R. P. SETHI, C. J.

( 1 ) THE appellants while they were in the service of the first respondent as Assistant Security Supervisor in the Security Department of the Factory at Bangalore were issued charge sheets on 28th of July, 1984. They denied the allegations vide their reply dated 1-8-1984. The Deputy General manager ordered an inquiry as a sequence of which the appellants were dismissed as per the order dated 21-1-1986. The 1st respondent- management filed an application before the National Industrial Tribunal, bombay (hereinafter called the Tribunal) under Section 33 (2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short the Act) seeking approval for the action taken against the appellants. The application was rejected vide order dated 1-9-1987 on the ground that one month's back wages had not been tendered by the management as mandated under the provisions of the Act, the action was illegal. After the rejection of the application of the management, the appellants prayed for being taken back to duties, which was declined and they were told that effective orders would be passed and sent to them. On 9th of October, 1987 another order was passed dismissing the appellants from service. Another application was filed before the Tribunal seeking once again the approval in terms of the provisions of Section 33 (2xb) of the Act. Without recording any evidence, but on the basis of the documents filed the Tribunal vide its order dated 2nd of March, 1989 (Annexure-A) allowed the application by according approval to the action of the management in dismissing the appellants from service. Aggrieved by the action of the Tribunal, the appellants filed writ petitions, which were dismissed vide the order impugned in these appeals. While dismissing the writ petitions, the learned Single Judge however observed that the findings of the Tribunal would not operate as res judicata in a proceeding which may be initiated by the workman either under Section 10 or Section 33-A of the Act.

( 2 ) IT is contended on behalf of the appellants that the order underappeals was contrary to law and facts, as the learned Judge did not deal with all the contentions and objections raised in their petitions. The learned Single Judge is stated to have failed to notice that the rejection of the management's application seeking approval was a decision on merits and without taking the appellants back into service, the management could not have ventured to pass another order of dismissal seeking statutory approval. It is contended that without reinstating and allowing the appellants to work, the management continued to persist with the earlier order of dismissal passed against the appellants. It is contended that there could not be a second order of dismissal under the circumstances unless the appellants were taken back to work. It is further contended that despite the appellants having been kept under suspension from 4-5-1984 and without paying them full back wages, the management chose to terminate the service by paying them only one month's salary allegedly in terms of the provisions of Section 33 (2) (b) of the Act. The action of the respondents have been termed to be a unfair labour practice. The learned Single Judge is stated to have erred in making a distinction between a case where the approval application had been rejected on prima facie examination and where it was rejected on the ground of non-compliance with the proviso to Section 33 (2) (b) of the act. It is further contended that it was not correct to hold that the management was entitled to pass an order on the basis of the inquiry held, because such a liberty had not been obtained by the employer at the time of dismissal of the first application on the ground of non-compliance of proviso to Section 33 (2) (b) of the Act, It is further contended that the learned Judge was not justified to hold that there existed a prima facie case. In support of the order of dismissal of the appellants, a specific relianc

Click Here to Read the rest of this document