The court ruled that specific performance cannot be granted if the plaintiff's own pleadings assert that the defendant lacks rights to the property, rendering the claim inequitable.

ORDER :

1. Heard the learned senior counsel appearing for the parties.

2. The decree of the Trial Court was set aside by the High Court by its impugned judgment.

3. Brief reference to few facts will be necessary. The first appellant on 03.10.1988 executed a sale deed in favour of the second appellant and the respondent in respect of the suit property. On 03.03.1989, a registered release deed was executed by the second appellant in favour of the respondent-defendant relinquishing her rights in respect of the suit property under the sale deed executed by the first plaintiff (therein) on 03.10.1988. According to the case of the appellants, on 19.03.1989, the respondent executed an agreement in favour of the second plaintiff for re-conveyance of the suit property.

4. On 29.12.1989, a suit simpliciter for injunction was filed by the appellants praying for restraining the respondent from executing a sale deed in respect of the suit property in favour of the strangers. An injunction was also claimed for protecting possession of the appellants over the suit property. Subsequently, an application was made by the appellants for amendment of the plaint. The application was allowed. By the amendment, an averment was added in the plaint that the appellants were always ready and willing to pay the amount of Rs. 29,400/- to the respondent. A prayer was added for specific performance of the agreement dated 19.03.1989 (for short ‘the suit agreement’) seeking a direction to the respondent to execute a sale deed in favour of the first appellant.

5. There was some dispute about execution of the suit agreement with reference to the dates appearing in the suit agreement. The Trial Court had accepted the evidence of scribe (PW-3) of the suit agreement. The Trial Court passed a decree for specific performance. While allowing the first appeal, by the impugned judgment, the High Court discarded the testimony of PW-3 and ultimately, held that this was not a fit case to exercise discretion under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (for short ‘the 1963 Act’). Hence, the High Court reversed the decree passed by the Trial Court.

6. The first submission of the learned counsel appearing for the appellants is that after the Trial Court exercised the discretion under Section 20 of the 1963 Act in favour of the appellants, the ppellate Court did not have jurisdiction to interfere with the exercise of discretion unless it was established that the exercise of discretion was perverse or arbitrary. He has relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of K. Prakash v. B.R. Sampath Kumar, (2015) 1 SCC 597 and particularly what is held in paragraph ‘16’ which reads thus:

“16. The principle which can be enunciated is that where the plaintiff brings a suit for specific performance of contract for sale, the law insists upon a condition precedent to the grant of decree for specific performance: that the plaintiff must show his continued readiness and wiling to perform his part of the contract in accordance with its terms from the date of contract to the date of hearing. Normally, when the trial court exercises its discretion in one way or the other after appreciation of entire evidence and materials on record, the appellate court should not interfere unless it is established that the discretion has been exercised perversely, arbitrarily or against judicial principles. The appellate court should also not exercise its discretion against the grant of specific performance on extraneous considerations or sympathetic considerations. It is true, as contemplated under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, that a party is not entitled to get a decree for specific performance merely because it is lawful to do so. Nevertheless once an agreement to sell is legal and validity proved and further requirements for getting such a decree are established then the court has to exercise its discretion in favour of granting relief for specific performance.”

7. He has also relied upon what i