1. Dispute over date of birth for computation of voluntary retirement scheme benefits — conflict between statutory form and service book records. (Para 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 )
Back
Next 
2022 Supreme(SC) 336
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD, ANIRUDDHA BOSE, JJ.
Shankar Lal - Appellant
Versus
Hindustan Copper Ltd. & Ors. - Respondents
Civil Appeal No.2858 of 2022 (Arising out of Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 16886 of 2019)
Decided on : 20-04-2022
Important Points
IMPORTANT POINT
Voluntary Retirement – VRS benefit is an entitlement and assumes character of property to employee concerned once his application for VRS is accepted – It is right of a person under Article 300A of Constitution of India to have VRS benefit to be given on accurate assessment thereof.
Voluntary Retirement – VRS benefit is an entitlement and assumes character of property to employee concerned once his application for VRS is accepted – It is right of a person under Article 300A of Constitution of India to have VRS benefit to be given on accurate assessment thereof.
Subject
Employment Law - Voluntary Retirement Scheme (VRS)
Act Referred
Headnote
Service Law – Voluntary Retirement – [Constitution of India – Article 300A – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 115] – Computation of benefits – This is not a case where a workman is seeking to change his date of birth to his benefit at end of his career – This is a case where employer is altering records at end of career of workman to his detriment on taking unilateral decision that date of birth specified in appellant’s service book was erroneous, relying on a date disclosed in a statutory form – Employer, a public sector unit in this case, was expected to act with a certain element of responsibility in maintaining service records of their workmen and ensure that there is uniformity in particulars concerning individual employees – High Court ought not to have had accepted “mistake” as cause for different entries in different documents – VRS benefit is an entitlement and assumes character of property to employee concerned once his application for VRS is accepted – It is right of a person under Article 300A of Constitution of India to have VRS benefit to be given on accurate assessment thereof, employer here being a public sector unit – If at the time of quantifying VRS benefit after accepting employee’s application for voluntary retirement, employer take any step that would reduce such benefit in monetary terms, such step shall have to be taken under authority of law – Process of fixing of appellant’s date of birth had continued beyond date on which he was released from his service – Decision not to follow service book recordal was taken without giving opportunity of hearing to appellant – Very reasoning on which an employee is not permitted to raise age-correction plea at fag end of his service to extend his tenure should also apply to employer as well – Principle of estoppel cannot be invoked in this case against appellant to debar him from claiming benefit properly computed as per his age reflected in official documents – Respondents to extend benefits of VRS to appellant treating his date of birth as 21st September, 1949. (Paras 16, 18, 20, 21, 22 and 23)
Facts of the case:
Appellant is primarily questioning validity of an order of the employer (Hindustan Copper Limited the first respondent in this appeal) treating his date of birth as 21st September 1945. This date has relevance for computation of his benefits accruing from a Voluntary Retirement Scheme (“VRS”), for which he applied and was granted. The appellant’s stand is that his date of birth is 21st September 1949. The appellant had invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur, but was unsuccessful before a Single Judge and the Division Bench in sustaining his case. If the latter date, i.e. 21st September, 1949 was accepted by employer to be his date of birth, his financial benefits from the said scheme would have been higher, as he would have had longer service tenure left.
Findings of Court:
Division Bench as also the Single Judge of the High Court did not appreciate the materials available in their proper perspective. We do not think that the view taken by Division Bench was a possible view. Sustaining such view would result in depriving the appellant of his legitimate benefits under the applicable Voluntary Retirement Scheme.
Result : Appeal allowed.
Legal Category Hierarchy
Advocates appeared:
For the Appellant(s) : Mr. Kaushal Yadav Adv Dr. Sushil Balwada Aor Mr. Ram Kishor Singh Yadav Adv. Mr. Nandlal Kumar Mishra Adv. Mr. Shafik Ahmed Adv.
For the Respondent(s): Ms. Nandini Sen Mukherjee, AOR
For the Appellant(s) : Mr. Kaushal Yadav Adv Dr. Sushil Balwada Aor Mr. Ram Kishor Singh Yadav Adv. Mr. Nandlal Kumar Mishra Adv. Mr. Shafik Ahmed Adv.
