M.S. Ramachandra Rao, J.

1. The important question which arises for consideration in this Civil Revision Petition is "whether an execution petition filed on 19.11.1999 by the respondent, which was later numbered as E.P. No. 473 of 2000 by the Court below, to execute a decree of specific performance passed in O.S. No. 103 of 1974 is within time or not?" The admitted facts are that O.S. No. 103 of 1974 was filed for specific performance of an agreement of sale by respondent against the father of petitioner one K. Kuppaiah Chetti. The respondent also filed O.S. No. 192 of 1974 for recovery of sum of Rs. 874.79 from the father of petitioner. Both the suits, viz., O.S. No. 103 of 1974 and O.S. No. 192 of 1974 were disposed of by a common judgment dt. 18.09.1979 and both suits were dismissed by the said common judgment.

2. Aggrieved thereby, the respondent filed A.S. No. 416 of 1981 against the decree in O.S. No. 103 of 1974 and A.S. No. 419 of 1981 against the decree in O.S. No. 192 of 1974 before the Additional Subordinate Judge, Chittoor. Both the appeals were allowed by a common judgment and decree dt. 14.02.1983.

3. Aggrieved by the common judgment of the first appellate court, the father of petitioner preferred S.A. No. 898 of 1984 and S.A. No. 974 of 1984 before this Court. This Court by judgment dt. 30.11.1987 dismissed both the appeals without costs. There was no challenge to the judgment of the High Court and the said judgments became final. The respondent was already in possession and enjoyment of the E.P. Schedule property.

4. He filed E.P. No. 136 of 1984 in O.S. No. 103 of 1974 for execution of sale deed pursuant to decree of specific performance, but it was dismissed on 03.07.1986. The respondent again filed E.P. No. 473 of 2000 on 19.11.1999 seeking execution of a registered sale deed in respect of the E.P. Schedule property in its favour.

5. The petitioner, who is the son of Judgment-Debtor, contended that the Execution Petition is barred by limitation, and the E.P. is liable to be dismissed.

6. By order dt. 21.06.2014, the Court below rejected the said contention. It held that the judgment of the High Court in the Second Appeal rendered on 30.11.1987 is the first point for counting the period of limitation for execution of a decree under Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as, 'the Act') and since the E.P. was presented on 19.11.1999, which was within a period of 12 years fixed under the said Article, the E.P. was not barred by limitation.

7. Challenging the same, this Revision is filed.

8. Heard Sri R.N. Hemendranath Reddy, counsel for petitioner; and Sri G. Manohar, counsel for respondent.

9. The counsel for petitioner contended that no stay of the execution of the decree was granted in favour of respondent/decree holder pending Second Appeals, and therefore, the period of limitation for execution of the decree for specific performance should be counted from the date of judgment of the first appellate court on 14.02.1983 and not from the date when the Second Appeals were dismissed i.e., 30.11.1987. He placed reliance on Bimal Kumar and another v. Shakuntala Debi and others (2012) 3 SCC 548 : 2012 (5) ALT 41.1 (DN SC), Manohar, S/o. Shankar Nale and others v. Jaipal Singh, S/o. Shivlal Sing Rajput and others (2008) 1 SCC 520, and Siraj-ul-Haq Khan and others v. The Sunni Central Board of Waqf, U.P. and others AIR 1959 SC 198.

10. The counsel for respondent Sri G. Manohar, on the other hand, refuted the above contentions and stated that the order passed by the Court below is correct and did not warrant any interference by this Court. He contended that the judgment of first appellate court merged in the judgment of the High Court in the Second Appeals and since the judgment in the Second Appeals constitutes a decree, the Court below had rightly calculated the point for commencement of