IMPORTANT POINTS
(1) There is presumption about constitutionality of law made by Parliament/State Legislature.
(2) Exercise of power in a reasonable manner inheres concept of its exercise within a reasonable time.

JUDGMENT

A.M. Khanwilkar, J.

In these appeals, the subject matter is the notification dated 23.6.2005 bearing No. HD 34 KOMAME 2004, Bangalore issued under Section 17 of the Karnataka Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1973 [for short, 'the 1973 Act'] by the Housing Department of the State of Karnataka and the constitutional validity of Section 20 of the 1973 Act. The persons aggrieved by the issue of the impugned notification dated 23.6.2005 had filed Writ Petition No.22611 of 2005 [filed by B.R. Muralidhar, respondent No.1 in Civil Appeal No.1966 of 2013], Writ Petition No.20955 of 2005 [filed by V. Balasubramanya @ Balender Venkta, respondent No.3 in Civil Appeal No.1966 of 2013] and Writ Petition No.21192 of 2005 (GM-Slum) [filed by M/s. Chandra Spinning and Weaving Mills Private Limited, respondent No.4 in Civil Appeal No.1966 of 2013 and also appellant in the companion appeal i.e., Civil Appeal No..of 2022 @ S.L.P. (C) No.18942 of 2013] before the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore [for short, 'the High Court'].

2. The challenge to the stated notification was twofold. The first is that the impugned notification was issued without adequately considering the objections taken by the writ petitioners and in excess of the power vested in the authority. The second was about the lapsing of the acquisition which was in furtherance of the show cause notice issued under the 1973 Act on 14.10.1982. It was the case of the writ petitioners that by efflux of time, the stated show cause notice (preliminary notification) had worked out and no acquisition in furtherance thereof after 23 years could be permitted in law. As regards the validity of Section 20 of the 1973 Act, the challenge was essentially about the method of determining payment predicated therein to pay amount at the rate of three hundred times the property tax for acquiring the land under Section 17 of the 1973 Act and not fair market value of the property. Whereas, the amount offered on the basis of property tax is inevitably an illusory amount, including in the teeth of the legislation made by the Parliament, namely the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 [for short, 'the 1894 Act'].

3. Learned Single Judge of the High Court of Karnataka vide common judgment and order dated 20.9.2007 declared Section 20 of the 1973 Act as ultra vires. He, however, rejected the plea of the writ petitioners that the acquisition pursuant to preliminary notification dated 14.10.1982 had lapsed on the finding that there was no such provision in the 1973 Act analogous to the provisions of the 1894 Act. Learned Single Judge also rejected the plea taken by the writ petitioners that their objections were not adequately considered. Having so held, the learned Single Judge did not set aside the impugned notification dated 23.6.2005. As learned Single Judge took a view that Section 20 of the 1973 Act was ultra vires, it had to then opine that vacuum regarding the method of determination of amount to be paid to the land losers was created and until a just method for determination of amount was replaced by a law made by the State Legislature, the land losers ought to be paid amount in accordance with Sections 23 and 24 of the 1894 Act.

4. Against the decision of the learned Single Judge, cross appeals were filed by the writ petitioners as well as by the State of Karnataka. Respondent No.3 herein (V. Balasubramanya @ Balender Venkta), however, later withdrew his appeal. The appeal filed by the State of Karnataka for assailing the decision of the learned Single Judge declaring Section 20 of the 1973 Act ultra vires, came to be disposed of vide impugned judgment and order dated 28.8.2012 passed in Writ Appeal No. 918 of 2008 and Writ Appeal Nos. 1484-1485 of 2011 (GM-SLUM). In view of withdrawal of the cross appeal filed by the writ petitioner (respondent No.3 herein), the Division Bench was not required to examine the correctness of the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in respect of plea of lap