Respondent filed a suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (for short "the Act") for recovery of possession of the plaint schedule property alleging that plaint schedule property is her property and that the first revision petitioner, who is her husband, and other revision petitioners, who are the first wife and children of the first revision petitioner, have forcibly necked her out of the plaint schedule property.

2. The first revision petitioner filed his written statement, inter alia, contending that after he developed intimacy with the respondent prior to the marriage, he purchased a vacant site in the name of the respondent and constructed a house therein later and so the plaint schedule property, in fact, belongs to him and that the sale deed in favour of the respondent is only a benami transaction and that the respondent out of her own volition went away from the house and so she is not entitled to any relief.

3. On the basis of the pleadings, the trial Court framed two issues for trial. In support of her case, the respondent examined herself as P.W.1. and another witness as P.W.2 and marked Exs.A-1 to A-5. On behalf of the revision petitioners, the first revision petitioner examined himself as R.W.1. and two other witnesses as R.Ws.2 and 3, but they did not adduce any documentary evidence on their behalf. The trial Court held in favour of the respondent and decreed the suit directing the revision petitioners to vacate the plaint schedule property within two months from the date of the judgment. Aggrieved by the said judgment, this revision is preferred.

4. The main contention of the learned counsel for the revision petitioners is that inasmuch as a suit under Section 6 of the Act has to be filed within a period of six months from the date of dispossession, and since the alleged dispossession, according to the respondent, was in June, 1993 and since the suit is of the year 1997, the suit is clearly barred by time. His next contention is that the dispute between the respondent and the first revision petitioner is purely a marital dispute and the respondent by converting the marital dispute between her and her husband, the first revision petitioner, wants to grab the property purchased by him in her name, to cause wrongful loss to him and that the trial Court without properly appreciating the evidence on record, erroneously decreed the suit. It is also his contention that when it is specifically alleged by the revision petitioners that the respondent voluntarily left the society of the first revision petitioner, it cannot be said that there was any dispossession or forcible dispossession of the respondent by the revision petitioners and so the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a suit under Section 6 of the Act

5. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondent is- that since the specific case of the respondent is that she was necked out of the house by the first revision petition and since the sale deed relating to the plain schedule property is standing in her name as evidenced by EX.A-1 and since there is no reason for the respondent to leave the society of the first revision petitioner and stay somewhere else out of her own accord, the contention that she left the society of the first revision petitioner voluntarily, and was not necked out from the plaint schedule property cannot be believed or accepted. It is also his contention that the specific evidence of the respondent, as P.W.1 in her chief-examination, that she was dispossessed from the house is not denied or disputed by the revision petitioners in her cross-examination by them and similarly the evidence of P.W.2 that the respondent was necked out of the house was not disputed in his cross-examination, the contention that there was no forcible dispossession of the respondent cannot be accepted and contended that since the trial Court gave cogent reasons for its conclusion, there are no grounds to interfere with the judgment under rev