2004 Supreme(SC) 1090

2004(7) Supreme 33
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Madhya Pradesh High Court)
R.C. Lahoti, CJI & C.K. Thakker, J.
M.P. High Court Bar Association -Appellant
versus
Union of India & Ors.  -Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 5327 of 2002
With
Civil Appeal No. 5328 of 2002, Civil Appeal No. 6104 of 2004 @ SLP (C) No. 22648 of 2002, Civil Appeal Nos. 6105-06 of 2004 @ SLP (C) Nos. 23615-23616 of 2002, Civil Appeal Nos. 8292-8295 of 2002, Writ Petition (C) Nos. 369 of 2003 and 374 of 2003
Decided on 17-9-2004
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant in C.A.No. 5327/02 : Prashant Bhushan, Narinder Kumar Verma, Rohit Kumar Singh, Sanjay Pathak, Advocates.
For the Appellant in C.A.No. 5328/2002 : Ajit Puduseery, Advocate (NP).
For the Appellant in C.A.No. 6104/2004, 8292-95/2002 and Respondent for the Union of India : B. Datta, Additional Solicitor General, P. Parmeswaran, Advocate.
For the Appellant in C.A.Nos. 6105-06/2004: Sanjeev Sachdeva, Mukesh Kr. Mishra, Ms. Priya Puri, Advocates.
For the Petitioner in W.P. (C) No. 369/2003 : Shiv Sagar Tiwari, Ms. Pratima, Umesh Babu Chaurasia, M.P. Singh, Mani Mittal, Advocates.
For the Petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 370/2003 : B.B. Dubey, S.K. Bandyopadhyay, Amitav Poddar, C.L. Sahu, Advocates.
For the Respondents : Satish K. Agnihotri, Anil K. Pandey, Amit Mishra, Prakash Srivastava, Advocate (NP), Sanjeev Sachdeva, Mukesh Kr. Mishra, Ms. Priya Puri and Ajit Pudussery, Advocate (NP).

IMPORTANT POINT
The State Government of Madhya Pradesh is empowered under Section 74(1) of the M.P. Reorganisation Act to abolish the State Administrative Tribunal and no directions from the Central Government as envisaged under sub-section (4) of Section 74 of the Act are necessary to take this decision to abolish the Tribunal.

Headnote:Madhya Pradesh Reorganization Act, 2000-Sections 74 and 85-Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985-Sections 4, 5, 6 to 13, 14 to 18 and 19 to 27-Constitution of India-Article 323A-Reorganization of existing State of Madhya Pradesh into two States to be known as State of Madhya Pradesh and State of Chhattisgarh-Decision taken by the two States to abolish State Administrative Tribunal-Challenged-Validity of Section 74 of Act of 2000 challenged-Whether State of Madhya Pradesh is empowered u/s 74(1) of the Act to abolish the State Administrative Tribunal-(Yes)-Whether directions from the Central Government as envisaged under sub-section (4) of Section 74 of the Act are necessary to take the decision to abolish the Tribunal-(No).

       Held : In the opinion of the Court, there was no inconsistency or conflict between Section 74(1) of the Act of 2000 and Article 323A of the Constitution or Section 4 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. It was also observed that sub-section (1) of Section 74 of the Act of 2000 opens with non obstante clause ("Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force") and allows the States of Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh to continue or to abolish Tribunals in the respective States. In this connection, it is also profitable to refer to Section 85 which declares that the provisions of "this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law". Conjoint reading of Article 323A of the Constitution, Section 4 of the Administrative Tribunals Act 1985 and Sections 74(1) and 85 of the Act of 2000, in our considered opinion, leaves no room of doubt that Parliament authorized the State of Madhya Pradesh as well as the new State of Chhattisgarh to take an appropriate decision with regard to State Administrative Tribunals having jurisdiction over those States. Parliament empowered both the successor States to take an appropriate decision to continue such Tribunals, to abolish them or to constitute separate Tribunals. It cannot be said that by enacting such a provision, Parliament had violated any mandate or the Act of 2000 is ultra vires Article 323A or any other part of the Constitution. (Para 33)

