7 years, and those with a maximum imprisonment of 7 years and under. Under the Code as applicable to offences against other laws, offences having a maximum sentence of 7 years and under are triable by the Magistrate’s courts, whereas offences having a maximum sentence of above 7 years are triable by Courts of Session. This scheme has been completely done away with by the NIA Act, 2008 as all Scheduled Offences i.e. all offences under the UAPA, whether investigated by the National Investigation Agency or by the investigating agencies of the State Government, are to be tried exclusively by Special Courts set up under that Act. In the absence of any designated court by notification issued by either the Central Government or the State Government, the fallback is upon the Court of Session alone. Thus, under the aforesaid scheme what becomes clear is that so far as all offences under the UAPA are concerned, the Magistrate’s jurisdiction to extend time under the first proviso in Section 43-D(2)(b) is non-existent, “the Court” being either a Sessions Court, in the absence of a notification specifying a Special Court, or the Special Court itself. The impugned judgment in arriving at the contrary conclusion is incorrect as it has missed Section 22(2) read with Section 13 of the NI