IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, KALABURAGI BENCH
MOHAMMAD NAWAZ, K.S. HEMALEKHA, JJ.
Basappa, S/o. Channabasappa Biradar, Since Deceased Through Lrs : Sanganagouda, (S/o. Late Basappagouda Biradar) and Ors. – Appellants
Versus
Land Tribunal, Basavanabagewadi Vijayapura District, (Earlier Bijapur District) Represented By Its Chairman and Ors. – Respondents
Writ Appeal No.200296 of 2017 (KLR-RR/SUR)
Decided On : 25-06-2025
JUDGMENT :
(K.S. HEMALEKHA, J.)
This intra Court appeal is preferred by the petitioner in W.P.No.81521/2012 challenging the order dated 21.08.2017, whereby the writ petition was dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. The petitioner in the writ petition sought to challenge the order passed by the Land Tribunal dated 10.10.1979 passed in TNCSR No.660.
2. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellant and learned Government Advocate for respondent Nos.1, 2 and 4. The private respondents are not served in this writ appeal.
3. The appellant claims to be a tenant of an agricultural land bearing Survey No.132/2, measuring 10 acres 33 guntas of Kudli Salawadagi village, Tq. Basavana Bagewadi, Dist. Vijayapur (hereinafter referred to as the ‘petition land’ for short). He filed Form No.7 under the provisions of Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961. His application seeking occupancy rights came to be rejected by the Tribunal on 10.10.1979.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that the order of dismissal passed by the Tribunal in the year 1979 was not communicated to the appellant/petitioner. It is contended that appellant’s name appeared in the revenue records from 1971-72 and he has remained in peaceful possession of the petition land. Learned counsel contends that the appellant only became aware of dismissal order of the Land Tribunal in the month of February, 2012 after which he approached the Court by filing writ petition. He argues that the concept of “sufficient cause” as provided in law must be interpreted liberally to allow Courts to do substantial justice, particularly when procedural delays are not intentional or negligent.
5. The contesting private respondents before the Writ Court filed objections, categorically denying the appellant’s claim and asserted that the appellant is the brother of deceased Bhimanagouda, and the father of the appellant had already taken his share in the joint family properties. It was contended that the land in question was allotted to Bhimanagouda and therefore, the appellant’s claim over the petition land is false and baseless. Further, that the Land Tribunal, in its order dated 10.10.1979 specifically found that the petitioner failed to produce any documentary evidence in support of his claim of tenancy.
6. Before the Writ Court, attention was drawn to the order sheet of the Land Tribunal dated 10.10.1979, wherein it was clearly recorded that the appellant/petitioner was present before the Land Tribunal and his statement was recorded on the very day i.e., 10.10.1979 and therefore, it was contended that the petitioner’s claim that he was unaware of the Land Tribunal's order until February, 2012 was rejected, as unbelievable.
7. The learned Government Advocate supporting his contention in the Writ Court submits that the original records of the Land Tribunal was examined by the Writ Court and the learned Single Judge observed that the appellant was present during the hearing before the Land Tribunal on 10.10.1979 and had participated in the proceedings.
8. Learned Single Judge relying upon the original records of the Land Tribunal produced before the Court, concluded that the appellant had knowledge about the Land Tribunal's order as early as 10.10.1979. Given the long delay of 34 years, and absence of any convincing explanation, the learned Single Judge held that the appellant has failed to establish “sufficient cause” for condonation of delay. Further, to condone the delay is discretionary and justice has to be balanced keeping in mind the rights of both parties and taking into account the facts and circumstances of the case, dismissed the writ petition on the ground of delay and laches.
9. The private respondents have not been served in this appeal, the learned Government Advocate accepts notice on behalf of the respondent Nos.1, 2 and 4/State. Learned Government Advocate submits that the writ petition is rightly dismissed on the ground of inordinate delay and laches. It is submitted that
Delay and laches in legal claims; Courts dismiss inordinate delay which prejudices other parties, emphasizing the necessity of prompt action in asserting rights.
The court emphasized the importance of timely action in legal proceedings, ruling that significant delays undermine claims of being unheard and warrant dismissal.
Point of Law : Limitation - Delay/Latches - Doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity cannot be said to be a technical doctrine and has to be examined on peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. D....
Inordinate delay in seeking relief can bar a petition under Article 226, emphasizing the principle of laches and the need for timely action by litigants.
The principle that delay and laches may result in the refusal of relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
The doctrine of delay and laches bars stale claims in writ petitions, emphasizing timely action for relief.
Delay and laches bar relief in writ jurisdiction as per established legal principles.
Inordinate delay in filing appeal lacks satisfactory explanation, mandating dismissal under principles of delay and laches, emphasizing that delay defeats equity.
Point of Law : Doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in ....
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