The main legal point established in the judgment is that acquisition proceedings initiated under the repealed Act of 1894 after the coming into force of the Act of 2013 are illegal, invalid, and void-ab-initio.

JUDGMENT :

1. In this writ petition, the petitioner has sought for the following reliefs :

"a. Issue writ of certiorari quashing 4(1) notification published in official gazette dated 06.02.2014 vide Annexure-A;

b. Issue writ of certiorari quashing 6(1) notification published in official gazette dated 09.04.2015 vide Annexure-T;

ba. Issue a writ of certiorari to quash the award dated 10.04.2017 passed by the 2nd respondent at Annexure-W;

c. Issue such other writ or direction as this Hon' ble Court deems fit to serve the ends of justice and equity.

d. Award costs of this writ petition."

2. Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and learned HCGP for respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and learned counsel for respondent No.4. Perused the material on record.

3. The material on record indicates that the petitioners claim to be the owners of the subject land which was notified for acquisition by the respondents vide preliminary notification dated 06.02.2014 published in the official gazette pursuant to which the respondents also issued the final notification dated 09.04.2015 which was also published in the official gazette which was followed by the impugned award dated 10.04.2017. In addition to the other contentions urged on behalf of the petitioners, it is their specific contention that the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (for short 'the said Act of 2013') came into force with effect from 01.01.2014 and Section 114 of the said Act of 2013 expressly repealed the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short 'the said Act of 1894'). It is contended that upon coming into force of the said Act of 2013, the respondents were not entitled or authorized to take steps to acquire the subject lands under the said Act of 1894 which had been expressly repealed and all acquisition proceedings initiated after 01.01.2014 would have to be done only under the said Act of 2013 and not by the repealed Act of 1894. In this context, learned counsel for the petitioners invited my attention to the impugned preliminary notification published on 06.02.2014 and the final notification dated 09.04.2015 followed by the impugned award dated 10.04.2017 in order to contend that the impugned notifications and award which are purported to have been issued under the Repealed Act of 2013 were without jurisdiction or authority of law and that the same deserve to be quashed.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioners also submitted that though the preliminary notification is said to have been dated 31.12.2013 prior to 01.01.2014 when the said Act of 2013 came into force, the preliminary notification took effect only on 06.02.2014 when it was published in the official gazette as can be seen from the said notification and consequently after 01.01.2014, it was not open for the respondents to issue a preliminary notification under Section 4(1) of the said Act of 1894 which had been expressly repealed by the said Act of 2013 in the light of the express language employed in Section 4(1) of the said Act of 1894. In this context, reliance is placed on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Urban Improvement Trust, Udaypur Vs. Bheru Lal and others (2002) 2 KLJ 201.

5. Per contra, in addition to reiterating the various contentions urged in the statement of objections, learned HCGP submits that a perusal of the preliminary notification will indicate that the same was issued on 31.12.2013 prior to the coming into force of the said Act of 2013 with effect from 01.01.2014 and consequently by virtue of Section 114(2) of the said Act of 2013 r/w Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, the acquisition proceedings pursuant to the preliminary notification dated 31.12.2013 were perfectly valid and legal and the present writ petitions are liable to be dismissed.

6. While considering the scope and ambit of Sec.4 and 6 of the said Act of 1894, the apex Court in the aforesaid case of Urban Improvement Trust supra, has held that a publication