1. Employee seeking correction of date of birth in service records — Application for correction ignored — Civil suit filed for rectification. (Para 2 , 3 )
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2022 Supreme(SC) 1808
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Sanjiv Khanna, Bela M. Trivedi, JJ.
Tulshi Choudhary – Appellant
Versus
M/s. Steel Authority of India Limited (Sail) & Ors. – Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 5062 of 2022 (& SLP(C) No. 8443 of 20181
Decided On : 03-08-2022
Important Points
The main legal point established in the judgment is that the jurisdiction of the civil court is not ousted in cases relating to the correction of date of birth, which do not fall under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
Subject
Civil Law - Employment Law
Act Referred
Headnote
Industrial Dispute - Date of Birth Correction - Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - Section 33-C (2)
Fact of the Case:
The appellant requested for correction of his date of birth, but the respondent did not make any change. The appellant filed a civil suit, which was dismissed by the trial court but decreed by the first appellate court. The High Court dismissed the suit, stating that the appellant should have approached the labour court under Section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
Finding of the Court:
The Supreme Court disagreed with the High Court's finding, stating that the present case is not covered by the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as the issue involved relates only to the correction of the date of birth. The court held that the appellant is entitled to relief as claimed and decreed the suit, awarding back wages, interest, and costs to the appellant.
Issues: The main issue was whether the appellant's case fell under the jurisdiction of the civil court or the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and whether the appellant was entitled to relief for the correction of his date of birth.
Ratio Decidendi: The court applied the principles established in The Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamelekar Shantaram Wadke of Bombay & Ors., (1976) 1 SCC 496, to determine the jurisdiction of the civil court in relation to an industrial dispute. The court concluded that the present case did not fall under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and the appellant was entitled to relief through the civil court.
Final Decision: The Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgment, allowed the appeal, and decreed the suit in favor of the appellant, awarding back wages, interest, and costs.
Legal Category Hierarchy
Advocates Appeared:
Mr. Anubhav Kumar, Advocate, Mr. Abhishek Swarup, Advocate, M/S. Manoj Swarup And Co., Advocate, for the Appellant; Mr. Ranjan Kumar Pandey, Advocate, for the Respondent.
Mr. Anubhav Kumar, Advocate, Mr. Abhishek Swarup, Advocate, M/S. Manoj Swarup And Co., Advocate, for the Appellant; Mr. Ranjan Kumar Pandey, Advocate, for the Respondent.
Table of Contents
2. Whether a dispute regarding correction of date of birth is an industrial dispute requiring adjudication under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. (Para 4 )
3. Correction of date of birth does not constitute an industrial dispute or the enforcement of a right under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. (Para 5 , 6 )
4. Civil court jurisdiction is not ousted if the dispute does not relate to the enforcement of a right or obligation created under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. (Para 5 , 6 )
5. Appeal allowed — Suit decreed — Grant of back wages with interest and costs. (Para 7 , 8 )
6. When does the jurisdiction of a civil court exist in relation to an industrial dispute?
Civil court jurisdiction exists if the dispute is not an industrial dispute and does not relate to the enforcement of any right under the Industrial Disputes Act, or if it arises from general or common law, in which case the jurisdiction is alternative. (Para 5 )
7. Does a dispute regarding the correction of an employee's date of birth oust the jurisdiction of the civil court?
No, a dispute relating only to the correction of the date of birth does not relate to the enforcement of a right or obligation under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and thus the jurisdiction of the civil court is not ousted. (Para 6 )
8. When is adjudication under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the only available remedy?
Adjudication under the Act is the only remedy if the industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation specifically created under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. (Para 5 )
ORDER
1. Leave granted.
2. During the course of hearing, it is accepted that, pursuant to the communication dated 07.08.1998 (Exhibit-8), appellant-Tulshi Choudhary had submitted an application dated 02.09.1998 (Exhibit-9) requesting for correction of his date of birth as 03.10.1949. The appellant had enclosed copy of the matriculation certificate (Exhibit-1) and the certificate issued by the Government of Bihar to the effect that the appellant had undergone training in the Industrial Training Institute (Exhibit-2), wherein again his date of birth has been mentioned as 03.10.1949. The respondent M/s. IISCO Limited, now amalgamated with the Steel Authority of India Ltd. (SAIL), had earlier issued the communication dated 07.08.1998 (Exhibit-8) pursuant to National Coal Wage Agreement III implementation instruction No. 76. The communication dated 07.08.1998 had stated that the date of birth of the appellant, as recorded in their records, is 14.09.1947 and in case the date of birth as recorded with them is wrong, the appellant may apply for change within the period stipulated therein.
3. In spite of the representation/written communication by the appellant dated 02.09.1998 enclosing the required documents, the respondents did not communicate or make any change. In these circumstances, the appellant was compelled to file a civil suit on 06.12.2005, when he was still in service, the age of retirement being 60 years.
4. The trial court had dismissed the suit, but the first appellate court, on appreciation of the evidence on record, had decreed the suit. The High Court by the impugned judgment has dismissed the suit inter alia recording that the appellant should have approached the labour court under Section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
5. We are not in agreement with this finding in view of the decision of this Court in The Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamelekar Shantaram Wadke of Bombay & Ors., (1976) 1 SCC 496, where the principles applicable to the jurisdiction of the civil court in relation to an industrial dispute were examined to conclude:
(1) If the dispute is not an industrial dispute, nor does it relate to enforcement of any other right under the Act, the remedy lies only in the civil court.
(2) If the dispute is an industrial dispute arising out of a right or liability under the general or common law and not under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the jurisdiction of the civil court is alternative, leaving it to the election of the suitor concerned to choose his remedy for the relief which is competent to be granted in a particular remedy.
(3) If the industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, then the only remedy available to the suitor is to get an adjudication under the Act.
(4) If the right which is sought to be enforced is a right created under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, such as Chapter VA, then the remedy for its enforcement is either Section 33-C or the raising of an industrial dispute, as the case may be.
6. In our opinion, the present case is not covered by principles (3) and (4) as the issue involved relates only to the correction of the date of birth. Jurisdiction of the civil court is not ousted, as this is not a case relating to enforcement of a right or an obligation under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Equally, on merits, we find that the appellant is entitled to relief as claimed. The respondents have not been just and fair.
7. Accordingly, we hold that the suit filed by the appellant should be decreed. However, as the appellant had retired, we pass the decree in the following terms:
(i) The appellant would be entitled to back wages from 01.10.2007 to 31.10.2009, that is, the actual wages payable to the appellant, as if he had worked during this period. The respondents would be entitled to deduct from the amount, the pension amount, if any paid by them, or paid by the third party in terms of the agreement between
