(N.V. Ramana, ACJ.)

1. The petitioners filed these two writ petitions questioning the amendment made to Rule 5(1) of the A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Rules 1983 (for short ‘the Rules’) as being contrary to the scheme of the A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 (for short ‘the Act’), as being discriminative and consequently sought a direction to declare the amendment as ultra vires the parent Act. It would be appropriate to refer to the prayer made by the petitioner in one of the writ petitions, namely W.P No. 36625 of 2012 which reads as under:

“(a) call for the records pertaining to and connected with the amendment issued by the 1st respondent to Rule 15(1) under impugned G.O. Ms. No. 539 Revenue (Acts & Rules) Department dated 25.8.2012 (24 years after the rule came into the force) is contrary to law laid down under Special Enactment made under A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act 1982 and defeating the object of the Act in resisting the rule in respect of Government is illegal, arbitrary, discriminatory, totally non-application of mind and violative of Art 14, 21, 31 and 300-A of the Constitution of India and hence the impugned G.O. liable to be set aside, and

(b) consequently direct the Respondents 3 and 4 to implement the orders passed in LGC No.2/2004 dated 18.9.2008 as confirmed by the Division Bench of the Hon’ble Court vide its order dated 25.4.2011 in W.P. No. 25010 of 2008 and 26811 of 2008 and pass such other and further order or orders as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case.”

2. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners challenge the aforesaid amended Rule, primarily, on the ground that the said amendment is contrary to the scheme of the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 and it is discriminative whereby different procedure is prescribed for Government lands and private lands. The retrospective effect given to the amended Rule is also questioned on the ground that it unsettles the existing executions. Petitioners in both the writ petitions have traced history of the litigation in which both the petitioners state that they have become successful and while anxiously awaiting for the fruits of the decree by taking up the execution proceedings before the RDO, the aforesaid amendment is brought into force at the instance of the District Collector, Hyderabad and now the petitioners are exposed to fresh long drawn execution proceedings before the civil Court. The power of the Special Court/Tribunal to execute its own decrees and decisions is now taken away by the aforesaid amendment by asking each decree holder to approach the civil Court for execution whereas the power to execute the order so far as Government land is concerned, the same continues to be retained with the RDO.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioners have elaborated the submissions by placing reliance on a decision of the Privy Council in Province of Bombay v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay (AIR 1947 PRIVY COUNCIL 34) and the relevant portion of para 11 thereof is extracted hereunder:

“11. It was contended on behalf of the respondents that whenever a statute is enacted “for the public good” the Crown, though not expressly named, must be held to be bound by its provisions and that, as the Act in question was manifestly intended to secure the public welfare, it must bind the Crown. This contention, which did not meet with success in the High Court, was again raised before their Lordships. The proposition which the respondents thus sought to maintain is supported by early authority, and is to be found in Bacon’s Abridgement and other text-books but in their Lordships’ opinion it cannot now be regarded as sound except in a strictly limited sense. Every statute must be supposed to be “for the public good,” at least in intention, and even when, as in the present case, it is apparent that one object of the Legislature is to promote the welfare and c