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2018 Supreme(AP) 767
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT HYDERABAD FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AND THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J. UMA DEVI, JJ.
A. - Appellant
Versus
The Registrar (Admn.), High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad and Ors - Respondent
Writ Petition Nos. 34418, 44927 of 2017 and 2537 of 2018
Decided On : 25-10-2018
Advocate Appeared:
For the Appellant : G.U.R.C. Prasad
For the Respondent: Swaroop Oorilla, Standing Counsel
Headnote:
Constitution of India, Art. 226 -Sexual harassment - Charge Memo issued for major penalty proceedings - Refusal of respondents to grant permission to her to engage legal practitioner to defend herself in enquiry - Order passed by Enquiry Officer on an objection taken by writ petitioner to marking of certain documents - Held, Consent of petitioner, cannot form basis for disciplinary proceedings against petitioner - Woman subjected to sexual assault is not to be treated as an accomplice, but victim - Initiation of disciplinary proceedings against petitioner, completely misconceived - Writ petition allowed. Para 47, 48, 49
The ratio of the judgement is that the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against a woman who has been subjected to sexual harassment or assault is misconceived and unjustified, especially when the proceedings are based on her deposition and observations in a criminal appeal that recognize her as a victim rather than an accomplice. The court emphasizes that a woman subjected to sexual harassment or assault should not be treated as an accomplice, and her consent or past conduct cannot serve as a basis for disciplinary action. Furthermore, the court highlights that the principles of fair procedure and victim dignity demand that institutions avoid secondary victimization and should not proceed with disciplinary measures that are fundamentally based on observations that undermine her victim status. Consequently, the court quashes the charge memo and closes the proceedings, asserting that the disciplinary action was not only misconceived but also violated the principles of justice and victim protection.
V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.
1. The petitioner has come up with the above writ petitions challenging in the first writ petition, a Charge Memo issued for major penalty proceedings, challenging in the second writ petition, the refusal of the respondents to grant permission to her to engage a legal practitioner to defend herself in the enquiry and challenging in the third writ petition, an order passed by the Enquiry Officer on an objection taken by the writ petitioner to the marking of certain documents.
2. Heard Mr. G.U.R.C. Prasad, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Swaroop Oorilla, learned Standing Counsel for the respondents.
3. The petitioner was originally selected and appointed as a Steno-Typist in the Court of the Magistrate at Narsapur in West Godavari District, on 22-6-1994. Later, she was transferred to the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Narsapur, where she had to work under a Judicial Officer by name K. Basava Raju.
4. The case of the petitioner is that she was subjected to sexual harassment and was raped repeatedly by the Judicial Officer, forcing her to make complaints. By April 1995, the officer made a request and got transferred to another District.
5. It is the case of the petitioner that even after transfer, the officer continued to spread rumours about the petitioner, which led to an aborted attempt by the petitioner to commit suicide.
6. Though no proceedings were initiated against the officer, a criminal complaint was registered in Crime No. 96/1996 against the Judicial Officer on 29-6-1996, for offences punishable under Sections 376 and 417 IPC.
7. The case was made over to the Mahila Court, Visakhapatnam, in the year 1999 and after the examination of the witnesses, it was transferred to the Court of the III Additional Sessions Judge, Visakhapatnam on 14-12-2001 and renumbered as Sessions Case No. 228 of 2001.
8. After trial, the Sessions Court delivered a judgment dated 23-8-2002 holding the Judicial Officer guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 376 and 417 IPC and he was sentenced to simple imprisonment for 3 years and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- for the offence under Section 376 IPC and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- for the offence under Section 417 IPC. Both sentences were directed to run concurrently.
9. On the basis of the judgment of the Criminal Court, the High Court recommended the dismissal of the Judicial Officer from service. Accepting the recommendations of the High Court, the Government issued orders in G.O. Ms. No. 41, Law Department, dated 22-3-2003, dismissing the officer from service.
10. However, the Judicial Officer filed a criminal appeal in Criminal Appeal No. 971 of 2002. During the pendency of the appeal, an interesting turn of events took place. It appears that the petitioner was convinced (by whom is irrelevant) to compound the offence punishable under Section 417 IPC. She was made to move an application in Crl.M.P. No. 513 of 2008 in the pending Criminal Appeal No. 979 of 2002 seeking to compound the offence punishable under Section 417 IPC. The application was allowed, the offence under Section 417 IPC was compounded and the Judicial Officer was acquitted of the offence.
11. Fortunately for the petitioner and unfortunately for the Judicial Officer, the offence under Section 376 IPC is not compoundable. Had it been compoundable, the issue would have been buried fathom deep.
12. After the offence under Section 417 IPC was compounded, it became easy for the judicial officer to convince the court to go into the question of consent on the part of the petitioner with regard to the charge of rape and to get acquitted by a judgment dated 14-3-2008. While acquitting the judicial officer, this court recorded certain curious findings touching upon the conduct of the writ petitioner herein. The findings are as follows:
"19. ... ... ... I have gone through the bunch of letters, which have been marked as Ex. P-1. The text of th
