The main legal point established in the judgment is that the respondent's prima facie case and the balance of convenience justified the granting of the temporary injunction, and the purchase of a property by the husband in the name of the wife did not constitute a benami transaction in this case.

JUDGMENT :

1. This appeal is filed by the defendant in O.S.No.29/2021 on the file of Prl. Sr. Civil Judge, Puttur. The appellant has questioned the correctness of the order dated 18.11.2021 on I.A.2.

2. I.A.2 is an application filed by the respondent under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC being the plaintiff in the suit for restraining the appellant-defendant from alienating plaint ‘A’ and ‘B’ schedule properties. The respondent is the husband of the appellant and it is his case that he purchased plaint ‘A’ and ‘B’ schedule properties in the name of his wife when he was serving in Indian Army as a Subedhar. He borrowed money from a bank for purchasing one of the properties and that he himself was repaying the loan though the loan was obtained in the name of his wife. When he learnt that the appellant was about to sell away the properties, he brought the suit claiming declaration of title over the properties and ancillary relief of permanent injunction. Along with the plaint, he made an application for temporary injunction to restrain the appellant from alienating the properties and as it stood allowed by the impugned order, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant.

3. The appellant does not dispute that she is the wife of the respondent, what she has contended is that she purchased the properties from her money without the aid of the respondent. She admits that the respondent made some payments towards loan installments and submits that over time, he stopped making payments. The loan has not been cleared yet and that she has school going children. She has found it difficult to maintain the family without any help from the plaintiff and in this view she has got every right to dispose of the properties for the benefit of the family.

4. Heard the arguments of Sri. K. Ravishankar, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri. Chandranath Ariga, learned counsel for the respondent.

5. Sri. K. Ravishankar argued that the trial court should not have granted an order of temporary injunction when apparently the suit appears to be highly time barred. He referred to para 14 of the plaint and submitted that therein it is clearly written that the cause of action of the suit arose on 18.6.2012, again on 24.11.2017 and then on 1.6.2021. Once the cause of action arises, it begins to run and it never stops. Therefore from 18.6.2012, the suit should have been filed within three years according to Article 58 of the Limitation Act. Thus the suit is time barred.

5.1. It was his second line of argument that the respondent claims to have purchased the properties in the name of his wife. But the fact remains that the wife has got independent income. No document is produced to show that the respondent made payment of the sale consideration. He might have paid some money towards loan installments, but by that itself he cannot claim right over the property. Even otherwise according to Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, the appellant becomes the absolute owner of the property and in this view she has every right to alienate the property. Since the respondent has neglected to maintain the wife and his children, there is absolute dearth for money and the wife is compelled to alienate the property for the maintenance of the family. In these circumstances the trial court should not have granted injunction. The respondent has failed to make out prima facie case. Balance of convenience lies in favour of the appellant. In support of his argument he placed reliance on the judgment of Co-ordinate Bench of this court in the case of R.Dilip Kumar Vs. S. Ramu (ILR 1992 Kar. 2905).

6. On the other hand Sri. K. Chandranath Ariga for the respondent argued that the cause of action for the suit actually arose when the respondent learnt that the appellant was attempting to sell the properties. The date of cause of action should be taken as 1.6.2021, not 18.6.2012 and 24.11.2017, which are the dates of execution of the sale deeds. The suit is not time barred.

6.1. His