ORAL JUDGMENT :- Heard. Rule. By consent, the rule is made returnable forthwith.

2. The petitioner challenges the judgment and order dated 13th October, 2006 passed by the Industrial Court at Kolhapur, in Revision Application (ULP) No. 25 of 2004. The challenge to the impugned judgment and order is restricted to the permission granted to the respondent/employer to lead additional evidence consequent to the findings arrived at by the Labour Court about the inquiry being vitiated.

3. The learned advocate appearing for the petitioner, while drawing attention to the decisions of the Apex Court in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. vs. Ludh Budh Singh, reported in AIR 1972 SC 1031, Shankar Chakravarti vs. Britannia Biscuit Co. Ltd. and anr., reported in AIR 1979 SC 1652, Shambhu Nath Goyal vs. Bank of Baroda and ors., reported in AIR 1984 SC 289, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation vs. Lakshmidevamma (Smt.) and anr., reported in 2001 (II) CLR 640, submitted that the Industrial Court has failed to consider that the decision about the refusal of permission to the employee to amend the written statement in relation to the right to lead additional evidence had attained finality consequent to the earlier order of the Industrial Court and thereby acted illegally in directing the Labour Court to grant permission to the respondent-employer to lead additional evidence by the impugned order. The Industrial Court, in effect, by the impugned order has set aside and reviewed its earlier order passed in another revision application between the same parties and arising out of same proceedings. In fact, the earlier order had attained finality, and therefore, it could not have been subjected to reconsideration in the present revision application, nor in the circumstances the decision of the Apex Court in Divyash Pandit vs. Management, NCCBM, reported in (2005) 2 SCC 684 was attracted.

4. The learned advocate appearing for the respondents, on the other hand, placing reliance in the decisions of the Apex Court in The Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. vs. Shri G.K. Patankar and anr., reported in (1976)1 SCC 810 and Bharat Forge Co. Ltd. vs. A.B. Zodge and anr., reported in (1996)4 SCC 374, has submitted that the Industrial Court, having found that the Labour Court ought to have given an opportunity to the respondent-bank to establish the charges which were levelled against the petitioner-complainant consequent to its finding about the inquiry being vitiated, has directed to exercise the power in terms of section llA of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and in that context, it cannot be said to have reviewed its earlier order passed in another revision application. In fact, it has followed the decision of the Apex Court in Divyash Pandit's case (supra), and to that extent, a substantial justice has been done which would not warrant interference in exercise of powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

5. The Industrial Court, after taking into consideration the decisions of the Apex Court in Workmen of Motipur Sugar Factory (Pvt.) Ltd. vs. Motipur Sugar Factory, reported in 27 FJR 376, Cooper Engineering Ltd. vs. P. P. Munde, reported in (1975) 48 FIR 152 and K.S.R.T.C.'s case (supra) as well as Divyash Pandit's case (supra), has held thus :-

“In the case in hand, the Bank had preferred an application at Exh.C-34 for making an amendment in the Written-statement but, the same was disallowed. The said order was confirmed by the Industrial Court. Thereafter, the Labour Court after considering entire material on record, came to the findings that the enquiry was non-est. The facts of the case warranted that the Labour Court should have given one opportunity to the petitioner Bank to establish the charges before delivery of the Judgment in favour of the Complainant. This aspect was never considered by the Labour Court when it concluded that the enquiry was non-est. Divyash Pandit's case cited (supra) makes it amply clear that even if, the man

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