SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Audio Icon Pause Audio Icon
judgment-img

1995 Supreme(Bom) 67

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Dr. Saraf B.P. Trivedi D.K., JJ.
Technova Graphic Systems Private Limited .... Applicant.
Versus
Commissioner of Sales Tax.... Respondent.
Sales Tax Reference No. 42 of 1990 in Reference Application No. 86 of 1989, decided on 2-2-1995.
Advocates appeared :
P.V. Surte, for applicant.
M.V. Siodia, for respondent.

Headnote:Section 2 (17)-Scope of.

       The polyester films did not lose its original character despite the process of lacquering. In fact, the Tribunal has also recorded a categorical finding to the very same effect but held the lacquered film to be different and distinct from the original polyester film Only in view of the definition of "manufacture" in Section 2 (17) of the Act which is couched in very wide terms.

       Considering the nature of the process undertaken by the assessee on the polyester film in the instant case and the effect thereof on the nature, use and description of the commodity in the trade, the lacquering of polyester films does not amount to "manufacture" within the meaning of Section 2 (17) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act 1959. There is no essential difference in identity between polyester film and the lacquered polyester film. Polyester film remains polyester film despite application of the process of lacquering.

       

JUDGMENT - Dr. SARAF B.P., J.:---By this reference under section 61(1) of the Bombay Sales Tax, 1959, the Mahararshtra Sales Tax Tribunal has referred the following question of law to this Court for opinion at the instance of the assessee:

"Whether the Tribunal was justified in holding that lacquering of polyester film amounts to manufacture within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959 and it results into a different commercial commodity?"

2. The assessee M/s. Technova Graphic Systems carries on the business of buying polyester films and selling the same after subjecting it to the process of lacquering. On 26th November, 1987, the assessee made an application under section 52(1)(b) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959 ("the Act") to the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Admn.) seeking determination of the question whether subjecting the polyester film to the chemical process of lacquering amounts to manufacture within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act. The contention of the assessee before the Deputy Commissioner was that the process of lacquering did not amount to manufacture. The Deputy Commissioner (Admn.) however did not accept this contention of the assessee and held that the said process amounted to manufacture as, according to him, lacquered polyester film was a difficult commercial commodity than polyester film. Aggrieved by the above order of the Deputy Commissioner, the assessee appealed to the Maharashtra Sales Tax Tribunal (Tribunal"). The case of the assessee before the Tribunal was that despite the process of lacquering, polyester film remained polyester film and no new commercial commodity emerged as a result thereof. Hence, the process of lacquering could not be held to be "manufacture". The contention of the revenue, on the other hand, was that the definition of "manufacture" contained in section 2(17) of the Act was wide enough to embrace within its scope and ambit the process of lacquering. According to the revenue, on being subjected to the process of lacquering, the nature and character of polyester film underwent a change, and a new commodity known as lacquered polyester film emerged as a result thereof. In support of this contention, reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in (Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Dunken Coffee Manufacturing Company)1, 1975(35) S.T.C. 493. The Tribunal accepted the contention of the revenue and held that the process of lacquering amounted to "manufacture" within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Act. Hence his reference at the instance of the assessee.

3. We have carefully perused the order of the Tribunal and considered the rival submissions of the Counsel for the parties. So far as the interpretation of the definition of "manufacture" contained in section 2(17) of the Act is concerned, it is now well-settled by the decision of the Supreme Court in (State of Maharashtra v. Shiv Datt and Sons)2, 1992(84) S.T.C. 497 that only such of the processes referred to in the definition of "manufacture" given in section 2(17) of the Act and applied to the goods as are of such a character as to have an impact on the nature of the goods would amount to "manufacture". In the above decision, the Supreme Court made it clear that though the words used in the definition of "manufacture" were wide enough, limitation has to be put on the said words so that manufacture can be said to take place only when there is some alteration in the nature or character of the goods as a result of the process applied to the same. It was observed that if the definition of manufacture is given such wide interpretation as is sought to be given by the revenue, absurd results may flow therefrom. For instance, the definition includes ornamenting. If a dealer purchases certain goods and merely adds some decorative material thereto, according to the state's interpretation, there will be a manufacture. Similarly, if a car is purchased and some latest or some special gadgets are added the






































Click Here to Read the rest of this document

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
logo-black

An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers

Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance

qr

Scan Me!

India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!

For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :

whatsapp-icon Back to top