The concept of 'sufficient cause' for condoning delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction to advance substantial justice, and the length of delay is not a decisive factor.

ORDER

B.S Bhanumathi, J. - This revision is filed under Section 115 CPC challenging the order, dated 29.11.2023, dismissing I.A.No.536 of 2020 in unnumbered appeal filed before the Court of the Principal District Judge, Kadapa, under Order 41 Rule 3A CPC to condone delay of [1113] days in filing the appeal against the judgment and decree, dated 23.01.2017, passed in O.S.No.525 of 2011 on the file of the Court of Additional Senior Civil Judge, Kadapa.

2. The petitioner/appellant filed the suit to cancel the registered sale deed, dated 06.01.2011, executed by him in favour of the defendants and for perpetual injunction. The suit was dismissed on contest. While filing the appeal, I.A.No.536 of 2020 was filed to condone delay of [1113] days in filing the appeal stating that he engaged another advocate to prosecute the case in appeal and that his file relating to the lower Court was misplaced by his previous counsel in his office and the same was traced recently before filing the petition, and therefore, the delay in filing the appeal is neither willful nor wanton.

3. The petition was opposed by filing counter of the respondent/plaintiff. The reasons stated for the delay are unsupported by any evidence and that the certified copy of the decree and judgment were obtained within a month after the pronouncement of judgment and it cannot be expected that the senior counsel appearing for the petitioner would misplace the bundle and the reasons to condone the delay are invented for the purpose of filing the petition and are not acceptable.

4. After hearing both parties, the appellate Court dismissed the petition observing that the delay of [1113] days is not properly explained by placing proper material to substantiate the cause for the delay.

5. Aggrieved by the order, this revision petition is filed.

6. Ms. V.V. Gnanusha, learned counsel representing the counsel for the petitioner submitted that when there are no mala fides in seeking to condone the delay nor is it dilatory strategy of the petitioner, a Court has to adopt a liberal approach in construing 'sufficient cause' for condoning the delay, however length the delay may be, just for the purpose of deciding the matter on merits rather than throwing it on technicalities. She further submitted that an opportunity can be given to the petitioner/appellant to contest the case by imposing costs to condone the delay, particularly because no third party interest was created till now and thereby, no prejudice would be caused to anybody including the respondents. She further submitted that there is no intention to drag on the appeal since the petitioner has interest in the property and would like to get the decision as early as possible. She placed reliance on the decision in N. Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy, AIR 1998 SUPREME COURT 3222, wherein at paras 9, 12 & 13 held as follows:

'9. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncontainable due to want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases delay of very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in regional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammeled by the conclusion of the lower court.

12. A Court knows that ref