Sanjay Kumar, J.

1. Aggrieved by the admission of Company Petition No.231 of 2015, filed for its winding-up under Section 433(e) read with Sections 434(1)(a) and 439 of the Companies Act, 1956 (for brevity, the Act of 1956), the respondent company therein is in appeal under Section 483 of the Act of 1956 read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent.

2. The order under appeal was passed by the learned Company Judge on 25.10.2017 admitting the company petition and directing the respondent, the petitioner therein, to publish notice of its admission in Business Standard English Newspaper and Andhra Bhoomi Telugu Newspaper. Admittedly, advertisement of the admission of the company petition has already been carried out in terms of the order under appeal.

3. Sri S.Niranjan Reddy, learned senior counsel appearing for Sri Avinash Desai, learned counsel for the appellant company, would however contend that, notwithstanding the advertisement being published in the newspapers, this appeal would still survive for consideration on merits as various other consequences would flow from the admission order which would be adverse to the interests of the appellant company. He would point out that by virtue of the admission, any disgruntled creditor of the appellant company may come forward to support the winding-up petition under Rule 34 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959, and that apart, the commercial credibility and reputation of the appellant company would be put at risk though it is financially solvent as on date and provides employment to several people.

4. Per contra, Sri S.Ravi, learned senior counsel appearing for Sri T.Sujan Kumar, learned counsel for the respondent, the petitioner in the company petition, would submit that as advertisement of the admission order has already been carried out in the newspapers as directed, it would be appropriate for the appellant company to face trial in the company petition and that the discretionary order of admission, having already been given effect to by publication of the advertisement, ought not to be interfered with now.

5. It would be appropriate at this stage to refer to case law on the issue of maintainability of this appeal. In VIJAY KUMAR KARWA V/s. OFFICIAL LIQUIDATOR, ROHTAS INDUSTRIES LTD. (2008) 4 SCC 222, the Supreme Court considered the scope of an appeal under Section 483 of the Act of 1956 and observed that every order which may reasonably be considered to be a judicial order, distinct from a mere administrative order, would be appealable under Section 483 of the Act of 1956. Reference was made to SHAH BABULAL KHIMJI V/s. JAYABEN D. KANIA (1982) 1 SCR 187 = AIR 1981 SC 1786, wherein it was held that the intention of the givers of the Letters Patent was that the phrase judgment therein should receive a much wider and more liberal interpretation than the phrase judgment used in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, but at the same time, it cannot be said that every order passed by a trial Judge would amount to a judgment; otherwise there would be no end to the number of orders which would be appealable under the Letters Patent. It was therefore held that the word judgment has undoubtedly a concept of finality in a broader, and not a narrower, sense and before an order can be said to be appealable, its adverse effect on the party concerned must be direct and immediate rather than indirect or remote, In other words, every interlocutory order cannot be regarded as a judgment but only those orders would be judgments which decide matters of moment or affect vital and valuable rights of the parties and which work serious injustice to such parties.

6. Earlier, on the same lines, in CENTRAL MINE PLANNING AND DESIGN INSTITUTE LTD. V/s. UNION OF INDIA (2001) 2 SCC 588, the Supreme Court observed that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) CPC has no application to the Letters Patent and to determine the question whether an interlocutory order falls within the ambit of judgment for the purpo