IMPORTANT POINT
Mere registration of ECIR against suspects of offence under Section 3 of PMLA cannot go to mean that such persons are accused under Section 3 of PMLA.

1. Both the writ petitions are filed by same petitioners against the same respondents. While in WP.No.36838 of 2014, the summons issued by the first respondent to the second petitioner is questioned, in WP.No.31143 of 2015, the further steps initiated by the first respondent pursuant to the summons served on the second petitioner are questioned.

2. The material averments in the affidavit of the petitioners in nutshell are as follows:

WP.No.36838 of 2014:

(a) The first petitioner is a company registered under the Companies Act and the second petitioner is its Managing Director. Petitioners state that the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) filed a charge sheet before the Special Court for CBI Cases, City Criminal Court, Nampally against various accused and petitioners 1 and 2 are shown as accused 3 to 12 respectively. The Special Court has already taken cognizance of the offences against all the accused on 13.05.2013. Petitioners deny the charge sheet framed against them by CBI.

(b) Based on the allegations in the said charge sheet, the first respondent registered a case on 30.08.2011 as ECIR/09/HZO/2011 for scheduled offences under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (for short ‘PMLA’) in which the first petitioner is shown as accused at Sl.No.26, alleging that the same, prima facie, discloses an offence under Section 3 of the PMLA. Copy of the said ECIR is filed as annexure P2.

(c) Based on the said ECIR, the first respondent served summons dated 20.10.2014 on the second petitioner requiring him to appear in person for making statement and for production of documents. The second petitioner, accordingly, is stated to have informed the first respondent, on legal advice, under reply dated 31.10.2014 that he was accused in CBI case and does not wish to give any statement by claiming protection under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India. However, without responding to the said reply, the first respondent issued another summons dated 03.11.2014 to the second respondent once again calling him to appear to give statement and produce documents. The second petitioner sent a further reply dated 14.11.2014 requesting to consider earlier reply dated 31.10.2014. However, again, without responding to the reply of the second petitioner, further summons was issued on 19.11.2014 to appear in person and produce documents, which is challenged in this writ petition and the grounds raised in support of this writ petition, are, briefly, as follows:

1) The ECIR registered by the first respondent is based upon the CBI case. However, the facts involved and the allegations in both the cases are same and offences alleged are substantially same, which are also scheduled offences under PMLA. Petitioners, being accused in the CBI case, the statement of second petitioner and the production of documents by him, as insisted upon by the first respondent under the impugned summons, would compel the second petitioner to give incriminating statement and documents under compulsion, thereby violate the protection available to him under the Constitution of India as well as under Criminal Procedure Code.

2) It is stated that the impugned summons is issued in exercise of powers under Section 50 of PMLA and Section 63 of PMLA provides for punishment for giving false information or for failure to give information etc. Further Section 22 of PMLA raises a presumption that records of property produced by a person is presumed to be belonging to such person and the contents of the record are true etc. Hence, reliance is placed upon Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India, which provides that no person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Thus, the petitioners state that as they are accused in the CBI case and by virtue of the impugned summons, the first respondent is forcing and compelling the second petitioner to appear and give statement and that disobedience of the same is also a punishable offence. Hence, the s