R.C. CHAVAN, J. :- Rule. Rule is made returnable forthwith and is heard by consent of parties.

2. This appeal raises the following short question:

"Whether the Collector deciding an appeal under section 137 of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 can condone under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 the delay in preferring such an appeal?"

3. Facts, which gave rise to the controversy, have been elaborately enumerated in the erudite judgment of the learned Single Judge, who dismissed appellant's Writ Petition No. 4962 of 2006. The appellant was called upon to pay a sum of Rs. 46,11,394.80 towards the arrears of excise duty by demand notice dated 23-6-2003. The appellant preferred appeal under section 137 of the Bombay Prohibition Act on 10-6-2005 challenging the said demand notice. The period prescribed for filing an appeal under section 137(1) of the Bombay Prohibition Act expired on 25-8-2003 and thus the appeal had been filed substantially after the prescribed period was over. The appellant sought condonation of delay in preferring the appeal. The Collector held that there was no provision authorizing him to condone delay and, therefore, rejected the application for condonation of delay and consequently disposed of the appeal. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant filed a writ petition before this Court, which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge by his judgment dated 21-12-2006.

4. It is the appellant's contention that a Collector entertaining an appeal under section 137(1) of the Bombay Prohibition Act functions judicially and, therefore, while performing such judicial functions, could have recourse to the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act in view of the provisions of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. The appellant contends that the Collector was obliged to decide the question of condonation of delay on merits. According to the appellant, there are several statutes, which provide for appeals to various authorities other than the Courts, where time-limits within which appeals can be preferred are prescribed, and if a rigid view regarding such time-limit is taken, without leaving the authority with any power to condone delay, even in a fit case, the parties would be left without remedy. According to the appellant, the learned Single Judge ought to have appreciated this aspect of the matter and should have held that the Collector had the power to condone delay while entertaining appeal under section 137 of the Bombay Prohibition Act.

5. Upon notice, the respondents appeared through the learned AGP. We have heard both Shri P. C. Madkholkar, learned Advocate for the appellant, and Smt. B. H. Dangre, learned AGP for respondents. Both the learned Advocates painstakingly took us through several decisions relevant for resolving the controversy, crafted their submissions and marshalled their arguments powerfully enough to underline the truism that advocacy is an art of reconciling the irreconcilable.

6. The contention of Shri P. C. Madkholkar, learned Advocate for the appellant, that the party should not be made to lose the remedy for technical reasons, though attractive, does not imply that a party, who is not vigilant about his own right, must be shown indulgence in the matter of enforcement of remedies. It is not that the statutory appeal provided under section 137 of the Bombay Prohibition Act is to be instantly filed after the demand notice is received. A period of sixty days has been given to enable to party to prefer appeal. This period {s reasonable and would take care of the normal vicissitudes in life. Therefore, it is not that by prescribing a statutory limit or seeking to religiously enforce it, the State intends to deprive the citizens of remedies available. The question is whether the indulgence available to a litigant before a Civil Court, by invoking provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act, could be indiscriminately extended to parties before all authorities exercising statutory powers.

7.