The right to free speech does not exempt individuals from civil liability for defamatory statements, especially when additional remarks beyond a complaint are made public.

ORDER :

M.NAGAPRASANNA, J.

The petitioner is before this Court calling in question an order dated 13-12-2024 passed by the XXXV Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru on I.A.No.7 filed by defendant No.1 under Order VII Rule 11(a) of the CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE in O.S.No.7586 of 2023 seeking rejection of the plaint.

2. Facts in brief, germane are as follows:-

Respondents 1 to 4 who are the plaintiffs institute a suit in O.S.No.7586 of 2023 seeking permanent injunction against the defendants in the suit and also seeking restraint from making any statement or any publication that would be defamatory or in effect tarnish the image of the plaintiffs. After issuance of notice, the present petitioner/defendant No.1 in the said suit files an application under Order VII Rule 11(a) of the CPC seeking rejection of the plaint, on the score that the plaint does not even divulge any cause of action and what are the statements that are defamatory are not indicated in the plaint averments. The concerned Court, in terms of its order dated 13-12-2024, rejects the application on the score that the plaintiffs have rightly filed the suit for permanent injunction and the plaint discloses cause of action. It is this order that has driven the 1^st defendant to this Court in the subject petition.

3. Heard Sri A.C. Chethan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri Rohan Tigadi, learned counsel appearing for respondents 1 to 4.

4. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would vehemently contend that plaintiff No.1 is the Minister for Women and Child Development, Government of Karnataka and other plaintiffs are senior officers of the Department. The 1^st defendant is the Advocate/petitioner who files a complaint before the Lokayukta alleging corruption in the Department to the tune of ₹600/- crores committed by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs immediately file a suit for injunction to stop the defendants from defaming them. The 1^st defendant/petitioner files an application seeking rejection of the plaint on the ground that it does not divulge any cause of action. The learned counsel would submit that the complaint and the complaint allegations filed before the Lokayukta were projected in a press-conference. Nothing beyond the complaint was spoken. The plaintiffs will always have a remedy to file a suit for malicious prosecution in case the Lokayukta holds that the complaint so registered is false. Reporting the contents of the complaint and the allegations mentioned therein cannot mean they would become defamation. The trial, in the civil suit, will be parallel to what the investigation is being conducted by the Lokayukta. On all these grounds, the learned counsel submits that plaint must be rejected.

5. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents 1 to 4/plaintiffs would vehemently refute the submissions in contending that free speech under Article 19 of the Constitution does not foreclose civil suits for defamation. A tort of a malicious prosecution, again, does not foreclose a suit for defamation. The proceedings before the Lokayukta have no bearing on maintainability of the suit. The scope of inquiry, in both these proceedings, are entirely different. The plaint discloses cause of action and the suit is maintainable. The order of the concerned Court does not warrant any interference.

6. The learned counsel for the petitioner would join issue to contend that none of the contentions advanced by the petitioner, even taking the Court through the plaint averments, borne consideration at the hands of the concerned Court. Therefore, the matter must be set aside on that score as well.

7. I have given my anxious con