SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
PANKAJ MITHAL, S.V.N. BHATTI, JJ.
Anurag Bhatnagar & Anr. – Petitioners
Versus
State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. – Respondents
Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 18084 of 2024 with Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.18087 of 2024, Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.18094 of 2024, Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.18091 of 2024, Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.18095 of 2024
Decided On : 25-07-2025
(A) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – Section 156(3) – Direction for Police investigation – Person aggrieved must first exhaust alternative remedies available to him in law before approaching court of law – He cannot ordinarily approach court directly – It is imperative upon informant to first approach officer-in-charge of police station for the purposes of lodging FIR in respect of a cognizable offence and where Police refuses to record such information, remedy is to approach concerned Superintendent of Police – It is only when no action is taken even by Superintendent of Police and information of commission of a cognizable offence is not being recorded by officer-in-charge of police station or even by Superintendent of Police, that person aggrieved or informant may move court of Magistrate concerned to get FIR registered and lodged with concerned police station. (Paras 26, 27 and 29)
(B) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – Section 156(3) – Direction for Police investigation – Magistrate ought not to ordinarily entertain an application under Section 156(3) CrPC directly unless informant has availed and exhausted his remedies provided under Section 154(3) CrPC – But as Magistrate is otherwise competent under Section 156(3) CrPC to direct registration of FIR if allegations in application/complaint discloses commission of cognizable offence, order so passed by Magistrate would not be without jurisdiction and would not stand vitiated on this count – Whenever any power is bestowed upon a judicial authority, it is incumbent that it should be exercised on the basis of sound legal principles by application of mind and by a speaking order – Reasoned order upon application of judicious mind is inherent while passing order under Section 156(3) of CrPC – Mere stating in the order that Counsel has been heard and application and material produced have been perused, may not be indicative of fact that Magistrate had actually applied his mind to controversy in issue – Speaking order is a part and an essential component of Principles of Natural Justice, which are applicable to every judicial order – It was but natural for Magistrate to pass a reasoned order, irrespective of interpretation of provision subsequently which was in line with Principles of Natural Justice. (Paras 33, 35, 38 and 40)
(C) Precedent – Merely because a Judgment by Court has simply interpreted and reiterated established principles of law that ought to have been into practice, it would not mean that such principles would be applicable prospectively only from date of its interpretation – Interpretation made later on would not mean that provision had a different meaning prior to its above interpretation. (Para 38)
(D) Constitution of India – Article 226/227 – Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – Section 482 – Inherent Jurisdiction – Exercise of – Powers conferred upon court under Section 482 CrPC or Article 226/227 of Constitution of India are discretionary in nature – It is not obligatory upon court to exercise inherent power in each and every case, even if order impugned suffers from minor procedural irregularity, provided there is no miscarriage of justice – In a case where pursuant to order of Magistrate which is not illegal or without jurisdiction, FIR has been registered which discloses cognizable offence and, thereafter, upon investigation, charge-sheets have been submitted, there is no justification for court to exercise discretionary jurisdiction so as to quash FIR or order of Magistrate – Registration of FIR, giving rise to fresh cause of action to challenge charge-sheets, High Court has rightly refused to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction so as to interfere with FIR as investigations have been completed and charge-sheets have been filed – There are elements of inducement, criminal conspiracy and cheating – Once such allegations are made out, it is difficult for court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction to interfere with FIR, only for reason that some of disputes are of civil nature which may or may not be having any criminality attached to it. (Paras 43, 44 and 46)
(E) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – Section 482 – Inherent Jurisdiction – Exercise of – Discretion to quash FIR at a nascent stage has to be exercised with great caution and circumspection – Court would not thwart any investigation – Court should be very slow in interfering with process of investigation – It is only in rare cases where no cognizable offence is disclosed in FIR that court may stop investigation so as to avoid harassment of alleged accused – Even in such exercise of power, court cannot embark upon inquiry as to genuineness or otherwise of allegations made in FIR or complaint which have to be examined only after evidence is collected. (Para 46)
(F) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – Sections 154 and 300 – Second complaint/FIR – Maintainability – Section 300 CrPC debars second trial – No one should be harassed twice for same offence by putting him to trial again and again – Successive FIRs in respect of same cognizable offence are not maintainable provided that on the basis of earlier FIR, investigations have been completed and trial had either resulted in conviction or acquittal of accused – When a complaint is dismissed on merits, second complaint on same facts cannot be made except in a very exceptional circumstance. (Paras 52, 53 and 54)
Facts of the case:
Following points crop up for determination:
(i) Whether an application under Section 156(3) of the CrPC could have been filed without approaching the police authorities;
(ii) Whether the order dated 01.07.2005 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate is an order passed without application of mind, irrespective of the fact that it states that the parties were “heard” and the documents were “perused”;
(iii) Whether the High Court can deny quashing of the order dated 01.07.2005 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate and the FIR registered pursuant to it for the reason that the investigations have been completed and the chargesheets have been filed against the accused persons;
(iv) Whether the nature of dispute raised in the offending FIR is of a civil nature and there is no involvement of criminality when both sides have previously lodged FIRs originating from same MoU dated 11.03.1995;
(v) Whether the present FIR amounts to a successive FIR based upon the same allegations as contained in an earlier FIR No.326/2004 and as such cannot be investigated independently.
Findings of Court:
Since in connection with FIR No.380/2005, investigations have been completed and the High Court has refused to quash the said FIR in exercise of its discretionary power, we do not deem it necessary to exercise our discretion to override that of the High Court and leave the matter to proceed further in accordance with law.
Result : Petitions dismissed.
Certainly. Based on the provided legal document, the key points are as follows:
An application under Section 156(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) cannot be filed directly with the court without first exhausting the available remedies with police authorities, such as approaching the officer-in-charge of the police station or the Superintendent of Police if the police refuse to record a cognizable offense (!) (!) (!) (!) .
