The legal point established is that the withdrawal of resignation renders subsequent acceptance of resignation with no legal effect, and entitlement to pensionary dues should be based on completing the minimum pensionable service.

JUDGMENT

Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, CJI. - The appellant was appointed as an Auxiliary Nurse Midwife by the District Panchayat, Valsad on 15 January 1980. She submitted her resignation from service on 18 April 1993, but on 23 November 1993, withdrew it. On 20 December 1993, she was called upon to resume service. She was however not permitted to join until 16 April 1994. On 23/26 December 1994, an order was passed accepting her resignation with effect from 31 March 1993. This gave rise to the institution of a petition[Special Civil Appeal No 10418 of 1995] under Article 226 of the Constitution by the appellant.

2. By a judgment dated 12 October 2000, a Single Judge of the High Court of Gujarat set aside the order dated 23/26 December 1994 and directed that the appellant would be entitled to all consequential benefits.

3. In a Letters Patent Appeal[Letters Patent Appeal No 97 of 2001] filed by the State of Gujarat, a Division Bench of the High Court found that the appellant had not been allowed to resume her duties for no fault of hers. However, the Division Bench directed that the appellant shall not be entitled to any benefits for the period for which the resignation was in force.

4. The above narration indicates that the issue pertaining to the resignation of the appellant attained finality with the judgment of the Division Bench dated 22 February 2001. Evidently, the appellant had withdrawn her resignation prior to its acceptance. The subsequent order of the Government accepting her resignation in December 1994 with effect from 31 March 1993 was of no consequence in law. The consequence of the decision of the High Court was that the resignation of the appellant from service which was withdrawn on 23 November 1993 would not have any legal effect. The only consequence of the judgment of the Division Bench was that whereas the Single Judge had directed that the appellant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, the Division Bench held that she would not be entitled to benefits for the period for which the resignation was in force. In other words, this period would be from 18 April 1993 until 23 November 1993.

5. Despite the above legal position, an order was initially passed on 8 April 2002 by the respondent holding that (i) the period from 24 November 1993 to 30 March 2001 would be treated as unauthorized leave; and (ii) the above period would be considered as a break in service without salary. Subsequently on 17 July 2002, a similar order was passed treating the period of resignation as unauthorized leave.

6. The two orders dated 8 April 2002 and 17 July 2002 led to the institution of fresh proceedings[Special Civil Application No 9723 of 2002] under Article 226 of the Constitution. By a judgment dated 9 August 2004, a Single Judge of the High Court quashed and set aside both the above orders dated 8 April 2002 and 17 July 2002. The respondents were directed to pay all the benefits for the period from 24 November 1993 till 30 March 2001 together with interest at 9% from 22 February 2001. The amount was paid in 2004 and the interest element was paid in 2012. Significantly, the judgment of the High Court dated 9 August 2004 attained finality. There was no appeal against the decision.

7. On 16 July 2005, a third order was passed by the respondents holding the following period as unauthorized leave and to be treated as a break in service, namely;

8. The above order gave rise to a third petition[Special Civil Application No 14636 of 2006] under Article 226 at the instance of the appellant. By its impugned judgment dated 25 July 2006, the High Court has held that no continuity of service could be granted on account of her absence from service over a period of 782 days