Advocates appeared:
For the Petitioner(s): Mr. Konark Tyagi, AOR
For the Respondent(s): Mr. Yasharth Kant, AOR Mrs. Anamika Agarwal, Adv. Ms. Sonal Kushwah, Adv. Mr. Rajesh Kumar, Adv. Mr. Navank Shekhar Mishra, Adv. Ms. Vimal Sinha, Adv. Mr. Aviral Kashyap, AOR

Key Points: - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court’s order quashing the FIR and proceedings, restoring them to the Trial Court for expeditious disposal (!) . - The Appellant was an injured victim and original complainant; he was not a party to the Settlement Agreement; High Court erred by quashing based on that agreement (!) (!) . - Inherent power to quash is distinct from compounding under Section 320 CrPC; quashing depends on securing ends of justice and preventing abuse of process, with considerations on the nature and gravity of the crime and whether settlement justifies quashing (Gian Singh principles) (!) (!) . - Offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., cannot be quashed even with settlement; private or civil-flavoured cases may be quashed if continuation would be oppressive and justice requires ending the case (!) . - The case involved non-compoundable offences under IPC Sections 147, 148, 149, 364; the settlement between accused and Respondent No. 5 did not include the injured victim, affecting the legality of quashing (!) (!) . - The High Court’s 2nd Settlement Order directing quashing based on the 28-09-2022 agreement was found erroneous; proceedings were restored (!) . - The Trial Court’s initial observation acknowledged non-compoundable nature of some offences and that the injured party/complainant was not a party to the settlement (!) . - The judgment cites Gian Singh (Supra) to emphasize that the ends of justice and abuse of process considerations guide quashing under inherent power (!) .

What is the scope of the High Court's inherent jurisdiction to quash criminal proceedings in light of a settlement between the victim and the accused?

What are the factors to determine whether quashing a FIR or proceedings is permissible despite a settlement, as per Gian Singh and related principles?

How should lower courts handle settlements where the complainant or injured victim is not a party to the settlement, in cases involving non-compoundable offences?