The appeal is filed against that portion of the common order allowing I.A. No. IV filed by respondent, who was the defendant before the Trial Court.

2. Sri H.S Dwarakanath, appearing for the appellant, would contend that the appellant is the plaintiff before the Trial Court. The plaintiff claims that he has put up structures over the suit land. The defendants sought to interfere with his possession and sought to demolish the structures and it is in this circumstances that the suit was filed along with I.A. No. II seeking an order of injunction restraining the respondents from interfering with his possession and I.A. No. III restraining them from demolishing the structures in the suit property. Respondent 2, who claimed as an agreement holder, to purchase a portion of the suit property, had, in turn, filed an application numbered as I.A. No. IV seeking a restraint against the appellant from putting up construction. The Trial Court granted both the applications in favour of the plaintiff, restraining the defendants from interfering with his possession and from demolishing the structures. However, the plaintiff was also restrained from carrying on with any construction activity on the suit property.

3. The appellant questions the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain LA No. IV at the instance of respondent 2. He relies on the judgment of this Court in G. Veerabhadrappa v Mayappa, wherein it has been held that it is only sub-clause (a) of Rule 1 of Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as 'CPC' for short) that any party could be restrained by means of an order of temporary injunction, which clearly presupposes that either the plaintiff or the defendant could file an application against either party under this particular sub-clause. Sub-clauses (b) and (c) of Order 39, Rule 1 of the CPC as also Order 39, Rule 2 of the CPC enable the Court to grant injunction against the defendant restraining the defendant from committing any acts mentioned therein. The words "any party" occurring in sub-clause (a) of Rule 1 of the CPC does not find a place in these rules Therefore, it is clear that it is only the plaintiff, who can seek redress against the defendant having regard to the plain meaning of the Rules. By no means is the defendant able to obtain an order of injunction under these very sub-rules, and therefore would contend, that as I.A No. IV filed by respondent 2 does not arise out of the pleadings of the appellant and that since the prayer was beyond the scope of the suit and since such a prayer was barred under Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, the defendants were not entitled for any relief, as the relief prayed for by respondent does not arise out of the same cause of action as that of the plaintiff and hence the Trial Court has committed an error.

4. Per contra, the Counsels for respondent 2 would seek to support the order of the Trial Court in I.A. No. IV.

5. To appreciate the contention of the appellant, the case-law cited by the appellant needs to b8 examined The facts in the case decided in the case of G. Veerabhadrappa, the suit was for specific performance of agreement During the pendency of the suit, the defendant filed an application seeking for grant of temporary injunction restraining the plaintiff from interfering with his possession. The application being' rejected, the same was carried in appeal before the Civil Judge, who set aside the order and granted an injunction in favour of the defendant, restraining the plaintiff from interfering with his possession. The plaintiff then preferred a revision petition, which was considered by this, Court. After examining sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC, this Court held that it is only under sub-clause (a) of Rule 1 of the CPC that the defendant could maintain an application and in the circumstances, spelt out thereunder, that the alleged circumstances pleaded by the defendant not falling under the s