The delay in implementing a High Court order should not prejudice the rights of appellants regarding seniority, affirming their entitlement over subsequent appointees.

JUDGMENT :

B.R. GAVAI, J.

1. Delay condoned.

2. Leave granted.

3. The present appeal challenges the judgment and final order dated 30th July 2019, passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur (hereinafter referred to as, “High Court”) in Writ Appeal No. 341 of 2019, whereby the High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the appellants thereby affirming the order dated 13th May 2019 rendered by the learned Single Judge of the High Court in Writ Petition (S) No.3620 of 2019.

4. The facts, in brief, giving rise to the present appeal are as under:

4.1 On 2nd April 2003, the Chhattisgarh State Public Service Commission issued Advertisement No.01/2003/Exam inviting applications for recruitment to the post of Civil Judge, Class-II.

4.2 The appellants submitted their applications, participated in the examination as well as the interview. Thereafter, while preparing the final select list, the appellants who secured 127 and 125 marks respectively, were placed in the supplementary select list/waiting list, despite securing better marks than two women candidates.

4.3 Aggrieved thereby, the appellants filed Writ Petition No.1827 of 2004 before the High Court challenging the legality and validity of the selection on the ground that the selection under the reserved quota for women has been made in excess of the quota prescribed under Rule 6-A of the Chhattisgarh Lower Judicial (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1994 and Article 15(3) of the Constitution of India.

4.4 On 2nd May 2012, the Division Bench of the High Court allowed the writ petition and directed the appointment of the appellants, subject to the fulfilment of necessary formalities such as police verification etc., against the available vacancies for the post of Civil Judge (Junior Division). The High Court further held that the seniority of the appellants will be reckoned from the date of their appointment.

4.5 Consequently, the appellants were appointed on 8th July 2013 and confirmed on 4th December 2015.

4.6 Discontented by the fact that though the appellants were appointed pursuant to the selection process held in the year 2003, they were placed below the candidates selected in the year 2006, 2008 and 2012, the appellants made a representation before the Registrar General of the Chhattisgarh High Court claiming seniority over the candidate prior to 2006 batch on the ground that the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (General Conditions of Services) Rules, 1961 provides that seniority of the direct recruits shall be determined on the basis of order of merit irrespective of the date of appointment.

4.7 On 24th June 2016, the representation of the appellants was rejected by the Registrar General of the High Court stating that the order of the High Court in Writ Petition No.1827 of 2004 clearly states that the seniority will be determined from the date of appointment and the said order has attained finality.

4.8 Consequently, the appellants filed an application being MCC No.681 of 2016 in Writ Petition No.1827 of 2004 seeking clarification of the order dated 2nd May 2012.

4.9 On 28th September 2016, the Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the aforesaid application stating that the order dated 2nd May 2012 requires no clarification as it does not suffer from any ambiguity.

4.10 Aggrieved thereby, the appellants filed Writ Petition No.3620 of 2019 before the High Court seeking quashing of the letter dated 24th June 2016 issued by the Registrar General of the High Court rejecting the appellants’ claim of seniority.

4.11 On 13th May 2019, the learned Single Judge of the High Court rejected the writ petition of the appellants stating that the Division Bench of the High Court vide order dated 2nd May 2012 in Writ Petition No.1827 of 2004 had stated in categorical terms that the seniority of the appellants would be reckoned from the date of appointment. If the appellants were aggrieved by the said direction, they ought to have challenged the same at that point of