       What has been held by this Court in L. Chandra Kumar was that the jurisdiction conferred on this Court under Articles 32 and 136 of the Constitution as also of the High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is a part of the "basic structure" of our Constitution. That jurisdiction cannot be ousted by making any provision in the Constitution also. So far as Tribunals are concerned, they may perform a "supplemental role" in the discharge of power conferred upon the Supreme Court as well as upon High Courts. From that, however, it cannot be said that once a Tribunal is constituted, created or established, there is no power either in the Central Government or State Governments to abolish it. There is no constitutional or statutory prohibition against exercise of such power. To us, it is clear that Parliament which allowed the State Government to request the Central Government for establishment of an Administrative Tribunal under the 1985 Act has authority, power and jurisdiction to enable the State Government to take an appropriate decision to continue or not to continue such Tribunal and a provision by Parliament authorizing the State Government to abolish such Tribunal, by no stretch of imagination, can be held ultra vires the Constitution or inconsistent with the law laid down by this Court in L. Chandra Kumar. (Para 36)

       The matter can be looked at from another angle also. As already indicated in the earlier part of the judgment, Article 323A is not self-executory. The said provision did not create or establish Administrative Tribunals. It was merely a permissive or an enabling provision allowing Parliament to make law to establish Administrative Tribunal if it wished to do so. Thus, there was no binding requirement on the part of the Parliament (or State Legislature) to create such a forum as contemplated by Article 323A of the Constitution of India. It also cannot be overlooked that the Administrative Tribunal in question was to be created for a particular State, i.e. State of Madhya Pradesh. Neither under Article 323A of the Constitution nor under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the Central Government could have created such Tribunal except in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 4 of the said Act. As already noted, the Central Government could exercise the jurisdiction, power and authority conferred on the Administrative Tribunal for the State by or under the said Act only "on receipt of a request in this behalf from any State Government". Essentially therefore, it was on the request made by the State of Madhya Pradesh to the Central Government that the power to create and establish Administrative Tribunal in the State of Madhya Pradesh was exercised by the Central Government and the Tribunal was established. We, therefore, see no objection in conferring the power on the State Government to continue or to abolish such Tribunal. In our considered opinion, there is no excessive delegation by Parliament to the State Government which would be hit either by the provisions of the Constitution or the law laid down in In re: The Delhi Laws Act, 1912 or other decisions of this Court. (Para 49)

       In the instant case, there is no interference with a "judicial order" passed by a competent court or a Tribunal, but a "policy decision" has been taken by the State Government to abolish State Administrative Tribunal allowing aggrieved litigants to approach appropriate authority/court for ventilating their grievances. The ratio laid down in P. Sambamurthy, therefore, does not apply and the contention cannot be upheld. (Para 59)

       We fully agree with the interpretation of the High Court. In our judgment, the High Court was right in observing that Section 74(1) is not subservient to Section 74(4) of the Act and once the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 74 of the Act are attracted and invoked, the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 74 has no application. The contention of the appellants, therefore, has no force and has to be rejected. (Para 63)

       Now, it may be stated that there is no concrete material on record to show that the decision to abolish State Administrative Tribunal was taken because of orders passed by the State Administrative Tribunal. Except bald assertions by the appellants and Press cuttings, there is nothing to substantiate such allegations. On the contrary, sufficient material is available on record to show what weighed with the respondent-State in taking a decision to abolish the Tribunal. So far as allegations by the appellants are concerned, they were emphatically denied by the State of Madhya Pradesh by filing a counter-affidavit. Moreover, the Advocate General, appearing for the State of Madhya Pradesh placed chronological events in detail before the High Court (Para 65)

       Thus, from the correspondence between the State of Madhya Pradesh and the Central Government and from various letters and communications and also from the decision which has been taken by the Cabinet, it is clear that the State Government took into account a vital consideration that after the decision of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar, an aggrieved party could approach the High Court, the object for establishment of the Tribunal was defeated. In our opinion, in the light of the facts before the Court, it cannot be said that the decision to abolish State Administrative Tribunal taken by the State of Madhya Pradesh can be quashed and set aside as mala fide. (Para 66)