The court ruled that the victim's age of 19 years at the time of the incident precluded the application of kidnapping laws under IPC, leading to the quashing of the conviction under Section 366 IPC.

JUDGMENT

B.R. GAVAI, J.

1. This appeal challenges the judgment and order dated 14th December, 2011 passed by the High court of Karnataka at Bangalore, vide which the learned Single Judge of the High Court has partly allowed the appeal filed by the appellants herein and set aside the judgment and order of the P.O. and Addl. Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court-IV, at Kolar, by which the learned Additional Sessions Judge convicted the appellants under Section 366 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC” for short) and sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years. Thereafter, the High Court convicted them for the offence punishable under Section 363 of the IPC and sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year.

FACTS:

2. The facts, in brief, giving rise to the present appeal are as follows:

2.1 According to the prosecution on 21st February, 1997 at about 08:00 a.m., PW2-Bharathi-victim, the daughter of PW1 was going along with PW7-Kalavathi and PW-9-Sharada to the College at Srinivasapur from Kallur village. They boarded the bus from Kallur village to Srinivasapur. When they got down at Srinivaspur bus stand at about 08:00 a.m., they saw a car parked. The original accused No.1-Reddappa, who is known to PW2 and who was also from the same village, came out from the said car, allegedly gagged her mouth and forcibly took PW2 in the car to a place called Navadi Village in Hosur Taluk, Tamil Nadu. She was kept in the house of accused Nos. 6 and 7. It is the prosecution’s case that the PW7 and PW9, who had seen the incident, went to the house of PW1 (Smt. Chowdamma), the mother of the victim, and informed her that accused No.1 and others have kidnapped the PW2. PW1 went to Srinivasapur Police Station wherein the statement of PW1 was recorded at 10:15 a.m. and Crime No. 42 of 1997 came to be registered for the offence punishable under Section 363 of the IPC. In a search operation, the police party went to the house of accused Nos. 6 and 7. They found victim-PW2 and accused Nos. 1 to 3 in the said house. The police arrested accused Nos. 1 to 3 and brought the victim to the police station and produced them before the PW-15, G.N. Narayanappa, the Investigating Officer (I.O.). Accused Nos. 4 to 7 were not arrested.

2.2 Since the original accused No.1 was absconding, the trial was conducted against the six other accused.

2.3 Upon the conclusion of the trial, the learned trial Judge convicted the appellants for the offence punishable under Section 366 IPC and sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years.

2.4 Being aggrieved thereby, the appellants preferred an appeal before the High Court.

2.5 Learned single Judge of the High Court found that the Trial Court had erred in convicting the appellants under Section 366 of the IPC, inasmuch as there was no demand for ransom.

2.6 However, the High Court has set aside the conviction of the appellants for the offence punishable under Section 366 IPC and convicted the appellants punishable for an offence under Section 363 IPC and sentenced them to suffer Rigorous Imprisonment for one year with fine of Rs. 5000/- each. In default to pay fine, they have to undergo simple imprisonment for 3 months each. It was also directed that out of the fine amount of Rs. 20,000/-, Rs. 15,000/- to be paid to the PW2 and Rs.5,000/- fine in the State account.

3. We have heard Mr. Mr. Shekhar G. Devasa, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants as well as Mr. Avishkar Singhvi, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the respondentState of Karnataka.

4. Mr. Devasa submits that learned Trial Court has grossly erred in convicting the appellants. He submits that an offence under Section 366 IPC was not made out, inasmuch as the victim herself has admitted in her evidence that she was 19 years old at time of incident. He, therefore, submits that the impugned judgment and order is liable to be quashed and set aside.

5. Mr. Singhvi, on the contrary, submits that the High Court has