( 1 ) SRI P. V. Sanjay Kumar representing the appellant, the unsuccessful defendant in both the courts below M/s. Hindustan petroleum Corporation Limited, had raised the following substantial question of law: whether the courts below had not misinterpreted the terms of the lease deed Clauses2 (c) and3 (d ). All other questions are only ancillary to the principal question involved in the Second appeal.

( 2 ) THE suit O. S. No. 137/92 on the file of principal Junior Civil Judge, Hyderabad west and South, Ranga Reddy District, was filed by the plaintiff, M. A. Kareem for eviction and other reliefs, who died during the pendency of the suit and the legal representatives who were brought on record are at present prosecuting the present litigation. The suit was decreed on 23-12-1998 and aggrieved by the same, the defendant/corporation preferred Appeal a. S. No. 44/98 on the file of I Additional district Judge, Ranga Reddy and the same was dismissed on 9-12-1999 and aggrieved by the same, the present Second Appeal is preferred. Submissions of Sri P. V. Sanjay Kumar:

( 3 ) THE learned Counsel representing the appellant/defendant/corporation submitted that the right to have the renewal of lease is not in controversy between the parties. The counsel also in all fairness submitted that the question whether M. A. Kareem alone or the legal representatives of him subsequent thereto can maintain this action or all other heirs also should be on record, cannot be agitated in this Second Appeal in view of the concurrent findings in this regard. The learned Counsel also maintained that the crucial question is whether there has been breach of covenants specified in Ex. A-1 and whether the terms of Ex. A-1 had been interpreted properly especially in the light of clause 2 (c) and Clause 3 (d) of Ex. A-1. The learned Counsel explained the aforesaid clauses in detail and would maintain that there was no breach at all. The learned counsel further submitted that the renewing period also lapsed long back and since no amendment was prayed for in this action, the cause of action does not survive and hence the respondents/plaintiffs may have to institute yet another suit on the strength of fresh cause of action. The Counsel also would maintain that the time of 60 days and 30 days specified in Clause (d) would assume lot of importance and much emphasis was laid on the expression "after being demanded". Right to sue and cause of action were elaborately argued. Certain submissions also were made relating to subsequent events and certain interlocutory orders made during the pendency of the appeal. Reliance was placed on Bhagwati v. Chandramul, Jadu Gopal Chakravarty v. Pannalap, Nagumilli Narayanamurthy v. Gudimetla Gangaraju, Nair Service Society v. K. C. Alexander, Bhusawal Borough municipality v. Amalgamated Electricity Co. Ltd. , Bhusawal and another and M/s. H. P. Corporation Ltd. v. M/s. R. P. Agarwalla and bros. (P) Ltd. Submissions made by Mr. Meher Chand noori:

( 4 ) THE learned Counsel representing the respondents would maintain that payment of rent with due diligence is the duty of the lessee and the where the duty is not performed, that itself would amount to breach of covenant to pay the rent. The learned Counsel in detail had explained exs. A-1 to A-15 and would contend that breach of covenant normally is a question of fact. Even otherwise, Ex. A-1 may have to be read as a whole for ascertaining whether breach was committed or not. The Counsel also had submitted that Ex. A-1 as such is not a completed document and it is only an agreement which would require registration to be construed as a completed lease transaction. The learned Counsel further submitted that Ex. A-1 was interpreted properly in the light of the evidence available on record, especially on the strength of admission made by D. W. 1 in relation thereto and hence there is no substantial question of law involved in the present Second Appeal and such concurrent findings