The main legal point established in the judgment is that the Medical Council of India was not competent to make regulations contrary to the mandate of Article 15(4) of the Constitution, and that the State's legislation providing for reservation must be upheld.

( 1 ) THE appellant had filed W. P. No. 44138 of 1993 seeking to quash the communication No. MCI /34 (i) /93-Mad. 25059 dated 15-12-1993 issued by respondent-2 herein and to direct respondent-1, the Director, Sri Jayadeva Institute of Cardiology, Bangalore, to reserve one seat out of the three seats notified for selection of candidates to D. M. , Cardiology course commencing from 1-1-1994 for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and to admit him to the said course as against the reserved seat. He has also sought for an interim relief based on the above reliefs. That writ petition having been dismissed by the learned Single judge, by his order dated, 1-3-1994, the appellant has preferred this appeal seeking to set it aside on more than one grounds taken, in the appeal. The prayer in the writ appeal is as follows:-"wherefore this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to call for records in writ petition No. 44138 of 1993 on the file of this Hon'ble Court and set aside the order dated 1-3-1994 made therein and further be pleased to grant the relief sought in the writ petition by allowing this appeal with costs in the interests of justice. "

( 2 ) THEREFORE, the appellant filed an application (I. A. No. 1) under Section 151, C. P. C. , read with Art. 226 of the Constitution for interim relief as follows :-"wherefore it is prayed that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to issue appropriate directions to the first respondent to permit the appellant to attend the D. M. Course (Cardiology) at his risk, in the interest of justice. "

( 3 ) WE have heard Sri S. P. Shankar, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri M. R. Achar, learned counsel for respendent-1. Respondent-2 though served with the notice remained unrepresented.

( 4 ) AT the out-set, bringing to our notice the Karnataka Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other Backward Classes (Reservation of appointment etc.) Act, 1990 (Karnataka Act 7 of 1991) (hereinafter called the Act) which came into force on 1-6-1992, in particular sub-section (3) of Section 4 therefore, Sri Shankar submitted that the learned Single Judge was not aware of the Act though it was in force as on the date of his order and that therefore, he sought permission to address arguments in that behalf. He was permitted to do so.

( 5 ) AT this stage, it is necessary to extract sub-section (3) of Section 4 of the Act. It reads:" (3) Subject to such rules as may be prescribed; while making admissions, after the appointed day, to a course of study in University established or deemed to be established by or under any law of the State Legislature or an educational institution established or, maintained or aided by the State Government, there shall be made reservation for the persons belonging to the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes and other Backward Classes to such extent and in such manner as maybe prescribed. "xx xx xx

( 6 ) BASED on the above provisions, Sri Shankar argued that when the State had clearly provided for reservation of seats for persons belonging to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other Backward Classes in admission to Universities and to the educational institutions established or maintained or aided by the State Government to the extent and in accordance with the manner also provided by it, it was not open to respondent-1 to take a stand that there could not be any reservation out of three seats meant for D. M. Cardiology course in Entrance Examination to be held on 27-12-1993. He further, submitted that respondent-2 Medical Council of India was not competent to make any legislation or to take any decision that there cannot be any reservation in favour of persons belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the matter of admission to D. M. , in Cardiology and that merit alone should count, in the absence of such power conferred on it. With regard to the status of respondent-1, the learned counsel argued that it is an institution registered under the provisions of the