The order passed by the Magistrate under Section 156(3) must be a reasoned, speaking order that reflects application of judicial mind. Merely stating that counsel was heard and documents were perused is insufficient; the order must demonstrate that the Magistrate actually applied his mind to the allegations and material before him (!) (!) (!) .
The order of registration of an FIR by the Magistrate, if found to be legally sound and based on a proper application of mind, cannot be invalidated solely because investigations have been completed or chargesheets have been filed. The legality of the initial order is crucial, and subsequent investigation or filing of chargesheets does not automatically warrant quashing the FIR (!) (!) (!) .
The dispute raised in the FIR may involve elements of criminality such as cheating, conspiracy, and inducement, even if some aspects are of a civil nature. Criminal proceedings are permissible if there are allegations that involve criminal intent or conduct, and the mere civil nature of some claims does not preclude criminal investigation (!) (!) .
The court should exercise its discretion to quash an FIR with great caution and only in exceptional cases where no cognizable offense is disclosed or where investigation would be an abuse of process. Routine interference at an early stage, especially after investigation and chargesheet submission, is generally unwarranted (!) (!) .
A subsequent FIR based on similar allegations as an earlier FIR is generally not maintainable if investigations have been completed and a trial has resulted in conviction or acquittal. However, if the earlier FIR was stayed or not progressed to trial, a subsequent FIR may be permissible, provided the allegations are not identical in a manner that would amount to double jeopardy (!) (!) (!) .
The court recognizes that the order directing registration of an FIR, if passed after proper application of judicial mind and in accordance with legal principles, is not illegal, and subsequent steps in investigation or prosecution do not justify interference unless there are procedural irregularities or violations of jurisdiction (!) (!) (!) .
The overall approach emphasizes that the courts should respect the investigative process and avoid unwarranted interference unless there is a clear legal flaw or abuse of process, and that the application of principles of natural justice, such as providing reasons, is fundamental to judicial orders (!) (!) .
These points collectively highlight the importance of proper procedural conduct, application of judicial mind, and cautious exercise of inherent powers in the context of FIR registration and criminal investigations.
JUDGMENT :
(PANKAJ MITHAL, J.)
1. In Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.18084 of 2024 and in Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.18087 of 2024, the challenge is to the judgment and order of the High Court in Crl.M.C.2833 of 2005 and Crl.M.C.3244 of 2005 dated 3rd September, 2024 whereby petitions seeking quashing of the order dated 1st July, 2005 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi and the criminal proceedings pursuant to the FIR No.380 of 2005 were dismissed.
2. In Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.18094 of 2024, Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.18091 of 2024 and Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.18095 of 2024, challenge is to the judgment and order of the High Court again dated 3rd September, 2024 whereby petitions seeking quashing of the order dated 3rd June, 2004 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi and the criminal proceedings pursuant to the FIR No.326 of 2004 were refused on the same and identical grounds as contained in the above referred judgment passed in Crl.M.C.2833 of 2005 and Crl.M.C.3244 of 2005.
3. Since, in all the above SLPs, the facts and contentions are similar, they are being considered and decided by this Court vide common judgment by taking SLP(Crl.) No.18084 of 2024 as the lead case and by narrating the facts as stated therein.
4. Heard Shri Ranjit Kumar, Shri Jayant Bhushan, and Shri Rajat Nair, learned counsel for the parties.
5. The short question arising for consideration in Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.18084 of 2024 is whether the High Court in exercise of its power under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure1[In short ‘CrPC’] or under Article 226/227 of the Constitution is justified in refusing to quash the FIR No.380/2005 registered at Police Station, Defence Colony, Delhi, under Sections 420, 120-B and 34 of the Indian Penal Code2[In short ‘IPC’] and the order dated 01.07.2005 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, directing for the registration of the aforesaid FIR.
Factual Background:
6. The facts leading to the present dispute are that the complainant M/s Sunair Hotels Limited3[In short ‘SHL’] was allotted land at Bangla Sahib Road, New Delhi, for the purposes of construction and operation of a hotel. The said construction and operation of the hotel, apart from land, required substantial financial investments which were not readily available with SHL.
7. A non-banking finance company VLS Finance Limited4[In short ‘VLS’] through its directors and senior officers (the accused) Shri M. P. Mehrotra, Shri Somesh Mehrotra, Mr. Harsh Allagh, Mr. Anurag Bhatnagar, Mr. K.K. Soni & Mr. Pankaj Shrimali, upon acquiring knowledge of the above hotel project approached SHL with the desire to join the project as financial consultants. They assured SHL that it would launch a public issue of 10 lakh equity shares of Rs.10/- each on a premium of Rs.100/- per share so as to resolve its financial crises. Accordingly, SHL entered into a Memorandum of Understanding5[In short ‘MoU’] with VLS on 11.03.1995. The MoU inter alia provided that VLS would invest Rs.7 crore as equity and give Rs.10 crore as an interest-bearing security deposit. On the other hand, SHL were to contribute Rs.22 crore. VLS valued the shares of SHL at Rs.60/- per share and promised to bring a public issue of 10 lakh equity shares at a premium of Rs.100/- per share. SHL, however, later discovered that the promise of VLS to issue shares at a premium of Rs.100/- per share was legally not possible due to the guidelines of the Securities and Exchange Board of India6[In short ‘SEBI’], which required a company to have three-year track record of consistent profitability. SHL being a new venture could not have met the said criteria. VLS being an experienced and expert in financial matters deliberately concealed the above guidelines and deceived SHL so as to gain control over the hotel venture.
8. SHL in view of the arbitration clause contained in the MoU dated 11.03.1995, initiated arbitration proceedings against VLS alleging
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