The main legal point established in the judgment is that the provisions of the Limitation Act are not barred in respect of the appeal under the Domestic Violence Act, as the Domestic Violence Act does not prevent the application of any other law.

1. Whether Sub-section (3) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963 operates as a bar for filing the application under Section 5 of the said Act before the lower appellate court in respect of the proceedings under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, (‘Domestic Violence Act, 2005’ for short) is the question that has arisen in this petition.

2. Brief facts are that, the respondent herein being the wife of the petitioner, filed Crl. Misc.No. 1915/09 before the trial court under Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 seeking certain reliefs. The petitioner herein being the husband contested the said application and ultimately, the trial court by its order dated 19.06.2010, directed the petitioner herein to provide residence to the 1st respondent and in the event of the petitioner giving up his rights in the government quarters, he will have to provide alternative accommodation to his wife and the court further directed the petitioner to settle the home loan to the extent of this liability and the respondent-wife shall not be made liable towards the settlement of home loan. The court also directed the petitioner to give the benefits to his wife in the event of the petitioner resigning from his job. The trial court also passed an order subsequently on 22.06.10 following the additional affidavit filed by the complainant-wife and ordered that the order of maintenance passed earlier shall become absolute and gave direction to the drawing officer of the petitioner to directly remit the maintenance amount to the court.

3. The petitioner being aggrieved by the order dated 19.06.10, preferred an appeal before the lower appellate court under Section 29 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 and also filed an application seeking condonation of delay in preferring the appeal by contending that the delay of 7 days in preferring the appeal was for bonafide reasons and therefore, the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act be allowed.

4. Learned Judge of the lower appellate court dismissed the I.A. filed seeking condonation of delay in preferring the appeal as not maintainable and consequently, the appeal Ws also dismissed. It is this order of the lower appellate court that is called in question by the husband in this revision petition.

5. Sr. S.S.Koti, learned Counsel for the revision petitioner submitted that the lower appellate court committed error in holding that Section 5 of the Limitation Act has no application to the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 and it has observed that Section 29 of the Limitation Act is a bar to present an application under Section 5 of the said Act. The lower appellate court though has observed in the course of its order that there is only six or seven days delay, the reasons given by the lower appellate court for dismissing the I.A. filed therefore cannot be sustained in law, particularly having regard to the provisions contained in the Limitation Act as well as in the Domestic Violence Act, 2005. In support of the said contentions, reliance is placed on the following decisions:-

1976(2) SCR S.C.260,ILR 2010 KAR 249, ILR 1987 KAR 2844, J.T.2000 (5) S.C. 389, AIR 2008 SCW 5692 & 2010 (2) KCCR 1114.

6. On the other hand, submission of Sri.G.R.Gurumath, learned Counsel for the respondent is that the lower appellate court committed no error in holding that the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not maintainable and learned Counsel drew my attention in this regard to Sub-section (3) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act to contend that save as otherwise provided in any law for the time being in force with respect to marriage and divorce, nothing in the Limitation Act shall apply to any suit or other proceeding under any such law. Therefore, it is argued that by virtue of Sub-section (3), Sub-section (2) of Section 29 also will have to be ruled out and the view taken by the lower appellate court therefore is the correct view. In this connection, lear