Kalyan Jyoti Sengupta, CJ.

1. Both these writ petitions are heard together since the issues involved herein are identical, so also the reliefs.

2. The reliefs claimed by the writ petitioners in both the writ petitions, in a real sense, would have been entertained by the Andhra Pradesh State Administrative Tribunal, 1st respondent herein, but they feel, in the eye of law, it has no legal existence after enactment of the Andhra Pradesh Reorganization Act, 2014 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Act, 2014’), which came into force on 2.6.2014, for bifurcation of the erstwhile State of Andhra Pradesh into State of Telangana and State of Andhra Pradesh. As such they have come to this Court in writ jurisdiction straightaway, ignoring 1st respondent.

3. The facts are not in dispute. Petitioners are the State Government Employees of undivided State of Andhra Pradesh. Disputes in relation to their services would have been entertained and resolved at the first instance by first respondent before the appointed day. The Government of the then State of Andhra Pradesh had made a request to the Central Government, who, in its turn acting under Section 4 (2) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Act, 1985’) issued notification dated 26.10.1989 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the said notification’) whereunder 1st respondent was established with effect from 1.11.1989. In view of split of erstwhile State of Andhra Pradesh, the 1st respondent ceases to exist in the eye of law.

4. Counter-affidavits have been filed by the respective respondents. While denying the contentions of the petitioners, they assert that the 1st respondent continues to function as it is, even after bifurcation of the erstwhile State of A.P., like a common Tribunal for both the States. Therefore, the petitioners could not skip 1st respondent, to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court straightaway, which is absolutely prohibited in view of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (AIR 1997 SC 1125).

5. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, while placing various provisions of the Act, 2014, submits that there is no provision conferring power upon the 1st respondent, which was functioning on or before the appointed day, to function either for both the States or one of the States, unlike functioning of this High Court as a common one for both the States. He submits that the Act, 2014 has been enacted almost on the same lines as it has been done in case of Madhya Pradesh Reorganization Act, 2000 (hereinafter referred to as ‘M.P. Act’). He has drawn our attention to Section 74 of the M.P. Act, which enabled the existing counterpart of 1st respondent in that State to continue to function as a common Tribunal for both the split States on and from the appointed day for a maximum period of two years or till such time as is decided by mutual agreement between the successor States. Similar provision has not been made in the Act, 2014 for functioning of 1st respondent. He submits further that the conferment of power or jurisdiction of any authority has to be made expressly by law, not impliedly. No inference can be drawn with regard to conferment of jurisdiction on 1st respondent, which it is claiming to have. When the statute does not clearly mention, it has to be understood that 1st respondent has no power to function, as such it is non-existent. He further submits that the 1st respondent has to be constituted under sub-section (2) of Section 4 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. At present, neither of the State Governments has made any request to the Central Government to establish the same, consequently no action under law could be taken by the centre. There has been no agreement between the two States for functioning of the 1st respondent as a common one as required under sub-section (3) of Section 4 of the aforesaid Tribunals Act, 1985. Until this happens, no Tribunal can be said to have bee