2012 Supreme(Kar) 386
High Court of Karnataka
ARAVIND KUMAR, J.
M.M. Narayana & Others
Versus
The Management of KSRTC & Others
W.P. Nos. 24118-120 of 2009, 504 of 2012, 10333 of 2012, 10219 of 2012, 6060 of 2012, 6016 of 2012, 47896 of 2011 & 3729 of 2012 (L-KSRTC)
Decided on : 13-07-2012
For the Appellants:V.S. Naik, Ms. Manjula N. Kulkarni, L. Shekar, B.L. Sanjeev, K.S. Bharath Kumar, Advocates.
For the Respondents:Smt. Shwetha Anand, M.S. Narayan, H.R. Renuka, L. Govindaraj, Advocates.
Headnote:INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947 - Sections 33(2)(b),Proviso & 33-A: [Aravind Kumar, J] Approval under - In case of non compliance to the section or approval being rejected the dismissal or discharge of the workmen would be of no effect and workmen concerned would continue to be in service as if there was no discharge or dismissal. The workmen in such a case will be entitled to continuity in service and all consequential benefits with full back wages. In case of violation of Section 33(2) (b), the workman can make a complaint in writing under Section 33-A and lodge with the Authority before whom an industrial dispute is pending. He need not take recourse to Section 10 of the Act.
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947 - Section 33(2) (b) proviso: [Aravind Kumar, J] Discharge/dismissal of workman - Mandatory approval not sought by management under S. 33(2)(b) - Effect - Order of discharge or dismissal would be non est and void.
An employer who does not file an application and seek approval of the Court/Tribunal etc., before whom such dispute is pending, under section 33(2)(b) such employer cannot be relieved of his statutory obligation created under the Act on the ground the aggrieved workman can pursue his grievance by filing a complaint under Section 33A since such interpretation would lead to the very intent of the legislature in incorporation the said proviso being negated.
Proviso to Section 33(2)(b) casts a mandatory obligation or duty on an employer to file an application/petition and seek approval of the authority or the Labour Court as the case may be, by seeking its approval the order of discharge or dismissal passed against the workman. It is an independent provision by itself or in other words it is a Code by itself.
Hence, non-compliance of said provision by a employer visits him with penal consequences and as such Section 33(2)(b) has to be understood as mandatory and non-compliance of said mandatory provision would result in order of dismissal or discharge being non est.
Therefore, an order of discharge or dismissal passed against a workman without obtaining approval under Section 33(2)(b) would be non est. If the management/employer does not seek approval of Board, Arbitrator, Court/Tribunal etc., as required under Section 33(2)(b) on the ground that such aggrieved workman has a remedy under section 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act it would not validate such order of discharge of dismissal and in such cases order of discharge or dismissal would be non est and void. AIR 1962 SC 1500 AND AIR 2002 SC 643, Rel. on.
1. In W.P.Nos.24118-120/2009, 504/2012, 10333/2012 and 10219/2012 workmen have called in question the award passed by the Labour Court whereunder claim petitions filed by the workmen has been dismissed.
2. W.P.Nos.6060/2012, 6016/2012, 47896/2011 and 3729/2012 have been filed by Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation and Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation (both are referred to as 'Corporation' hereafter for the sake of brevity) questioning the awards passed by the Labour Court whereunder the claim petitions filed by the workmen have been allowed and orders of punishment of dismissal have been set aside as nonest on the ground that management has failed to take into consideration the pendency of I.D. 148/2005 and not complied with the provision of Section 33(2)(b) Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 by relying upon the judgment of the Honourable Apex Court reported in the case of Jaipur Zilla Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd., and Ram Gopal Sharma and Others reported in (2002) I LLJ 834.
3. I have heard the arguments addressed by the learned advocates appearing for the parties. On behalf of the corporations Sri. S. N. Murthy, learned Senior Counsel has led the argument and Smt. Shwetha Anand also appearing for Corporation has supported same and also has supplemented her arguments. Sri. V. S. Naik and Sri. L. Shekar, learned Advocates have argued on behalf of the workmen.
4. It is the contention of Sri. S. N. Murthy, learned Senior counsel appearing for the corporation that if there is a contravention or non compliance of section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 there is a remedy available to such aggrieved workman namely such workman can approach the Authority, Court or Tribunal as the case may be under section 33A which is a special provision for adjudication of contravention of section 33(2)(b) by an employer, that too during the pendency of proceedings before Conciliation officer, Board, Arbitrator, Labour court, Tribunal and as such mere noncompliance of section 33(2) (b) would not result in the order of discharge or dismissal being nonest and if it is to be so construed then section 33A would become superfluous or in the alternate it becomes redundant. He would further submit that if an employer contravenes the provisions of section 33 during the pendency of the proceedings before Conciliation officer, Board, Arbitrator, Labour court, Tribunal, the workmen aggrieved by such contravention if any has to make complaint in writing to the authority prescribed under said section and such workmen cannot contend that award passed by the Labour court pursuant to such order of discharge or dismissal is nonest on account of employer not obtaining approval or the same being nonest on said ground. He would elaborate his submissions by contending that as on the date of order of dismissal passed in these cases the corporation has followed the law that was existing as on the said date namely the judgment of Hon Tote Apex Court in the case of M/s. Punjab Beverages Pvt. Ltd., Chnadigarh Versus Suresh Chand and another reported in AIR 1978 SC 995 which was holding the field and contends that in the instant cases workmen should have reported for duty if the order was nonest and admittedly these workmen did not choose to report for duty on the ground that order of dismissal being nonest and as such he contends now the workmen cannot take shelter under section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act to assail the order of dismissal as bad in law on the ground it is nonest. Supporting the arguments of Sri. S. N. Murthy, Smt. Shwetha An and, learned counsel who is also appearing for the corporation would submit that it has to be seen as to whether I.D. 148/2005 is an "Industrial Dispute" or not so as to cast a burden on the employer to obtain permission from said Tribunal when a workman is discharged or dismissed as required under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act. She also contends that section 33(2) (b) is not at all attra