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2025 Supreme(SC) 1881

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
ARAVIND KUMAR, VIPUL M. PANCHOLI, JJ.
Canara Bank – Appellant
Versus
K.L. Rajgarhia (D) through LRs. – Respondent
Civil Appeal No. 2483 of 2014
Decided On : 09-10-2025

Advocates appeared:
For the Appellant(s) : Ms. Raakhi Sahijpal, Adv. Mr. Nitin Bhardwaj, AOR
For the Respondent(s): Mr. T.K. Ganju, Adv. Mr. Shekhar Kumar, AOR

IMPORTANT POINTS
(1) Agreement to Sell – Suit for Specific Performance cannot be based upon an agreement which is legally unenforceable.
(2) Doctrine of Severability – Court cannot remove essential part of an agreement or very object for which it was executed.

Headnote:

(A) Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Section 12 – Contract Act, 1872 – Section 23 – Agreement to Sell – Suit for Specific Performance – Dismissal of suit with direction to refund consideration paid by Plaintiff – Construction and delivery of eight flats formed core and essential terms of agreement, without which agreement itself could not subsist – Agreement in its current form is unenforceable as construction of eight flats was impermissible under Building Regulations but yet decreed suit – Division Bench rightly allowed appeal filed by Defendant and rightly dismissed suit instituted by Plaintiff. (Paras 13, 14, 17, 18, 26 and 28)

(B) Civil Procedure Code, 1908 – Section 9 – Doctrine of Severability – Court cannot remove essential part of an agreement or very object for which it was executed – While exercising such power, Courts must refrain from re-writing or re-constructing agreement between parties to make it work – Power of Court to sever invalid portion of an agreement from its valid portion must be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional circumstances – While doing so, Court cannot, under guise of severance, redraft or reconstitute fine tunes of contract by removing its essential terms or altering its fundamental object which parties had arrived at by way of their consensus ad idem, as such exercise would amount to creating a new agreement between parties, which is impermissible in law. (Paras 21 and 22)

Facts of the case:

Following points arise for consideration:

(i) Whether construction and delivery of eight flats specified in Schedule–I formed an essential condition of agreement, absence of which would render agreement incapable of subsistence?

(ii) Whether agreement in its current form unenforceable as it is in violation of Building laws?

(iii) Whether course adopted by Trial Court in modifying or interpreting the agreement to render it workable in its present form was legally justified?

(iv) Whether Division Bench of High Court erred in setting aside the judgment and decree of the Single Judge/Trial Court?

Findings of Court:

Course adopted by Trial Court in modifying or interpreting agreement to render it workable in its present form was not legally justified and as such appellate court has rightly reversed findings of trial court and rejected the prayer for specific performance.

Result : Appeal dismissed.

JUDGMENT :

ARAVIND KUMAR, J.

1. The Appellant before this Court is the unsuccessful Plaintiff in a suit1 [Suit No. 1669 of 1989, hereinafter referred to as the Suit] for Specific Performance and the Respondent is the Defendant in the suit. (The parties hereinafter are referred to by their respective ranks in the suit.) The Single Judge2 [Hereinafter referred to as the Trial Court] of the Delhi High Court3 [Hereinafter referred to as the High Court] had decreed the suit filed by the Plaintiff against the Defendant, directing the Defendant to execute a Registered Sale Deed in favor of the Plaintiff, based on the Agreement to Sell4 [Hereinafter referred to as the Agreement] dated 27.12.1984. This judgment and decree of the Trial Court was challenged in RFA (OS) No. 47 of 2009 by the Defendant before the Division Bench of the High Court which came to be allowed by the impugned order dated 08.05.2012 and dismissed the Plaintiff’s suit with respect to specific performance. However, directed the refund of the consideration already paid by the Plaintiff. This order of the Division Bench of the High Court is now assailed before this Court in the present appeal by the plaintiff.

BRIEF FACTS:

2. The plaintiff and defendant entered into an agreement to sell dated: 27.12.1984, wherein the defendant agreed that he would sell the property bearing Plot No. 9, Block B, East of Kailash5 [Hereinafter referred to as the Schedule Property] for a sum of Rs. 32,07,500. According to the Agreement the Defendant was responsible for construction of 8 (eight) flats on the schedule property in following terms:

SCHELDULE - I:

    (A) 2(Two) Flats of approximately 1000 sq. ft. in Ground floor.

    1 (one) flat of approximately 1000 sq. ft. in Mezzanine floor.

    2 (Two) Flats of approximately 1000 sq. ft. in first floor.

    2 (Two) Flats of approximately 1000 sq. ft. in Second floor.

    1 (One) Flat of approximately 1000 sq. ft. in Third/Barsati floor.

    (B) Basement of approximately 1950 sq. ft. The actual covered area will be determined after the construction is completed in all respects and the flats are ready for occupation legally.

3. Disputes arose between the parties regarding the Registration of the agreement and therefore the Plaintiff filed a Suit for Specific Performance, contending the following:

    3.1. In December 1984, the plaintiff entered into an agreement with the defendant for purchase of residential flats to be constructed on a plot in East of Kailash, Delhi, at a total consideration of Rs. 32,07,500/- of which about 90% (Rs. 28,86,750/-) was paid by the plaintiff. The defendant was obligated to complete construction within 18 months, with an additional six-month grace period, obtain all necessary statutory approvals, and hand over possession of the flats. The agreement also provided for payment of damages at Rs. 1,000/- per day for delays and allowed the plaintiff to complete unfinished work at the defendant’s cost if necessary.

    3.2. The defendant failed to complete the construction or hand over possession despite repeated requests, allegedly abandoning the project. The plaintiff contends that the defendant’s claimed difficulties with their contractor are irrelevant, as construction and delivery were solely the defendant’s responsibility. The Plaintiff contends that the mere monetary compensation is inadequate given the purpose of the flats for officers and public interest.

4. On service of summons, the Defendant appeared before the Court and filed his Written Statement contending the following:

    4.1. The Agreement to Sell (27.12.1984) was not a genuine sale but a cover for a loan transaction executed under the assurance of the plaintiff bank’s officers, with an understanding that advances would be repaid with 18% interest. The defendant contended the agreement was obtained under undue influence and coercion, as he was in urgent need of funds, indebted to the bank, and had no real freedom to negotiate terms.

    4.2. The agreement imposed unfair conditions such as low conside

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