IMPORTANT POINT
Plaintiff cannot challenge a registered sale-deed when he himself lacks any evidence to show his title over subject property.

JUDGMENT :

(Rajesh Bindal, J.)

1. The successor-in-interest of the plaintiff is before this Court challenging the judgment and decree¹[Judgement and decree dated 08.10.2004], of the High Court²[Punjab and Haryana High Court at Chandigarh] in Second Appeal³[Regular Second Appeal No. 1584 of 1980]. Vide aforesaid judgment, the judgments and decrees of the courts below were reversed.

2. The predecessor-in-interest of the appellant- Sukhjit Singh (deceased) filed a Suit⁴[Suit No. 345 of 1978], challenging the first sale deed⁵[First sale deed dated 28.09.1956], which was got registered by his father-Gurinder Singh (now deceased). The first sale deed was registered for the land measuring 166 kanals and 15 marlas in favour of Harjit Singh, who subsequently sold 118 kanals and 06 marlas to the State of Punjab (now falling in the State of Haryana), vide second registered sale deed⁶[Second sale deed dated 01.03.1958] for total consideration of Rs.14,784/- . The balance land was transferred by Harjit Singh in favour of his mother, namely, Smt. Davinder Kaur. The possession of the land was delivered to the buyers.

3. Challenging the first sale deed, the predecessor-in-interest of the appellant filed a Civil Suit on 03.10.1972 on the plea that his father sold the land when he was minor without taking permission of the Court in terms of Section 8 of the Act⁷[The Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956]. The same was not for need and welfare of the minor as nothing is stated therein. Harjit Singh, first buyer of the land from late-Gurinder Singh, did not contest the litigation as he had already transferred the land in favour of the State and his mother. The Trial Court⁸[Sub Judge II Class, Karnal], decreed the suit. The first Appellate Court⁹[Additional District Judge, Karnal] upheld the judgment and decree of the Trial Court, however the High Court in Second Appeal reversed the judgments and decrees of the courts below.

4. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the finding recorded by the High Court with reference to the date of birth of the appellant is erroneous and against the documentary evidence produced on record. Merely oral evidence has been relied upon which was just an estimation of age. He further referred to a certificate of Doon School showing the date of birth of late-Sukhjit Singh as 16.08.1951. If counted from that date, legal notice under Section 80 C.P.C. was issued by late-Sukhjit Singh to the State well before expiry of three years and the suit was filed within three years and two months from the date of attaining the age of majority by late-Sukhjit Singh. The same could not be dismissed as time barred. The High Court had gone beyond the pleaded case of the State. Once there was no permission from the Court to sell the property of the minor and the sale was not for the need and welfare of the minor, the same was rightly set aside by the Trial Court and the first Appellate Court.

5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State submitted that from the facts of the case, it is evident that it is a dishonest litigation initiated with a view to extract more money from the State. There were number of other sale deeds registered in the similar fashion as was done in the case of sale in favour of Harjit Singh from whom the State had purchased the same by way of second registered sale deed. The consideration as settled at that time was duly paid. Even if the date of birth of late-Sukhjit Singh is taken as 16.08.1951, still the suit filed by him was not maintainable as there is no document produced on record by late-Sukhjit Singh while filing the suit or in evidence that the property was ever registered in his name or had fallen to his share. It is merely a recital in the first sale-deed executed by Late Gurinder Singh in favour of Harjit Singh, where it is mentioned that the sale-deed is being registered as a guardian of Sukhjit Singh who was minor at that time.

6. He further submitted that it was a bona fide purchase b