For the Respondent(s): Ms. Nandini Sen Mukherjee, AOR
Table of Contents
2. Employer relies on statutory form and time-limit for corrections — employee relies on service book entries and subsequent consistent records. (Para 5 , 9 , 10 , 11 )
3. Unilateral alteration of service records without hearing the employee violates natural justice — consistent use of a date in official records precludes a claim of mistake. (Para 12 , 13 , 14 , 15 , 18 , 19 , 20 )
4. Employers cannot unilaterally alter established service records to the detriment of employees at the end of their career without following principles of natural justice. (Para 21 )
5. Rejection order quashed — direction to extend voluntary retirement benefits based on the later date of birth with simple interest. (Para 23 , 24 )
6. Is the entry in Form B under the Mines Act conclusive proof of an employee's date of birth?
No. While an entry in Form B possesses high probative value, it is not conclusive proof. Doubts regarding age can be verified by a medical board, and other records, such as service books, may be considered. (Para 13 )
7. Can an employer unilaterally correct a date of birth in service records at the end of an employee's tenure?
No. Such an exercise must not be mechanical or unilateral. The employer must provide the employee an opportunity to be heard, adhering to the principles of natural justice, especially when official records are contradictory. (Para 12 , 21 )
8. Does a prescribed time limit for correcting date of birth apply when the service book already contains the claimed date?
No. If the service book already reflects the date claimed by the employee, no occasion arises for the employee to seek a correction, rendering time-limit guidelines for corrections inapplicable. (Para 15 )
9. What is the legal character of benefits accruing from a Voluntary Retirement Scheme (VRS)?
VRS benefits are an entitlement that assumes the character of property under Article 300A of the Constitution of India once the application for voluntary retirement is accepted. (Para 21 )
JUDGMENT :
ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.
The appellant is before us primarily questioning the validity of an order of the employer (Hindustan Copper Limited the first respondent in this appeal) treating his date of birth as 21st September 1945. This date has relevance for computation of his benefits accruing from a Voluntary Retirement Scheme (“VRS”), for which he applied and was granted. The appellant’s stand is that his date of birth is 21st September 1949. The appellant had invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur (“the High Court”), but was unsuccessful before a Single Judge and the Division Bench in sustaining his case. If the latter date, i.e. 21st September, 1949 was accepted by the employer to be his date of birth, his financial benefits from the said scheme would have been higher, as he would have had longer service tenure left. It appears that the tenure of service left was the basis on which the VRS benefit was to be computed. We would like to point out here that in the pleadings and copies of various other documents forming part of the paper-book, there are overlapping dates claimed by the appellant to be his actual date of birth. These are 20th September 1949 and 21st September 1949. This variation, however, is insignificant so far as adjudication of this appeal is concerned. In this judgment, we shall ignore this variation and proceed on the basis that 21st September 1949 is the date claimed by the appellant to be his birthdate.
2. The VRS was operational in the appellant’s case with effect from 3rd October 2002. Admitted position is that 21st September 1949 was recorded as his date of birth in his service book. This was opened in 1975. He had joined the organisation in the year 1971 and the Form “B” reflects his date of birth as 21st September 1945. The appellant claims that at the time of his voluntary retirement, he came to learn for the first time that his date of birth was being changed to 21st September 1945. He invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High Court in the year 2008 as his representations for adhering to 21st September 1949 as his birthdate failed to evoke positive response from the employer. That writ petition (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.5690/08) was disposed of by a Single Judge with a direction to the appellant to make a fresh representation in light of the recommendations made by a committee of the employer themselves in his favour on the subject controversy. The competent authority was directed, in the same judgment delivered on 15th July 2008, to consider and decide on the same in accordance with law.
3. The appellant’s representation was rejected by the competent authority-employer by an order passed on 13th October 2008 (“the rejection order”). The appellant’s plea against the rejection order (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 13195/2008) was dismissed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court by an Order dated 24th November 2008 and his appeal (D.B.Special Appeal Writ No.1501/2011) assailing the order of dismissal before a Division Bench of the same High Court also failed. The judgment of the Division Bench was delivered on 8th December 2016. It is this judgment which is under appeal before us. The appellant stakes his claim primarily on his service book maintained by the employer, where his date of birth is shown as 21st September 1949. Mr. Kaushal Yadav, learned counsel for the appellant has also relied on a Life Insurance Corporation (“L.I.C.”) Policy in which the same date of birth has been shown. This policy, however, was subscribed to by the appellant in the month of May, 1980. The appellant’s counsel has brought to our notice sample copies of his pay slips for the months of August 1994 and August 2001. Both these pay slips carry the message, “Happy Birthday ***20.09.1949***”. The appellant has also relied upon certain clauses of the Standing Orders of the employer in support of his claim. We shall refer to the relevant clauses thereof later in this judgm
